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Abstract
The quality of healthcare is low in developing countries. In this dissertation,
I examine two di erent proposals to improve healthcare quality: improve
customer information regarding healthcare choices, or enroll individuals in
health insurance.
In Chapter 1, I present results from an audit study conducted in Uganda.
I compare the price paid and the drug quality received between shoppers in
the same village who either ask for a diagnosis (or declare the patient has
malaria) or ask for a drug recommendation (or ask for a specific product.
I find that shoppers who present information about either the diagnosis or
recommended treatment pay approximately $0.18 (5 percent) less. Counter-
intuitively, I find that customers who present information about either the
diagnosis or the recommended treatment are 3.4 percentage points more likely
to be sold a substandard drug. I develop a conceptual model to justify my
findings and conclude that improved information will not improve quality
in a market if information and detection of low quality are not su ciently
related.
xiii
In Chapter 2, coauthored with Esther Atukunda, we present descriptive
analyses from the same data collected in Uganda. We combine data from drug
outlets, covert shoppers, and real customers to test hypotheses of how low
quality drugs enter a market. We estimate that only 3.4 percent of purchased
drugs are substandard: a much higher drug quality than found in previous
studies. We develop three stylized facts: substandard medicines are typically
diluted high-quality medicines; customers cannot tell which drugs are low
quality; and vendors are complicit in the sale. We end with a discussion of
policy interventions.
In Chapter 3, coauthored with Rebecca Thornton, I present results from
an experiment conducted in Nicaragua that randomly allocated health insur-
ance subsidies to parents. We specifically examine di erential e ects among
children who were part of an insured household, but ineligible for health
insurance themselves due to an age restriction. Our results indicate that
the health insurance significantly increases access to higher-quality providers
and altered the entire family’s health demands. In particular, eligible, in-
sured children substantially increase healthcare utilization, while ineligible
children in insured households decrease healthcare visits.
xiv
Chapter 1: Do Informed
Consumers Reduce the Price
and Prevalence of Counterfeit
Drugs? Evidence from the
Antimalarial Market
1.1 Introduction
Because they possess superior information on their products and services,
healthcare providers have substantial power to influence the treatment choices
of patients (Arrow, 1963). Although patients expect healthcare providers to
advise treatments to maximize patient well-being, providers may instead use
this information advantage to increase profits. For example, providers may
selectively increase prices, advise unnecessary services, or substitute lower
1
quality products or services for unsuspecting customers due to conflicts of
interest. This situation is possible because healthcare is an experience good:
patients only realize the good’s quality after it is consumed, and not at the
point of purchase (Darby and Karni, 1973). To correct the resulting asym-
metric information and improve market e ciency, a commonly advocated
policy recommendation is to educate and empower patients or customers.
In this paper, I test a key assumption behind this policy approach. Does
increased customer information improve customer well-being?
Asymmetric information may contribute to the widespread prevalence of
low-quality healthcare in developing countries. Existing evidence suggests
that the quality of healthcare services is low, particularly among the poor
and uneducated (Das and Hammer, 2014). In addition, recent work has
found that low quality drugs are also prevalent. According to a recent meta-
analysis, approximately one-third of antimalarial medications in sub-Saharan
Africa are of “low-quality,” a catch-all term ranging from falsified to counter-
feit to unregistered but e ective generics (Nayyar et al., 2012).1 Low-quality
drugs represent wasted consumer expenditures, may delay or interfere with
individuals obtaining e ective treatment, and also increase drug-resistance
(Okeke et al., 1999).
This paper presents estimates of how providers adjust price and qual-
1It should be noted that the imprecise terminology contributes to the apparent increase
in counterfeit drug rates over time. For example, debates over language with respect
to counterfeit medicines have postponed the enactment of international agreements on
low-quality drug sales. It is feared that restricting counterfeit, ine ective drugs may
inadvertently restrict access to e ective generic formulations.
2
ity when customers have relatively more information about their purchases.
Existing research has focused on comparing the prices paid and services re-
ceived by experts compared to the general population (i.e., situations with
symmetric information) or how public releases of information a ect supplier
behavior. For example, Johnson and Rehavi (2014) estimate how providers
respond to an exogenous change in financial incentives by comparing dif-
ferences in caesarean section rates following a change in reimbursements at
HMO hospitals when physician-patients give birth compared to when non-
physician patients give birth.2 Related literature in non-healthcare markets
with “experts” finds similar di erences between prices paid by experts and
the general population.3 For example, Levitt and Syverson (2008) show that
real estate agents sell their own homes for higher prices and Bronnenberg
et al. (2014) show that, for a variety of products, experts choose lower-priced
equivalent products compared to regular customers. The provider response
to publicly available information to consumers, such as healthcare “report
cards”, finds more mixed results. Kolstad (2013) finds that surgeons im-
2There is a related, large body of research on whether health providers adjust treatment
recommendations in response to financial incentives. While still debated, these problems
of “agency” have been found in various healthcare markets, including those related to
chemotherapy drugs, cesarean sections, and prescription medicines (Currie et al., 2011;
Yip, 1998; Jacobson et al., 2010). There is also a substantial literature on whether im-
proved health information changes behavior and ultimately demand for healthcare, which
generally finds changes in behavior and beliefs but fewer changes in terms of product or
service demand (Meredith et al., 2013; Madajewicz et al., 2007; Godlonton et al., 2014).
3In non-health markets, strategic behavior is typically referred to as ‘provider agency,’
while, in health markets, it is called “provider-induced demand” (Evans, 1974). See
McGuire (2000) or Chandra et al. (2011) for comprehensive reviews of the literature on
health provider motivations.
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prove the quality of treatments given to patients due to intrinsic motivation
to beat the competition. Using a very similar policy experiment, Dranove
et al. (2003) show that surgeons selectively refuse to treat sicker patients to
increase their “grade”, thus negating any benefits to consumer welfare.
Empirically, there are two challenges in this literature. First, establishing
a causal link between customer information and how providers respond is
di cult. Customer information is not distributed randomly throughout the
population. Customers who “take-up” information may be systematically
di erent from those who do not, leading to a correlation of information and
other characteristics of demand. While information may increase bargain-
ing power, leading to a negative relationship between information and price,
the reverse story is also possible. If providers believe that more informed
customers also have higher incomes, then a standard price-discrimination
argument would predict providers to charge higher prices to more informed
customers. Previous experimental work in the Greek taxi market has found
that customers who know where their destination is, and who speak the lo-
cal language pay lower prices. This e ect is driven both by increasing the
likelihood of being taken on a more direct route (i.e., a reduction in over-
treatment), and decreasing the likelihood of being overcharged (Balafoutas
et al., 2013). However, the peculiarities of health markets may pose a greater
challenge. It may be that everyday customers or patients simply cannot sig-
nal the same knowledge and experience level as experts. Second, quality is
an important dimension of consumer well-being, yet one that is di cult to
4
measure. In healthcare, for example, the treatment chosen by providers is
typically based upon opinion regarding the best treatment for a specific pa-
tient. It is therefore di cult to identify unnecessary from essential treatment,
and similarly low quality treatment from high quality treatment.
This study is designed to address each of these challenges. I conduct
the first experimental evaluation to test how providers respond to two types
of information that an ordinary customer might present at the time of pur-
chase: information of what illness he has (diagnosis), and information re-
garding the appropriate treatment. Covert shoppers purchase antimalarial
drugs according to randomly assigned scripts that vary whether the cus-
tomer states the patient’s diagnosis and/or asks for a specific treatment.
These shoppers fill out a survey on the transaction and all purchases are
tested to determine objective quality using a handheld spectrometer. I then
compare conditional mean di erences in price and quality outcomes between
the randomly assigned scripts. The randomized design rules out confounding
supply or demand characteristics that may determine equilibrium outcomes
in the absence of random assignment. Moreover, implementing this study in
the antimalarial drug market allows for a clear interpretation of the supplier
response. In contrast to other areas of healthcare, the treatment recom-
mendations for malaria are constant across all patients. Thus, there are no
patient-specific di erences in appropriate treatment choices, as opposed to a
“gray” area of medicine. My design results in one type of drug purchased,
and my measure of drug quality is objective.
5
I find that improved customer information is e ective at lowering prices,
but may not improve quality. Customers who know the disease and know
what treatment they want pay $0.18 (5 percent) less on average than cus-
tomers who ask a provider for a diagnosis or a recommendation, holding con-
stant the type of drug purchased. This gap would have increased to $0.27 if
customers asking for a recommendation had bought the recommended prod-
uct. However, I find that the e ects of information on quality depend upon
whether the quality is observable at the time of purchase. For example,
customers with information regarding the product are 4 percentage points
more likely to receive the correct dosage, a version of “quality” that is veri-
fiable at the time of purchase. In contrast, I find that customers with more
information about their purchases are 3.4 percentage points more likely to
purchase a substandard medicine, a form of quality only known after the
drug has been consumed. I find that drug quality is relatively high com-
pared to previous studies: while 17 percent of antimalarial drugs can be
classified as counterfeit, 80 percent of counterfeits are chemically e ective.
I estimate that approximately 4 percent of all purchases are of substandard
quality. Although substandard drugs are relatively rare, I find that nearly
all of the substandard drug purchases are among customers with relatively
more information. Provider e ort, defined as whether the provider follows
a “checklist” of medical protocol, also falls by approximately 8 percentile
points among better-informed customers. While informed consumers may
gain from lower prices, the net e ect on consumer welfare from increased
6
information is ambiguous due to decreases in quality.
I develop a conceptual framework of an experience good to demonstrate
the interaction between consumer information, provider e ort, prices, and
quality. The experience good framework di ers from the standard frame-
work in that quality is only revealed after the purchase is completed; there-
fore, quality can only a ect future purchase decisions. There are two types of
customers, informed and uninformed, and customer type is common knowl-
edge. For each group, firms trade o  current benefits from selling a “bad”
drug against the potential reduction in future profits from selling a bad drug.
Customers who are sold a bad drug never return, but customers who are sold
a good drug return with some exogenous probability. Firms exert costly ef-
fort solely to make the customer agree to buy the drug. Thus, e ort and
price are positively related. To predict the e ect on drug quality, I consider
where type does not let a customer distinguish good” from bad” drugs, as
in a typical experience good setting. In this case, price and quality are not
necessarily correlated. Instead, other demand characteristics of the customer
type dictate the optimal choice of quality. I then consider where customer
type lets a customer distinguish “good” from “bad” drugs. If this assumption
holds, then quality must improve. I find implications of this simple model
are consistent with other data that I collect.
This paper measures the impact of increased customer information in an
important market for global health with substantial problems of asymmet-
ric information. Malaria is a widespread disease throughout sub-Saharan
7
Africa with severe economic and health consequences.4 Despite malaria’s
prevalence, misconceptions are common, and there is substantial evidence
that the average customer lacks su cient information with respect to both
malaria diagnosis and treatment. The findings here suggest that information
campaigns are complementary to widespread subsidies aimed at improving
access to medicines, although average prices remain high for the population.
However, as long as there is heterogeneity in take-up of information programs,
providers may use information in order to charge by “type” and extract more
surplus. The substantial decrease in both provider e ort and drug quality
in response to improved customer information in my model rationalizes why
information asymmetries persist, particularly for a common disease. Infor-
mation may not be as valuable to learn or retain if it lowers prices, but also
lowers the overall quality resulting from the transaction. Increased regula-
tion may instead be needed to ensure that lower prices do not also result
in lower quality. Finally, the results of this audit study suggest that while
provider agency is useful at expanding access to care, particularly in rural
areas, improved customer information unsurprisingly does not improve the
targeting of antimalarial drugs to the truly sick. According to WHO guide-
lines, antimalarial drugs should only be dispensed following a positive blood
test, or at least diagnosis based upon clinical symptoms. However, only half
of providers reported they sold or dispensed malaria tests. Conditional on
4It is estimated that expanded access to first-line antimalarial treatment will reduce
mortality and morbidity, and also can improve productivity and incomes by as much as
12 percent (Dillon et al., 2014).
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testing availability, only half of covert shoppers were advised to have the
patient take a malaria test. Finally, only 3 percent of shoppers purchasing
for a fictitious patient report being denied a sale, when according to best
practices all should have been denied.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, I outline why the private
sector for antimalarial drugs in Uganda is an ideal setting for testing improved
customer information. I describe the study design in Section 3, and in Section
4, I summarize the collected data. I present the conceptual framework in
Section 5, and in Section 6, I present the empirical strategy. In Section 7,
I summarize my results and in Section 8, I conduct robustness checks and
discuss mechanisms and policy implications. In Section 9, I conclude.
1.2 Study Background
Healthcare markets in Uganda di er substantially from regulated markets in
developed countries. In this section, I first outline anti-malarial treatment
protocol and the problems of low-quality medicines. I describe how this study
contributes to the nascent literature on low quality drugs by testing a hy-
pothesized solution: improve customer information. Next, I give background
information on malaria and treatment. I then characterize the demand and
information problems in this market. I conclude with a discussion of anti-
malarial drug supply in Uganda.
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Malaria and Treatment
Although malaria is a treatable disease, it is the second leading cause of death
for children under the age of five worldwide and the most common illness in
Uganda. The average child has approximately two episodes per year, and
the average adult has an episode approximately every other year (Uganda
Bureau of Statistics, Uganda Malaria Surveillance Project National Malaria
Control Programme and Macro, 2010).
In Uganda, the recommended first-line treatment for malaria is artemether-
lumefantrine (AL). The clinical e cacy of AL for uncomplicated malaria
ranges from 95 to 100 percent for both adults and children (Makanga and
Krudsood, 2009).5AL is part of a larger class of medicines known as artemisinin-
based combination therapies (ACTs) that combine multiple e ective thera-
pies so as to limit future drug resistance. AL is preferred over older ther-
apies, such as sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) or chloroquine, which are
no longer clinically e ective due to drug resistance (Baird, 2005). Quinine,
another commonly available treatment, is intended to be reserved for more
serious (“complicated”) cases of malaria, or used as a second-line treatment.
Despite the availability of e ective treatment, approximately one-third of
symptomatic children do not receive first-line treatment, likely due to a com-
bination of high prices and low levels of caregiver health knowledge (Uganda
Bureau of Statistics, ICF International, 2012).
5AL is not recommended for those with the sickle-cell trait, but the fraction with this
mutation is approximately 4 percent in the study area (Okwi et al., 2010).
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Low Quality Drugs
Low-quality drugs may harm individuals by delaying e ective treatment or
wasting money. They are also a public health concern, as they contribute
to drug-resistant diseases (Okeke et al., 1999). Although the precise impact
on human health and welfare is unknown, low-quality antimalarial drugs
appear to be widespread. According to a meta-analysis, nearly one-third of
antimalarials in sub-Saharan Africa are of low-quality (Nayyar et al., 2012).6
It is also unknown which interventions are the most cost-e ective for im-
proving drug quality. Recent studies with large sample sizes and randomized
designs to determine that introducing a competitor with a high level of drug
quality (such as an NGO, or a chain store) improves drug quality and also
drives down prices (Bjorkman et al., 2012; Bennett and Yin, 2014). Whether
demand-side interventions, such as customer information, would be e ective
at improving drug quality has not yet been evaluated.
Demand for Anti-malarial Treatment
Although malaria is a common disease, average levels of customer information
about appropriate treatment remain low as a result of two related factors: a
reliance on symptomatic diagnosis and low levels of overall health literacy.
These factors are not limited to Uganda, but generalize to other countries
within sub-Saharan Africa.
6For a review of the existing literature, see Kelesidis et al. (2007) or Atukunda and
Fitzpatrick (2015)
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There are four primary symptoms of malaria–headache, chills, fever, and
nausea. However, the symptoms of malaria overlap with the symptoms of
other bacterial or viral infections, thus making symptomatic diagnosis highly
error-prone. In order to prevent drug-resistance from unnecessary utilization
of first-line treatment, the o cial WHO guidelines state that symptomatic
diagnosis should be confirmed with parasitological testing whenever possible:
either blood microscopy or rapid diagnostic malaria test. Testing is not avail-
able at all outlets, however, and is relatively expensive compared to the costs
of presumptive treatment. As a result, only 39-53 percent of adults seeking
treatment for malaria at private sector facilities have tested positive accord-
ing to a blood test (Littrell et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2015). Adhvaryu (2014)
shows that repeated misdiagnosis introduces noise and makes learning of new
medical treatments more di cult. This may lead to approximately 50 per-
cent of those seeking treatment for malaria but testing negative purchasing
antimalarial drug anyway (Cohen et al., 2015).
Low health literacy is also a problem. Numerous studies have demon-
strated low levels of customer information about malaria transmission, diag-
nosis, and treatment in a variety of countries and settings (Nuwaha, 2002;
Deressa et al., 2003; Comoro et al., 2003). For example, although individu-
als typically know that malaria is transmitted via mosquito bites, some also
mistakenly believe that malaria is transmitted through drinking bad water
or unripe mangoes. These misconceptions have been linked with fewer pre-
ventive practices, choosing less e ective treatments, and buying low-quality
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medicines (Comoro et al., 2003; Deressa et al., 2008; Bjorkman et al., 2012).7
However, knowledge of malaria transmission mechanisms may not be revealed
to providers at the time of purchase. Instead, customers may only reveal in-
formation at the point of sale directly relevant to the transaction, such as
knowledge of specific drug choices.8 There are no studies to my knowledge
demonstrating that information regarding diagnosis or appropriate treatment
a ect economic outcomes.
Supply of Antimalarial Treatment
Current health policy focuses on increasing access to antimalarial treatment
through both public and private sector providers. In 2001, Uganda eliminated
user fees and made antimalarial treatment available for free in the public
sector. As a result, service quality fell as facilities became overburdened.
There are long wait times, drug stock-outs, and reports of rude sta  (Konde-
Lule et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2006).9 One cause of drug stock-outs is that
drugs are taken from public facilities, where they are free, and sold illicitly
in private facilities. In order to deter resale, public-sector drugs have specific
markings on both the tablets and packs.
In response to problems of distribution through the public health sector,
7These are the measures that the Malaria Indicator Survey currently uses to evaluate
health literacy and treatment-seeking.
8Drug advertising in Uganda is prohibited. Although there are advertising campaigns
for subsidized first-line treatment, customers primarily seek information through providers.
9In addition, public facilities are not conveniently available for much of the population.
Forty-one percent of Ugandans report that distance to a public health facility deters them
from seeking treatment (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ICF International, 2012).
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60-80 percent of those seeking care for malaria choose the private sector first
(Konde-Lule et al., 2012; Littrell et al., 2011; Uganda Bureau of Statistics,
Uganda Malaria Surveillance Project National Malaria Control Programme
and Macro, 2010). The private sector consists mostly of drug shops and med-
ical clinics, with some pharmacies.10 Although there are o cially clear dis-
tinctions between drug shops and clinics, including regulatory and minimum
education requirements for owners, in practice the di erence may be indis-
tinguishable to customers.11 In contrast to qualified public sector providers,
providers in the private sector may be unlicensed and lack minimum qual-
ifications. Up to 60 percent of drug vendors operate without the regulated
medical qualifications and licenses (Stanback et al., 2011).12
Private sector providers are important sources of healthcare in their com-
munities, and therefore are important agents for increasing access to essential
medicines. As a result, $500 million has been spent through the Private Sec-
tor Co-payment Mechanism, formerly known as the A ordable Medicines
Facility-Malaria (AMF-m), to finance large-scale manufacturing subsidies in
the private sector.13 However, first-line treatment is still una ordable for
10It is estimated that there are approximately 17,000 drug shops and clinics throughout
the country, and 440 registered pharmacies (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ICF Interna-
tional, 2012).
11Clinics are more likely to charge consultation fees and have beds in my data. However,
reported establishment type may be di erent than the store signage.
12This figure is roughly in line with my calculation that only 21-38 percent of dispensers
have the minimum level of required qualifications.
13This figure is likely a substantial underestimate of the costs of initiatives to improve
first-line antimalarial usage. The budget for the AMF-m was $8 billion, of which approxi-
mately 20 percent goes to medicines in both the public and private sectors; the budget for
the Private Sector Co-payment Mechanism is part of a larger grant portfolio of the Global
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many people. For example, the price of AL in my data is $3.19, three times
higher than the target price of approximately $1.14 There are no price regu-
lations on medicines in Uganda.
1.3 Study Design
Fieldwork took place from May-August 2013 and consisted of several rounds
of data collection. First, the sample frame was constructed by doing a census
of vendors within randomly selected areas. Second, two di erent covert shop-
pers visited each outlet and each purchased a drug. Third, additional survey
data were collected from the drug dispenser at each outlet, and from real
customers as they were exiting the outlet. Figure 1.1 contains the project
timeline. In this section, I describe the experimental methodology and study
protocol.
1.3.1 Sample Selection
Data was collected from 45 randomly selected parishes within 5 districts.15
Study team members then conducted a census and mapped all drug outlets
- primarily drug shops, clinics, and pharmacies - within study parishes with
Fund, but still contributes millions to global subsidies. In addition, NGOs and other
large-scale foreign aid programs, such as the President’s Malaria Initiative, also contribute
money and resources.
14Although my sample of real customers is not representative, the average price is ap-
proximately 3.3 percent of median monthly income, $96.
15Bushenyi, Busia, Mbarara, Rukungiri, and Kampala (the capital) were the study
districts.
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a corresponding physical description of the outside of the premises. Vendors
in all outlets found during the census were considered target respondents.
The final sample size of outlets used in the primary analysis is 459. Online
Appendix A describes the power calculations informing the design, and On-
line Appendix B describes how the analysis sample was created. Additional
details are also in Atukunda and Fitzpatrick (2015).
1.3.2 Experimental Design
The experimental design is pictured in Table 1.1 and consists of one “con-
trol” script and three “treatment” scripts, resulting in four randomly as-
signed scripts. I implemented randomization such that each script had an
equal probability of selection and no outlet received the same script twice.
Randomization was stratified by parish.
Two di erent covert shoppers visited each drug outlet and each recited
a di erent randomly assigned script. The experimental protocol was im-
plemented to simulate a typical shopping experience and hold constant all
behavior except for the randomly assigned script. In all scripts, shoppers first
entered the shop and greeted the shopkeeper.16 The shopper then described
the four clinical symptoms of malaria (headache, fever, shivering, and body
aches) displayed by the patient, either an uncle or a father, who was back
at home.17 Then, shoppers either 1) said that they think that the patient
16Scripts were carried out in local language at the discretion of the shopper, aside from
in Kampala and Busia where English was used occasionally.
17The patient was also randomly assigned independently of the shopper scripts. The
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has malaria, or 2) asked for a diagnosis, to which there was nearly always
a response of “malaria”.18 Shoppers then either 1) asked for artemether-
lumefantrine (AL), the WHO-recommended first-line treatment of malaria,
or 2) asked for a drug recommendation.19 A picture of the protocol is in
Figure 1.2. Additional details related to training and shopper behavior are
outlined in Online Appendix F.
Drug Purchases
All shoppers were given $3.86 (10,000 UGX) in small denominations of used-
looking money to pay for all transactions.20 All covert shoppers asked how
much the o ered product cost, and then (after learning the price) bargained
and bought a full adult dosage. The definition of “full adult” dosage was
defined by the shopkeeper.
patient was an adult male in the household in order to remove the possibility of pregnancy,
for which there are di erent guidelines for treatment. Shoppers did not pose as patients
themselves so as to limit suspicion based upon bad acting or the possibility of denied
sale from failing a malaria test or lacking other clinical symptoms. The motivation for
having two di erent patients was to limit the suspicion of the shopkeeper; there was not
hypothesized to be a di erence in price between patients. I control for the shopper in all
specifications, and the coe cient on the dummy is statistically insignificant in nearly all
specifications.
18If the vendor responded with something other than malaria, then the patient was told
to consider the response and then ask whether or not it could be malaria. In practice,
vendors responded with another illness in only two transactions.
19In the vernacular, AL is called “coartem”. To avoid confusion with the originator
brand Coartemr, by Novartis, I use “AL” throughout the paper, although it is not the
word used during the transaction.
20The per-transaction amount was based upon the pilot. This drug payment allocation
does not include transportation or other costs, which were administered separately. If
the final price charged was more than $3.86, the shopper returned to their supervisor for
additional money, and then went back to the store to complete the transaction. In 7.6
percent of transactions the price paid was more than this amount.
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A potential concern is that vendor recommendations would endogenously
change shopper preferences. Therefore, during scripts in which shoppers
asked for a recommendation it would no longer be clear whether the resulting
purchase reflected shopper or provider behavior. I overcome this challenge by
implementing a drug purchase protocol in the event that multiple products
were presented to shoppers in the course of the transaction. The following is
the protocol for purchasing drugs:
1. Buy the cheapest brand of AL o ered.
2. If a full dose of AL is not available, buy quinine.
3. If a full dose of quinine is not available, then buy the next cheapest
antimalarial available (typically SP).
4. If none of these is available, buy any other antimalarial.
5. If a full dose of any antimalarial is not available, do not buy anything.
Shoppers then purchased the drug and filled out a survey on details of
the transaction. Details included if another drug was recommended, the
price of the recommendation, and other products o ered. The total number
of antimalarial options and details on up to three options were recorded,
as well as provider behavior and other observations. Supervisors monitored
shoppers to ensure that they did not share information regarding price or
availability between visits or across shops. The supervisors also did other
quality control checks to ensure that the shoppers visited the correct shop.
For example, supervisors followed or led shoppers to shops in dense areas
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or areas in which shops might be di cult to find without attracting extra
attention.
Bargaining Protocol
In this market, only 2.2 percent of prices are posted. Therefore, covert shop-
pers were also given directions on bargaining. They were provided with
specific answers to common questions and told to limit bargaining to three
rounds. However, there was slippage in the implementation of this aspect
of protocol. Anecdotal evidence from supervisors suggests that shoppers re-
sisted these guidelines, because they were concerned they would not get a
good price.
I address the potential e ects of endogenous bargaining in several ways.
First, all shoppers were assigned to recite all scripts. Shoppers, and their
characteristics, are then uncorrelated with scripts. Second, I include shopper
fixed e ects in all specifications. However, there may be a remaining concern
that shoppers present di erential bargaining power when reciting certain
scripts. Therefore, I present the provider’s o er price (i.e., the first price
stated by the provider) as an outcome variable. In practice, results are
slightly stronger when the final price paid is used.
Covert shoppers were not allowed to retain the balance of their purchases.
In this context keeping the balance is not incentive-compatible as it might in-
duce them to manipulate or misreport prices or dosages.21 It is not expected
21First, shoppers could buy a half dose, report buying a full dose, and pocket the
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that this aspect of the protocol introduced bias into either the level of prices,
or the di erence in prices between scripts. Shoppers knew that there were
multiple visits to the same outlets, and they were not allowed to share price
information between visits. Thus, they believed that any price di erences
between shoppers would be noticeable and would be suspicious. If shoppers
did manipulate the reported price, it would need to be done in a manner
correlated with the randomly assigned script to introduce bias. This is un-
likely, because neither shoppers nor supervisors were told the study expected
to find price or quality di erences between di erent scripts.22
Covert Shopper Data Summary
In total, 1126 attempts to purchase medicine were made, and 90 percent
resulted in a successful visit, defined as an interaction with a provider in
which a script was recited (N=1016). Visits to the same outlet typically
occurred the same day, several hours apart.
Overall 89 percent of shops in the sample received 2 visits. Of the re-
di erence. There was no incentive in the current design to buy less than a full dosage,
but this occurred in 8 percent of transactions. Second, shoppers could buy a cheaper
drug, such as SP, and keep the balance, while reporting that AL was out of stock. Third,
if shoppers believed that supervisors might reduce the budget later when shopping less
expensive areas, they might inflate their prices at the beginning to ensure they would
continue to keep a portion later. Fourth, in a real life purchase of a relatively expensive
product– such as an antimalarial drug– the individual would be expected to return the
balance. Over the entire course of employment, the excess balance would have been the
equivalent of a huge windfall, also signaling that the project had no budget constraint. It
is unclear how the shoppers (as employees) would have responded to that signal.
22Study team members were told that the purpose of the two visits was to collect more
drugs for testing.
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maining shops, 2.27 percent received 1 visit; 6.19 percent received 3 visits;
and 0.62 percent received 4 visits. The number of shops visited di ers from
the target of two per shop, because 1) visits in which the script was done
incorrectly were repeated at a later time; 2) some shops were found during
later stages of data collection to be the same as a neighboring outlet. In the
latter instance, I combine them into one “outlet” for purposes of analysis,
meaning that they are treated as one cluster. I include visit order as a covari-
ate in all specifications. In practice, results are invariant to whether or not
this variable is included, although it does absorb a fair amount of residual
variation. Random assignment is uncorrelated with the number of visits per
shop (not shown).
Drug Inspection and Quality Testing
At the conclusion of the fieldwork, all purchased drugs were inspected by re-
search assistants. The recorded drug characteristics include brand, expiration
date, number of tablets, and whether the drug had public sector markings.
Drugs were then shipped to a laboratory at the University of Michigan for
testing with a handheld Raman spectrometer, the TruScanTM RM.23 Testing
consists of comparing a purchased tablet with a separate, high-quality au-
thentic tablet of the same brand. As part of testing I collected high-quality
tablets from manufacturers and wholesalers in Uganda, and built a “spectral
23This machine was loaned to me by Thermo-Fisher Scientific.
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library” for the study.24 Each purchased tablet was tested at least once. Ap-
pendix E details the testing protocol, with additional information on storage
and handling.
Analysis Sample
Testing requires obtaining authentic, high-quality tablets, ideally from the
brand manufacturer. I was able to obtain an authentic comparison tablet for
94 percent of samples (N=879). Where a high quality authentic sample could
not be found, it was typically because the samples had no identifying brand
information, or the brand was not registered for sale within Uganda. In order
to maintain a consistent sample throughout the analysis, I restrict the sample
to the 879 drug purchases that could be reliably tested. I document when
results di er between the full sample of purchases and the analysis sample.
Counterfeit vs. Substandard
In order to do analysis at the transaction level, I define “counterfeit” as a
purchased dosage (“sample”) for which at least one tablet failed the spec-
trometry analysis. Because many brands are chemically similar, in practice
a tablet that failed the comparison against its own high quality authentic
tablet could potentially match against another brand within the library. I
24The handheld spectrometer compares Raman spectra, or signatures, of two molecules.
The spectrometer detects changes in the wavelength of light that occur as part of an
energy shift (“Raman shift”) when the molecule is struck by a laser. This wavelength is
consistent and unique to a particular molecule, the combination of active ingredients and
binding agents, tablet coatings, etc., making testing brand-specific.
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define “substandard” as a purchased drug dosage that had at least one failing
tablet that did not match any high-quality authentic in the library. Figure
1.3 presents a scan distinguishing between counterfeit and substandard. The
ability to cross-check the authenticity against other brands is an advantage
of creating a large spectral library, and testing a large number of brands with
the same active ingredient.25
1.4 Data & Descriptive Analysis
I first summarize the primary outcome measures used in the empirical anal-
ysis: prices and drug quality. Next, I summarize additional data collected
from vendors and real customers, and describe how I use that data to cal-
culate profit margins. Finally, I demonstrate information asymmetries and
show that providers have market power to adjust prices.
1.4.1 Drug Prices: Mean and Variance
During shopping, 933 drugs were successfully purchased in 1016 visits to
outlets; 879 were able to be tested. Figure 1.4 graphically demonstrates
that there is substantial price dispersion among antimalarial drugs within a
25Recent work by Bate et al. (2012) also di erentiates between counterfeit and substan-
dard medicines, although the authors use chemical assays. Those authors find that 10
percent of a popular antibiotic fail testing, and 41 percent of failures contain too little
of the active ingredients. My definitions are not directly comparable to the definitions
of counterfeit or substandard in Bate et al. (2012), who use a di erent testing methodol-
ogy. However, my definitions reflect the current definition of counterfeit and substandard
according to the WHO and Newton et al. (2009).
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village, the variation that I use in the empirical analysis. Table 1.2 shows
average drug prices by type of active ingredient among purchased drugs.
Overall, AL (the first-line treatment) is the second most expensive drug
type at $3.19. Even though some brands of AL are heavily subsidized at
the producer level, the medication is still expensive for consumers. It is is
also the most commonly purchased drug in the sample. My results indicate
a common availability throughout the selected study sites in Uganda, in
contrast to previous evidence.26
Mean price di erences mask the substantial variation in prices, even for
the same type of drug. Panel B of Table 1.2 shows the average di erences
in prices by AL brand, for each of the 7 brands purchased during covert
shopping. Most of the variance in price is across brand. Within the sample
of AL used in the analysis, only 6 percent of variation was within brand. The
average price of AL ranges from $2.85 to $3.86. The distribution of prices is
graphed in Figure 1.5. Observed prices paid for a full dosage in the sample
range from $0.19 to $25.07, and the coe cient of variation (CV) is 0.501. The
variation in Uganda is substantially higher than in the US context. Sorensen
(2000) finds in the US market that, for a given prescription drug, the highest
price is 50 percent over the lowest price, and the coe cient of variation is
0.22. He attributes the observed price variation to di erential benefits from
26O’Connell et al. (2011) conducted research in 2009 that found that only 13 percent of
Ugandan private sector outlets had any antimalarial in stock at all, and, conditional on
having any antimalarial in stock, only 20 percent had first-line AL treatment available.
The large change is most likely due to increased policy focus on providing access to ACTs,
as through the subsidy programs.
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consumer search. Bronnenberg et al. (2014) also find that there are also
substantial price di erences between generic and originator brands in the US
market for over-the-counter medicines. The authors attribute observed price
di erences to lack of customer information regarding drug equivalencies.
Drug Testing Results
In total, 19.1 percent of tablets failed the handheld spectrometry test, and
17 percent of purchased drug dosages had at least one failing tablet (“coun-
terfeit”). Additional analysis found that only 3.4 percent of samples had at
least one tablet that could not be matched to any authentic brand within the
library (“substandard”). Results from a chemical assay that will conclusively
determine medical e cacy are not yet finished. In Atukunda and Fitzpatrick
(2015), we discuss these averages in detail, present descriptive correlates, and
compare our results to the previous literature.
1.4.2 Surveys of Real Customers
Surveys were conducted with a convenience sample of 867 real customers
from 350 shops; 372 customers purchased an antimalarial drug. Although
enumerators tried to interview three customers purchasing antimalarial drugs
from every shop in the study, in practice this was not achieved. Reasons for
imbalance include a high refusal rate (37 percent) and other logistical con-
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straints.27 For example, in some sample areas it was common for children
to be sent to the outlet to buy medicine. Our protocol required that inter-
viewed customers be over 18.28 As a result, there is an imbalance in the
number of interviews per outlet. Online Appendix Tables E1 and E2 show
that the characteristic most associated with both whether any customer was
interviewed and the total number of customers interviewed is the total num-
ber of customers reported on the vendor survey. In particular, there is no
correlation between prices and quality and whether or not real customers
were interviewed at the store.
Results from surveys of real customers suggest that the experimental
protocol was consistent with true customer behavior. On the survey, approx-
imately half of customers buying antimalarial drugs (52.3 percent) reported
asking for both a diagnosis and a product recommendation, and 23 per-
cent reported asking for neither a diagnosis nor a recommendation. Between
12-13 percent asked for either a diagnosis or a recommendation, but not
both. Therefore, each study arm is observed among real customers. Simi-
larly, 48 percent of antimalarial customers report successfully bargaining over
the price of the drug, and 53 percent of antimalarial customers were buying
for another adult within the household. Thus, covert shopper behavior is
27There was no incentive for the exit interviews given to respondents. During pilot
testing a bottle of water was provided to exit interview respondents. This attracted
excessive attention in the study areas, such as non-customers approaching enumerators
asking to be interviewed. Therefore we did not provide incentives for this aspect of data
collection in the full study, potentially decreasing consent rates.
28A precise figure of how common children shoppers are is unavailable.
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consistent with real shopper behavior.
1.4.3 Provider Characteristics
The vendor survey covered topics ranging from dispenser background and
knowledge regarding malaria to profits and the operating environment. The
survey was completed by 452 vendors, an 89 percent completion rate in the
analysis sample. There is no correlation between price or quality and survey
completion. Correlates of survey completion are in Online Appendix Table
E3.
Table 1.3 contains selected summary statistics of vendor characteristics.
The average respondent is 30 years old and 23 percent are male. Only 8.9
percent of respondents live in the same parish that they were born in. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests this low rate is because it is di cult to make profits
when selling to friends and family members. I estimate that 36 percent of
respondents meet the legal qualifications for dispensing drugs.29 The aver-
age vendor had been in that line of work for 6.2 years. Eighty-four percent
of respondents correctly identified the first-line treatment for malaria (AL).
Although the provider’s level of information may not be perfect, it is likely
higher than the average customer level of information. On a standard test
of malaria transmission knowledge, providers score an 81 percent compared
to 72 percent among customers.
29These requirements vary based upon the establishment type, and (for clinics) how
long the individual has had his or her degree (Uganda Ministry of Health, 2013).
27
Panel B contains relevant characteristics of the study outlets and their
customers. Vendors report that their stores receive on average 22 customers
per day, on average, of which approximately six are seeking malaria treat-
ment. Respondents report that they know approximately 43 percent of their
customers by name. Thus, new customers are not necessarily unusual for
vendors, even in relatively rural areas. Consistent with responses from real
customers, 65 percent of vendors report that customers ask them for advice
on what to purchase, and 66 percent ask for a diagnosis. 53 percent of ven-
dors report that customers can test for malaria at their outlet; conditional
on selling a test, the price was $1.09. Nearly half indicated that their outlets
have beds to consult or treat patients, although only 14 percent report ever
charging a consultation fee for treatment.
Outlets are small and somewhat profitable. On average, they have 2.4
employees, and regulation is reported to be relatively high in the study area.
Seventy-two percent of outlets indicated that they had been inspected by a
regulator from the National Drug Authority (the relevant governing body) in
the previous 6 months. Outlet profits are highly skewed. Although the aver-
age monthly profits are $436, the median value of monthly profits is $77.13,
with nearly 9 percent of outlets reporting negative profits for the previous
month.30 The collected data also suggests that vendors have market power.
30Profits in informal micro enterprises are notoriously di cult to measure (de Mel et al.,
2009). On the survey we allowed for corrections to reported sales and costs. For example,
if a vendor reported negative profits, enumerators asked why the value was negative to
check for mistakes. Vendors generally gave responses consistent with negative profits, such
as “low sales”, or “regulators seized drugs.”
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On average, there are 10 outlets (including the respondent’s outlet) in their
market, where the market is defined as the village. The median value is five
competing outlets. I construct the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, a common
measure of market power based upon shares of sales in the market. The
index, which ranges from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly) is 0.366 at
the village level. These values correspond to a highly concentrated market
(Commission, Federal Trade and US Department of Justice, US Department
of, 2010). At the same time, consumers do have some degree of choice; only
6 percent are monopolists.
Calculation of Profit Measure
The vendor survey contained a module on the drug inventory at the establish-
ment: an extensive collection of prices, costs, and measures for demand for
all antimalarial drugs typically in the store’s stock. I use this data to create
the outcome variable “profit per purchase,” a relevant variable for providers
to consider in dispensing drugs.
There are an average of 5.3 antimalarial drugs listed on the inventory sec-
tion of the data, and on average 4.4 drugs listed are currently in stock; 1.83 of
the drugs in stock are AL. Ninety-six percent of respondents report typically
stocking AL at their outlet, and 90 percent of respondents report having
AL in stock at the time of the drug vendor survey. Despite this extensive
range of data, only 423 (45%) drugs purchased during covert shopping were
able to be linked with their exact cost and selling price information. The
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remainder either were missing entirely from the survey, or the cost/selling
price information was not reported. There are several explanations. First,
no data is available for outlets at which no survey was completed. Second,
some respondents either did not know the cost price, or stated that such in-
formation was confidential. Third, due to the observed average di erences in
prices and costs by brand, I only consider exact matches by brand. Finally,
although the survey was intended to capture these measures for all drugs
that were typically carried, there is likely measurement error and recall bias
present, particularly for drugs not in stock at the time of survey.
In order to limit measurement error and non-random missing data, I
average unit costs for each brand at the parish level. Formally, the measure
is
costbp =
Npÿ
i=1
cibp (1.1)
where c is the calculated cost of one full adult dosage in store i of Np stores
within a given parish p. I then calculate per-unit profit:
profittb = pricetb ≠ costbp (1.2)
where profit varies at the transaction level t.31 To measure price for transac-
tion t of brand b, I use both the o er price and the transaction price. (The
31If there are no observations for a given brand in the parish, I then use the average
cost of one full adult dosage for that brand in the district, and include a dummy for the
imputation.
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o er price is the first price o ered by the vendor before bargaining.) In Online
Appendix B4, I present additional support for the validity of this measure of
per-transaction profits.32 It should be noted that this measure of cost as in
Equation (1.1) is not only the estimated average per-unit cost, but also the
estimated marginal cost for the majority of drugs. Survey data indicate that
the majority of vendors have a linear cost structure for antimalarial drugs,
although 36 percent report receiving bulk discounts.
1.5 Conceptual Framework
In this section I present a simple framework of an experience good to motivate
the empirical analysis. An experience good is a good where the quality
cannot be assessed at the time of purchase, but rather after the purchase is
complete.33 I focus on the provider’s decision to sell “bad” drugs or “good”
drugs, an attribute of the good that is unobservable to customers at the
time of purchase. A primary assumption is that quality does not enter the
customer’s utility in this period, because drug quality is only revealed after
the transaction is completed. I contrast the results with the situation where
quality can be assessed at the time of purchase.
32I use prices from the covert shopper survey because it is a better measure of the
per-unit profit than the average selling price as listed on the drug inventory survey.
33A similar, alternative framework would be a credence good, for which the quality of
the good cannot be assessed even after the time of purchase.
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Model Assumptions
Consider a market with two agents: a provider, and a customer. Providers
only sell drugs, and can choose to sell either a good quality drug (q = G), or
a bad quality drug (q = B). There are di erent costs to the provider for the
drug depending on its quality, cG > cB, and providers have market power
to set the price. Providers supply costly e ort, e(s).34 Providers therefore
choose prices, e ort, and drug quality in order to maximize their payo .
All customers are shopping on behalf of people sick with the same disease,
and each demands one unit of a good. All customers have two choices: either
to buy the drug, or to refuse the drug and shop elsewhere. There are two
types of customers, informed and uninformed. I index customer type by
i œ {I, U}. The customer’s type is known. In this context, “information”
may refer to information regarding outside options or the whether the drug
will cure their disease. Customers value service and provider input, si. The
extent to which they value si is given by the parameter, ◊.35
A crucial assumption is that neither type of customer can determine drug
quality at the time of purchase, but both types can determine drug quality
after the transaction is complete based on its e cacy. As a result, in order for
the provider to have any incentive to ever sell a good drug there must be some
sort of penalty to deceiving customers. I therefore incorporate payo  from
34The e(s) function has the properties eÕ(s) > 0, eÕÕ(s) > 0.
35A simple extension of the model could be that customers with less information place
a higher valuation on the provider’s opinion: ◊I < ◊U . All results go through under this
setup.
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future sales, where the lost future sales can be thought of as a reputation
cost to selling low-quality drugs.36 If any customer buys a bad drug, then
they do not return to the provider. If a customer buys a good drug, then
they return to the provider in the future with probability –, which may di er
by type. They may not get sick again, or they may simply shop elsewhere
next time. Therefore, the drug quality does not a ect the current customer’s
utility, but does a ect the provider’s future payo .37
The Provider’s Objective Function
The provider’s problem can be written as follows:
max
pi,si,qœ{G,B}
pi ≠ e(si)≠ cq + –qi i(pi)
subject to ◊si ≠ pi Ø 0
(1.3)
where p is the price charged, ◊ is the marginal valuation of service quality,
s is service quality, – is the likelihood of returning to the same provider if
the drug is of good quality, and   is the future profits from that customer.38
36This intuition is based upon the previous literature on credence goods, and is a stan-
dard feature of both models and empirical studies. See Hubbard (2002), Dranove (1988),
or Schneider (2007), among others. In our data, 93 percent of vendors thought that
the customer would stop shopping at their store if they were caught selling a bad drug
(Atukunda and Fitzpatrick, 2015).
37To keep the model as simple as possible, I assume no discounting of the future. In
addition, I do not assume that there is a correlation between information and knowing
the true drug quality. There is no empirical evidence that more informed customers are
also those more likely to actually have malaria, and given widespread over-utilization, it is
di cult to sign the correlation. In reality, the drug’s true quality is possibly only revealed
with some endogenous likelihood.
38To keep the equation as simple as possible, I have made   solely a function of price. If
  were also a function of e(s) then I would need an additional assumption for the following
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Customers of either type who are sold a bad drug never return; –b = 0.39 I
normalize the utility from the outside option to be 0 for both types.40
Note that the price does not signal drug quality. If price did signal qual-
ity, then drug quality would be at least partially observable at the time of
purchase. Rational customers would see price di erences and (correctly) in-
fer the drug’s true quality. Thus, the drug would not be an experience good.
Similarly, drug quality cannot be part of the consumer’s buying decision.
Solution
I first derive the relationship between price and service. Customer type is
observable, so providers find the optimal price and e ort choice separately
by type. The provider charges a price and provides a service quality such
that the customer is just indi erent between purchasing the drug there and
seeking the drug elsewhere. Substituting the constraint ◊si = pi into the
objective function and choosing the optimal si, we find the implicit function
that defines si:
logic to hold. In particular, I would assume that the marginal increase in profits from an
increase in price is greater than the marginal disutility on “profits” from providing better
service. Formally, ˆ ˆpi
ˆpi
ˆsi
> ˆ ˆe(si)e
Õ(si).
39To make the results hold, –b > 0, but –g > –b. Equation (5) becomes slightly messier
with no additional intuition.
40We could also write the outside option as u¯i, where u¯U < u¯I . In other words, all else
equal, more informed customers are more willing to walk away from the sale. Because
that assumption is stronger and unnecessary, I omit it. However, there is a nice intuition
between outside options and repeated visits to the same provider. If in every period
customers with increased outside options are more likely to visit other outlets, then rational
providers must assume that customers with more knowledge are less likely to visit their
store in particular (holding constant the total number of visits).
34
◊(1 + –i (◊si)) = eÕ(si) (1.4)
This equation highlights that the optimal choice of service quality is in-
creasing in –. Thus, customers with a higher likelihood of returning are given
higher service quality.
Next, I consider the provider’s choice of drug quality. Providers know
drug quality. The provider compares the total profits from selling a good
drug with the total profits from selling a bad drug. Let the revenue from the
current sale be A. A provider will o er the good drug if, and only if
A+ –i i ≠ cG Ø A≠ cB
–i i Ø cG ≠ cB
(1.5)
Thus, so long as the expected future payo  from selling a good drug
exceeds the one-period gain in profits from selling a bad drug, the provider
will choose to sell a good drug. So which customer type is more likely to
be sold a bad drug? Whichever group has the lower future profits: in this
model, not visiting the provider again is the “penalty”. Therefore, if –I I Ø
–U U , then informed types are more likely to receive a good drug; otherwise,
uninformed types are more likely to receive a good drug. While theoretically
ambiguous, empirically both the likelihood of returning and profits work in
the same direction in that equation: customers with more information are
more likely to receive a bad drug. My results show that providers make
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higher profits o  of customers with less information, customers with less
information are 16 percentage points more likely to visit the same vendor
again.41 This is somewhat intuitive: a rational provider would not want to
risk losing a loyal customer from whom they make high profits.
Alternative model: Quality is revealed at the time of
purchase
What if quality were observable at the time of purchase, for the I type?
This assumption corresponds to the standard lemons model with symmetric
information, where the good in question is not an experience good (Akerlof,
1970). Assuming type I customers do not agree to purchase drugs of low
quality, then providers only o er them high quality drugs. Therefore, high
quality drugs are always sold to type I, implying that type U must then be
weakly more likely to buy a low quality drug. The equilibrium price, however,
is still derived from equation 1.4, and is still based upon the e ort cost and
the likelihood of future visits from that customer. As long as type U still has
a higher likelihood of future visits, then the price will still be higher among
type U , and service quality will also be higher.
41The negative correlation between information and treatment-seeking is also found
empirically in Ingham and Miller (1983) and Das and Hammer (2013).
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1.6 Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy is to compare mean di erences in price, options, and
service quality between shoppers who recite randomly assigned scripts. I
first test an implication of the identification assumption by showing that
treatment groups display similar averages of observable characteristics. I
evaluate whether customer information a ects the provider’s choice of price,
quality, and service quality. I then test whether the type of information
results in di erent outcomes for customers.
1.6.1 Estimating Equation
Here I present the main estimating equation, and discuss how I handle stan-
dard errors and potential concerns of multiple outcomes hypothesis testing.
The main estimating equation is:
Yst = –0 + –1AnyInformationst + “v + ”ÕX + ‘st (1.6)
where Any Information corresponds to whether the shopper stated that the
condition was malaria, asked for a specific drug (“AL”), or both. Y is the
outcome: measures of price, drug quality, service quality, and other relevant
outcomes for transaction t in shop s located within village v. Because there
are a large number of outcome variables, I include as a dependent variable
summary indices for related groups of outcomes, following Kling et al. (2007).
This index is the average z-score within a family of outcomes compared to
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the mean and standard deviation of the control group, and all signs have
the same interpretation. In order to control for unobserved variation across
villages, I include “v, a village fixed e ect.42 I include a vector of covariates,
X, consisting of shopper, visit order, and patient fixed e ects to absorb
residual variation and address potential concerns of omitted variables. I
cluster standard errors at the outlet level to account for any correlation of
the error terms within outlets with respect to outcome variables. There are
459 clusters in the analysis sample. In Appendix Tables E4-E9, I present the
estimates with the multiple-outcomes adjusted p-values following Anderson
(2008).
To test whether providers respond di erentially to customers who present
information of either diagnosis or their preferred drug treatment, I use the
following specification:
Yst = —0 + —1KnowOnlyMalariast + —2KnowOnlyDrugst+
—3KnowMalaria&Drugst + “v + ”ÕX + ‘st
(1.7)
where KnowOnlyMalaria is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the
shopper was randomly assigned to the treatment group “Know Malaria, Ask
for Drug Recommendation”. Similarly, KnowOnlyDrug is a dummy vari-
able indicating random assignment to the “Ask for Diagnosis, Know Drug”
42In order to ease exposition, keep a consistent specification throughout the paper, and
to maximize statistical power, I present results from a village fixed e ect. An outlet fixed
e ect would remove the variation from outlets at which only one visit was conducted, and
also outlets where two “Any Information” scripts were recited. Empirically, the di erence
in outcomes between Any Information and No Information is the largest.
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group, and KnowMalaria&Drug is a dummy variable indicating random as-
signment to the “Know Malaria, Know Drug” treatment group. Each coef-
ficient measures the average di erence in outcome Y between the individual
script “treatment” script and the “control” script, wherein the customer has
no information about their purchase (“Ask for Diagnosis, Ask for Drug Rec-
ommendation”). Therefore, —1 identifies the provider’s response to a shopper
with information of the diagnosis (malaria) only; —2 identifies the provider’s
response to a shopper who only has information of the first-line drug treat-
ment (AL); and —3 identifies the provider’s response to a shopper with infor-
mation about both the diagnosis and the first-line drug treatment, compared
to having information of neither.
Note that the dummy variables refer to the script randomly assigned,
which may not always be the script the covert shopper actually used. In the
analysis sample, three percent of scripts used for purchase di er from the
assigned script. In Online Appendix E, I test whether these mistakes are
likely to introduce bias into results, and conclude that there is no correlation
between reciting a correct script and the actual script or outcomes of interest.
However, these mistakes may somewhat attenuate coe cients of interest by
introducing measurement error.
Assumption 1: Random assignment was e ective at creating four groups
that are comparable on average characteristics.
In order for estimated coe cients of interest to be unbiased, two identi-
fying assumptions need to hold. First, the assigned script needs to be uncor-
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related with other omitted variables specific to the transaction. The nature
of the design made it di cult to collect characteristics on outlets prior to the
shopper visits. Instead, I use objective observations and characteristics of the
shopper’s visit to test for systematic di erences between treatment groups.
These characteristics are unlikely to have been a ected by the script, and
are taken from the covert shopper data. Table 2.13 presents evidence that
there are no systematic di erences between scripts in the analysis sample.
Online Appendix Table E10 contains the same table using the full sample of
all visits.
In total, 53 percent of visits occurred at drug shops, and 39 percent oc-
curred at clinics. The predominant local languages Runyankole and Luganda
were used in approximately one-half and one-third of transactions, respec-
tively. As designed, the patient was the uncle in half of transactions. Overall,
41 percent of shop visits took place over a weekend, and 66 percent of visits
took place between 12 and 5pm. Approximately 79 percent of dispensers are
female. In total, 42 percent of shops did not have a posted name. Female
covert shoppers conducted 59 percent of visits, and bargaining resulted in a
successful price reduction in 59 percent of transactions.
Columns 6-8 of Table 2.13 provide supporting evidence that there are no
systematic di erences with respect to observed or unobserved characteristics
between any of the four scripts. P-values from an F-test of mean di erences
between the four groups demonstrate a statistically significant di erence for
only a few of the selected variables, using either the cross-sectional variation
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(Column 6), including a village fixed e ect (Column 7), or a village fixed
e ect and a shopper fixed e ect (Column 8). These p-values provide support
for the identification assumption that scripts are randomly assigned to visits,
and thus estimated coe cients are unbiased. Although there are several
statistically significant di erences, particularly for establishment type and
language used, this imbalance is likely not cause for concern. Some di erences
would be expected due to chance, and the absolute magnitude of di erences
is small. Controlling for imbalanced characteristics in regressions does not
change point estimates. However, my preferred specification omits these
controls, because some coe cients lose significance due to multicollinearity.
For example, there is little variation in language within a village.43
Assumption 2: Providers react to information, not the experiment.
Second, the shopkeeper must perceive all shoppers as identical on average
except with respect to the randomly assigned script. Available evidence does
not suggest this is a substantial source of bias. First, shoppers were exten-
sively trained, and the protocol was reviewed every morning.44 Similarly,
the protocol was carefully implemented to limit behavior that would be out
of the ordinary. For example, shoppers practiced approaching the shop and
a strict dress code was enforced so as to limit any signals of wealth, such
43The randomization was implemented with a parish fixed e ect, and thus there may
be a concern that random assignment is only valid conditional on a parish fixed e ect.
Because parish is collinear with village, comparing the p-values in the cross-section with
specifications inclusive of fixed e ects is equivalent to demonstrating that the stratification
cells are mostly relevant for absorbing residual variation.
44Details of training are in Online Appendix F.
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as cell phones or jewelry. In addition, I include a shopper fixed e ect to
control for any characteristics specific to a shopper. Responses on the ven-
dor survey suggest that these precautions were e ective at limiting provider
suspicion. Only eleven percent of vendor survey respondents reported that a
covert shopper had ever visited them, and only 3 percent reported a covert-
shopping visit during the time of our study. Moreover, as a robustness I
test whether results di er by measures of competition in the village, or the
number of customers that the outlet reported, and results do not di er (not
shown).
Selection bias on purchases
One concern with the analyses of prices and quality is that I do not observe
transaction prices from visits in which no drug was purchased. Therefore,
if the likelihood of purchase is correlated with the randomly assigned script
then there may be an issue of a selection bias for specifications conditional on
purchase. I account for this potential problem by showing that whether the
transaction is part of the analysis sample is uncorrelated with the randomly
assigned script, alleviating concerns of internal validity. However, there may
still be concerns of external validity. Second, I sign the selection bias term as
negative. Third, I construct Lee bounds (Lee, 2009) on point estimates from
models that are conditional on making a purchase and being in the analysis
sample as a robustness check; estimates are in Online Appendix Table E11.
Overall, 96 percent of attempts to purchase a drug resulted in the shopper
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interacting with a shopkeeper. Unsuccessful visits typically occurred because
the shop was temporarily closed (N=60). Of successful visits, 92 percent
resulted in a purchase. In 3.3 percent of visits there was no drug sale due to
refusal to sell without seeing the patient (N=34) and during 4.6 percent of
visits (N=47) the vendor was out of stock of antimalarials. Results in Panel A
of Table 1.5 show that presenting information does not change the likelihood
of reporting that a drug is out of stock, being denied a sale, or making a
purchase. Information also does not a ect the likelihood of purchasing AL
or SP, the most common classes of drugs purchased.
Although there is no correlation between having drugs in stock and the
randomly assigned script, there are slight di erences in being denied a sale
across the treatment groups. Shoppers indicating the information of both
malaria and appropriate treatment are 3.6 percentage points more likely to
be denied a sale than those reciting the no-information control script. Al-
though the likelihood of buying a particular type of drug is uncorrelated
with the randomly assigned script, customers who knew both the diagno-
sis and the appropriate treatment score 0.08 standard deviations lower on
the purchase index, significant at the 10 percent level.45Appendix Table E13
shows that whether clinics and outlets charge consultation fees is the primary
statistically significant of whether shoppers successfully made a purchase.
Consultation fees are approximately double the cost of treatment (which the
45Results are similar in the analysis sample. Although there is no di erence for the
purchase index across scripts, shoppers knowing only the diagnosis are 4.4 percentage
points more likely to buy SP. See Online Appendix Table E12 for additional details.
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customer still pays), so there are substantially higher profits from customers
who return with the patient at those establishments. Because clinics gener-
ally have higher prices than drug shops, these patterns suggest a negative
selection bias term.
1.7 Results on the Provider Response to Cus-
tomer Information
I present several sets of results showing that providers lower prices and lower
quality when customers state more information.
1.7.1 Prices
Increased customer information decreases the price o ered to shoppers for
the same drug. Panel A of Table 1.6 presents estimates of the e ect of any
information on the price o ered. In column 1, I show that in the analysis
sample, providers charge customers showing any information approximately 5
percent less, $0.18, than shoppers not showing any information. This e ect is
approximately the same for the o er price and the final transaction price. The
data collected can be used to assess what would have happened if instead the
shopper had bought the recommended option. Column (2) shows that if the
shoppers asking for a recommendation had instead bought the recommended
option, the di erences between scripts would have been even larger, at $0.27.
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These results are robust to both a log specification and the multiple outcomes
index. The aggregated index from these measures indicates that customers
with any type of information have a decreased average price index of 0.081
standard deviations.46
Panel B shows that, in the analysis sample, the provider response does
not di er by the type of customer information that is presented; shoppers
who only state the patient’s diagnosis are charged $0.23 less, and shoppers
who state both diagnosis and appropriate treatment are charged $0.19 less.
Results are approximately of the same magnitude for the price paid. These
price di erences would likely have become substantially larger if instead the
shopper had purchased the recommended option; shoppers who know both
diagnosis and treatment would have paid nearly $0.38 less. Using the out-
come of log of the o er price shows that these results are robust to a log
specification, although slightly noisier. The e ect of information on the price
index is consistently negative and approximately 0.07 to 0.09 standard devi-
ations lower, all significant at the 5 percent level. Results are robust to the
inclusion of day fixed e ects, day of week fixed e ects, and drug type pur-
46In the full sample of all purchased drugs, customers with any information are charged
$0.13 less, although this value is not significantly di erent from zero (p-value = 0.177).
Results similarly show suggestive evidence but no statistically significant e ects for prices
using either a level or a log specification due to a high amount of variation in the dependent
variable. However, the e ect of information on the price paid is significant when controlling
for the type of drug purchased, which absorbs additional residual variance. See Online
Appendix Table E14. In addition, dropping either the other high-quality antimalarials or
the quinine drug types reduces variation su ciently to obtain statistical significance. For
example, other high-quality antimalarials are priced approximately $2.18 more per dose
than AL.
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chased. However, I caution that results are not generally robust to additional
procedures to accommodate outliers, such as trimming or winsorizing (not
shown). Therefore, observed large responses among some providers to infor-
mation are an important component of the average e ect on prices charged.
The calculation of Lee Bounds in Online Appendix Table E13 also sup-
ports the interpretation that information decreased price. Although the up-
per bounds are not always statistically significant, the bounded estimates are
consistently negative for all outcome variables. In addition, the price index
(which increases statistical power) shows a negative upper and lower Lee
Bound. However, the construction of family-wise error rates, to control for
multiple hypothesis testing, leads to some caution in interpretation. Accord-
ing to that procedure, the e ects on price could be due to Type I error. The
p-value on the o er price after accounting for the large number of outcomes,
for example, is 0.158.
1.7.2 Profits
In Table 1.7, I test whether charging lower prices translates into lower prof-
its. I find that customers with more information are lower profit-margin cus-
tomers for vendors.47 Columns 1 and 3 calculate profits using the o er price;
Columns 2 and 4 calculate profits using the transaction price paid. Panel
A shows that by any measure, vendor marginal profits o  of the transaction
47Visits in which the drug brand could not be identified or cost data was not available
are excluded (N=32).
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decrease by approximately $0.22 when customers have some information re-
garding diagnosis or treatment. Specifically, Column 1 of Panel B shows that
when a shopper shows information of diagnosis (malaria), provider profits fall
by $0.22, and showing both types of information lowers profits by $0.27. Us-
ing the sample of purchases, as opposed to all visits, highlights that the e ect
of customer information on profits is not driven by whether or not a drug was
purchased. Although estimates are slightly noisier, potentially due to fewer
observations, results are similar. The di erence in profits between treatment
groups in the sample of purchases is similar in magnitude to the di erence
in price between treatment groups, and suggests that the lower profits are
actually driven by reductions in price (as opposed to costs). This interpreta-
tion is supported by the fact that average costs by brand at the parish level
do not di er by script (not shown). Results are robust to procedures that
account for multiple outcomes testing.
1.7.3 Add-Ons
In addition to selling antimalarial drugs, outlets also commonly sell other
products for the treatment of malaria symptoms: fever reducers, headache
medicine, vitamins, and even antibiotics. Results in Table 1.8 indicate that
providers also potentially lose profits to shoppers with more information by
not o ering them additional products. Panel A shows that providers of-
fer 0.092 fewer options to shoppers who know either the diagnosis or treat-
ment. Similarly, customers with any type of information are 13.3 percentage
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points less likely to be o ered additional products to relieve the symptoms of
malaria. Overall, providers substantially decrease the menu of options pre-
sented by 0.44 standard deviations of the z-score index. Results are robust
to procedures that account for multiple outcomes testing.
Panel B shows that the provider response becomes stronger as shoppers
present more information. Shoppers who ask for a specific treatment are
o ered between 0.13-0.16 fewer antimalarial drug options. Shoppers who
know the patient has malaria are 9 percentage points less likely to be o ered
an additional product. Shoppers knowing only the first line treatment are
13 percentage points less likely to o ered an additional product. Shoppers
with both types of information are 17.7 percentage points less likely to be
o ered an additional product. Therefore, in addition to the main channel
of decreased profits through lower prices, providers may also lose profits on
shoppers showing more information by not o ering them additional products
and services.48
1.7.4 Drug Quality
In Table 1.9, I examine whether vendors adjust drug quality in response to
customers with di erent levels of information. I find that increased customer
information increases observable quality, but decreases actual drug quality.
I first consider two measures of quality that would be observable to the
48Note that providers could assume that customers with information do not want addi-
tional products. However, not o ering additional products to certain groups would likely
result in lower profits for that group.
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customer at the time of purchase: whether the dosage had the correct number
of tablets, and whether the pack has public sector markings (“diverted”).49
These estimates correspond to testing the predictions generated in Section
5.4, if quality were observable at the time of purchase. For example, cus-
tomers knowing what drug they want may also be more likely to know how
many tablets are in a complete dosage. In the context of these ‘observable”
measures of quality, drug quality improves. Shoppers presenting any infor-
mation regarding diagnosis or treatment are 4 percentage points more likely
to receive the correct number of tablets, and 3.9 percentage points less likely
to buy a drug with public sector markings. The coe cients do not di er
substantially in magnitude by the type of information presented for either
dependent variable.
Columns 3 -5 present estimates of whether the drug is counterfeit or sub-
standard, a measure of drug quality not known at the time of purchase.
Although the level and kind of customer information has no e ect on the
likelihood of purchasing a counterfeit drug, there is a relatively large and sig-
nificant di erence in the likelihood of buying a substandard drug. Shoppers
who state either the diagnosis or the treatment they want are 3.4 percent-
age points more likely to buy a substandard drug. Shoppers who state the
49I classify a decrease in drugs with public sector markings as a quality improvement
because data from the pilot indicate that these markings are widely known and it is illegal
to sell these in the private sector. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that Ugandans
view selling these drugs as a form of corruption or deception (since they are intended to
be free). In Atukunda and Fitzpatrick (2015), we show that actually these drugs are more
likely to be substandard, even though public sector medicines must pass quality tests to
enter the country.
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patient’s diagnosis are 3 percentage points more likely to buy a substandard
drug, and shoppers stating both diagnosis and the first-line treatment are 5.4
percentage points more likely to buy a substandard drug. Although these
results are based o  a small proportion of the sample, they are robust to
using the fraction of dosage that is substandard, the z-score index of drug
quality, and multiple outcomes hypotheses corrections. This result is also not
driven by switching across di erent drug classes with di erent substandard
rates. The calculation of Lee Bounds in Online Appendix Table E11 shows
that all of these estimates are generally robust, and not the result of sample
selection. Correct dosage, diverted drug, and fraction substandard have sig-
nificant upper and lower bounds. Although the lower bound on whether the
drug was substandard is small and insignificant, it is still positive.50
Interpreting these results as strategic behavior relies on the assumption
that vendors know whether drugs are of high or low quality but that cus-
tomers do not. Available evidence supports this assumption. First, shoppers
stating any information are 3.9 percentage points more likely to report ven-
dors picked the dispensed drug from the back of the outlet, or otherwise out
of sight of the customer. There is similarly a positive, though insignificant
relationship between picking from the back and whether the drug had public
sector markings, was counterfeit, or substandard. Only 6 percent of outlets
sell substandard drugs to the covert shoppers. At a minimum only 6 percent
of the sample would need to behave strategically to generate these empiri-
50However, the drug quality index is inconclusive, as the upper bound switches sign.
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cal results. Second, the observed patterns would have to occur according to
chance alone in order to generate spurious correlations with the randomly
assigned shopper script. With a relatively large number of villages and out-
lets, this is less likely. Finally, the analysis of additional data collected show
that these quality di erences are not driven by price or cost di erentials by
brand of drug.
Additional evidence suggests that drug quality is unobservable to con-
sumers. Many of the drugs with public sector markings were bent to make
the stamp less noticeable, or the stamp was partly rubbed o . I compare
the distribution of failing tablets to the medical e ectiveness of completing
a partial dosage, compared to a full dosage (not shown). The medical liter-
ature suggests that in the short-term, a patient who has malaria is likely to
feel better so long as they consume at least 16 tablets.51 The average dose
response is consistent with the observed bimodal distribution of the number
of substandard tablets within a failing dosage. I estimate that 57 percent of
failing samples have enough passing tablets that the patient would likely still
have their malarial episode temporarily cured. In other words, substandard
medicines are more accurately thought of as diluted high-quality drugs than
dosages of sugar pills (Atukunda and Fitzpatrick, 2015).52
51More precisely, the medical literature suggests that the final 8 tablets of the full
adult dosage are no more e ective at immediately improving health, but rather reduce the
likelihood of a return infection of the same parasite over the next month by 18 percent
(Van Vugt et al., 1999).
52Of course, that estimation is rough and is dependent on a number of assumptions:
whether the individual actually does have malaria, the individual’s malarial resistance
level, diet, the presence of vomiting in the current malarial episode, and the order of
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1.7.5 Provider E ort
In Table 1.10, I estimate whether provider e ort changed in response to cus-
tomer information. First, following Das et al. (2013), I test whether providers
abide by a “checklist” of proper behavior. According to o cial guidelines,
providers should first administer a malaria test prior to dispensing antimalar-
ial medicines. If tests are not available, then the provider should ask for
additional symptoms to rule out other types of illnesses. I consider whether
providers alter any of these behaviors in response to the scripts. Second,
I test whether subjective measures of good customer service improve. Evi-
dence from both developed and developing countries indicates that patients
care about whether health outcomes improve, but also about the process
through which decisions are made (Kroeger and Hernandez, 2003; Jennings
et al., 2005; Kruk and Freedman, 2008). Patients value adequate time with
providers, being respected, and other aspects akin to “bedside manner.” I
apply these principles to the antimalarial health market. I test whether
the shoppers feel that they are given adequate attention, that the provider
explained all of the available options, and that the provider was friendly.
Results suggest that providers respond to increased shopper information by
exerting lower e ort and decreasing service quality.
The pattern of coe cients in Panel B indicates that the more information
that the customer presents to the vendor at the time of purchase, the less
likely it is that the provider adheres to the o cial guidelines. Providers
which the tablets were consumed.
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are 4.4 percentage points less likely to express doubts that the patient truly
has malaria when shoppers know either the diagnosis or the appropriate
treatment. They are 8.2 percentage points less likely to do so when customers
know both the disease and the treatment. Furthermore, providers faced
with a customer who knows either disease or treatment are 6.8 percentage
points less likely to advise that the patient take a malaria test. The number
jumps to 15.8 percentage points when the customer has both knowledge of
diagnosis and treatment. Shoppers with any information are 4.7 percentage
points less likely to report that the provider asked any questions regarding
the patient’s health, and again, the number rises to 9.7 percentage points
when the customer knows both the diagnosis and the treatment.
Shoppers reciting scripts in which they know either the diagnosis or appro-
priate treatment also report that providers put forth lower e ort. Customers
knowing either the diagnosis or appropriate treatment are 11.9 percentage
points less likely to report that the provider gave them enough time and
8.5 percentage points less likely to report that all options were explained to
them. Panel B shows that these measures of low service quality are found
among each treatment group. The e ect of information on whether the
provider gave enough time ranges from 5.6 - 18.6 percentage points. The
e ect of information on whether the provider explained all options ranges
from 7.2-10.4 percentage points. Finally, shoppers who know only the first-
line treatment are 5 percentage points less likely to rate the provider as very
friendly. There is also a consistent negative e ect on the service quality index
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for all treatment groups. Amassing these variables into an index, shoppers
showing information rate vendors’ service quality 0.126 standard deviations
lower. Results are robust to a wide range of specifications and samples.53
1.8 Mechanisms: Reputation E ects and the
Value of Service Quality
While the experimental results show that prices and quality change in re-
sponse to customer information, they do not explain how or why price and
quality di erentials can persist within a market. In this section, I use two
di erent approaches to identify plausible mechanisms driving the experimen-
tal results. First, I estimate hedonic regressions of price on quality from the
experimental data to show that there is a service quality, but not a drug
quality, “premium.” These results explain why customers within the market
do not necessarily find it optimal to declare that the patient has malaria
(a commonly known disease). Although customers would enjoy a 5 percent
price decrease, customers would also experience lower service quality, a val-
ued attribute of the good. Second, I analyze additional survey data from real
customers, testing the key assumptions of the conceptual model. The results
suggest that information may signal to providers additional characteristics
53Note that providers could assume that customers with information do not want such
advice or questioning, or assume that less was required of them. I interpret both of those
motivations as consistent with both the model and theoretical analysis. However, as health
professionals they are expected to act in the interest of the patient’s and the public health.
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regarding consumer demand. In particular, providers may believe customers
with more information are less likely to return to the outlet and less likely to
value good service. Providers would then strategically allocate lower quality
drugs to customers where the reputation incentives are weaker.
Importance of Service: Hedonic Models
One di culty is that price, quality, and service quality are all di erent out-
comes but measured during the same transaction. As a result, the changes
in outcomes may be correlated. For example, if price and drug quality were
correlated then it would be hard to justify drug quality as unobservable at
the time of purchase; similarly, a price di erential could persist in the market
if it is related to service quality, and may reflect the market valuation of good
service. Using my experimental data, I analyze these issues by estimating
hedonic regressions of the form:
PricePaidst = ’0+ ’1ServiceQualityst+ ’2DrugQualityst“v+‰ÕX+ ‘st (1.8)
Results in Table 1.11 support the interpretation that providers increase
the price charged based upon the e ort/service quality that they give. For
each additional standard deviation of the service quality index, the average
price paid increases by $0.36. The service quality index is significantly and
positively correlated with the price paid, although measures of drug quality
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are not correlated with the price paid. These results imply service quality
is observable and valued on the margin; drug quality, as an unobservable
measure of quality, cannot be priced in the market. This finding is robust to
a log price specification, using the price index as an outcome, and controlling
for drug fixed e ects.
The hedonic regressions support the interpretation that service quality is
a valued attribute of the good. Therefore, the market price reflects that the
marginal customer positively values this attribute, increasing prices as service
quality increases. Individuals with less information appear more willing to
pay for service quality. This intuition explains not only the experimental
results but also suggests why the majority of real customers continue to ask
for provider opinions, even though there are price decreases from presenting
information. If price falls at the expense of good service, customers may
simply not find it optimal to invest in information.
Evidence from Real Customers
One drawback of the experimental data is that I cannot explicitly document
what a given provider believes about customers with di erent levels of infor-
mation. For example, providers may believe that customers with di erent
levels of information regarding the disease may also di er in characteristics
correlated with individual demand, such as wealth, the likelihood of using
preventive measures, or the likelihood of returning to the outlet. Therefore,
I use additional data collected from real customers to estimate what demand
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characteristics are also correlated with information. The assumption under-
lying this analysis is that characteristics observable to the econometrician
would also be known to the provider.
I divide real customers who purchased antimalarial drugs into two groups:
customers with information, and those without information. Real customers
who report knowing either the disease (malaria) or a specific treatment are
classified as having information, to mimic the experimental design. Real cus-
tomers who report asking for both a diagnosis and a product recommendation
are classified as not having information. This divides the sample roughly in
half.
First, I analyze whether the correlation of information with transaction
outcomes is of the same sign as that found in the experiment. Results in
Panel A of Table 1.12 show that customers with information do not di er
in the likelihood of purchasing AL, but they are substantially less likely to
report that the patient took a malaria test. They are less likely to buy
an additional product, spend less money for the product, and have a lower
total bill.54 Although I cannot separate consumer preferences from provider
behavior, the net result of the transaction is similar to the experimental
results with a negative omitted variables bias. Therefore, if provider beliefs
explain the results, beliefs must be negatively correlated with information
and positively correlated with price, or vice versa.
54Note that because drugs purchased from real customers were not tested, I am unable
to directly test the correlation of drug quality with real customer characteristics.
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Second, I look at demand characteristics associated with customer in-
formation to test if providers lower quality and lower price on the basis of
observable characteristics. In particular, I examine characteristics that are
correlated with treatment-seeking and potential reputation incentives, such
as repeat visits: income, education, and being a repeat customer. Results in
Panel B show that there is only one characteristic with a statistically signifi-
cant correlation with information: whether or not the customer was a repeat
customer. Customers with no information are 15 percentage points more
likely to be a repeat customer than customers with more information, signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. While counterintuitive that customers appear
to repeatedly visit providers and ask for information about their purchases
– in other words there is little learning about health taking place– this pat-
tern is consistent with previous research in the health market (Ingham and
Miller, 1983; Das and Hammer, 2014). In contrast, the other potential char-
acteristics that may be correlated with both demand characteristics and/or
information, such as distance, preventive health behaviors, household char-
acteristics, and gender, are not found to be significantly correlated.
Finally, I adapt the specification in Equation (1.7) to examine the robust-
ness of this interpretation. Specifically, I examine the link between informa-
tion and the value of customer service. Real customers were asked where they
typically shop, and why they choose this particular store for their purchase
that day.
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Yst = ⁄0 + ⁄1AnyInformationst + “v + ÂÕX + µst (1.9)
where AnyInformation is a dummy variable indicating that the real cus-
tomer either knew their diagnosis or asked for a specific product.55 I test
whether information is correlated with the value placed on good service, con-
trolling for whether the patient was an adult, income, years of education, and
village fixed e ects. Results in Table 1.13 show that customers with relatively
more information are less likely to value a variety of customer service mea-
sures in choosing a store for their purchases.56 For example, customers with
information are 23.6 percentage points less likely to cite customer care as a
reason for choosing that outlet for their purchase. Other reasons for choosing
the outlet–cheap prices, convenience/distance, or good product selection–do
not di er between customers with more or less information. This analysis
is not consistent with di erent outside options by information revealed to
providers. This analysis instead suggests that the two characteristics of de-
mand negatively correlated with information are the likelihood of returning
and the value of customer service. Both of these characteristics support the
conclusions of the theoretical framework: customers with less information are
more likely to purchase a high-quality drug, pay higher prices, and receive a
higher service quality/e ort.
55I do not di erentiate between asking for AL specifically and asking for a di erent drug
or brand.
56Note that multiple responses were allowed.
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Policy Implications
The problems of asymmetric information in healthcare and other markets
for “experts” are well known. One strategy for correcting market failures is
to empower patients with increased information. Comparing results from a
symmetric information equilibrium to an asymmetric equilibrium leads to the
conclusion that improved customer information improves customer welfare.
However, this logic does not account for any potential strategic responses
from providers to maximize profit, and assumes that customers can credibly
signal a su cient level of information to providers. In this paper, I show
that information asymmetries are more di cult to correct than the standard
model predicts.
There are three primary lessons for policymakers to consider as a result of
this paper’s conclusions. First, information campaigns may have direct e ects
on the market price and quality. In particular, providers recognize that not
all people learn or “take up” information. In line with the existing evidence
on other health campaigns, my results are consistent with a model in which
certain demand groups are more likely to take up and utilize information
at the point of sale than others. As a result, profit-maximizing providers
use that information to price discriminate according to information, with
di erent outcomes for di erent groups of consumers.
Second, decreases in quality limit the gains to consumers from learning
and using health information. While price falls would be thought of as welfare
enhancing for consumers, incorporating quality changes the welfare calcula-
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tion. I show that unless quality is su ciently correlated with information
at the point of sale, quality may actually decline as a result of improved
customer information. The documented falls in quality are important for
understanding the welfare gains to information and rationalizing individual
decision making. For individuals who strongly value service quality from
their health providers, the net welfare gain from investing in increased infor-
mation may be small. Therefore, it makes sense that uninformed customers
do not find it optimal to invest in information if the result is lower service
or lower drug quality. As a result, information gaps can persist, even for a
common disease with a relatively simple treatment regimen.
Finally, improved customer information has limits on what it can accom-
plish, particularly in experience goods markets. The finding that information
could potentially reduce price but may also reduce quality does not imply that
individuals should be prevented from learning information about their pur-
chases. My results suggest that information campaigns intended to empower
customers regarding their purchases may have been somewhat successful at
lowering prices for those consumers. In situations in which price is the pri-
mary barrier to utilization, my results suggest that an individual would be
charged approximately 5.6 percent less.57 Other types of policies, including
increased regulation, would be necessary in order to improve drug quality
57It is di cult to translate this price reduction into increases in demand. Cohen et al.
(2015) estimate that among adults, the price elasticity of demand is ≠0.318, implying a
demand increase of only 1.8 percent. However, that is an out-of-sample prediction given
the average prices in my data.
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and overall market functioning. However, my results are specific to the type
of information varied. Information regarding prices, for example, could have
a very di erent e ect on the market.
1.9 Conclusion
Asymmetric information is a characteristic of health markets and other mar-
kets for experts. Understanding how to improve the functioning of such
markets has implications for individual costs and societal health. One pro-
posed solution to decrease information asymmetries is to empower customers
with information, potentially making customers less susceptible to fraud and
quackery. However, existing research does not indicate how providers will
respond to individual patients with more healthcare knowledge.
In this paper, I present results from a randomized audit study in the
Ugandan antimalarial drug market to assess whether customers with more
information pay di erent prices or receive drugs of a di erent quality. My
findings suggest that providers respond to increased information through
reducing prices, drug quality, and service quality. Prices for the recommended
first-line malaria drug fall by approximately $0.18. If, instead, shoppers
had bought the product recommended by the provider, the price di erential
would have increased to $0.27. In contrast, I find that drug quality falls by
3.4 percentage points in response to increased customer information. I also
find substantial decreases in service quality in response to increased customer
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information.
I interpret these results through a model of price discrimination in an
experience good market with two types of customers. All customers must
decide whether to accept or reject their purchase without knowing quality at
the time of purchase. Providers maximize profits over two periods, trading
o  the benefits of current period profits against the decrease in future profits
if they sell a low-quality drug. Through this framework, I find that providers
charge higher prices when they provide higher service quality, in order to en-
sure customers agree to purchase the drug. However, providers strategically
allocate low-quality drugs to customers from whom they would be less likely
to lose profits in the future, were low drug quality to be detected.
This study is an important contribution to the growing literature on mar-
kets with experience goods. Previous work has focused on situations where
there are no information asymmetries, as in when doctors themselves need
medical treatment. That work suggests that empowering customers should
lead to improved quality, more appropriate care, and lower incurred costs.
In contrast, I conclude that customers may have di culty signaling credibly
the same level of information as a provider at the time of purchase. Particu-
larly in contexts with low levels of human capital and low levels of enforced
regulation, consumers may continue be vulnerable to deception, even if they
present relevant information at the time of purchase. More research needs
to be done on problems of consumer deception worldwide, and whether re-
sults di er in non-health markets with experience goods. In this context, my
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results suggest that increasing consumer information does not necessarily im-
prove welfare once quality is accounted for. Therefore, information should
not be the a sole strategy for improving consumer and social welfare, but
should be used in conjunction with other interventions to improve access to
high-quality healthcare worldwide.
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Figure 1.1: Project Timeline
Random Selection of Parishes
Census of All Outlets within Parish
Mystery Shopping Visits (2)
Repeat Incor-
rect Shopper
Visits and
Closed Shops
Drug Ven-
dor SurveyExit Interviews
Spectrometry Analysis of Purchased Drugs
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Figure 1.2: Experimental Protocol
Describe the 4 symptoms of malaria
“I think he has malaria” “What do youthink he has?”
“I want AL”
“What
do you
recommend?”
“I want AL”
“What
do you
recommend?”
Buy drug, leave store. Fill
survey on transaction.
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Figure 1.3: Demonstration of A Raman Spectrometry Scan
Panel A: A Counterfeit Scan
Panel B: Discovery Mode- Counterfeit, But Not
Substandard
Notes: Raman spectroscopy works by blasting a molecule with an
intense beam of light that causes the molecule’s electrons to scatter
in a specific fashion unique to the molecule. Above is a picture
of the Raman spectra from a sample of AL that was classified as
“Counterfeit but not substandard”. In both panels, the darkest line
is the Raman spectrum of the purchased tablet. In Panel A, the
spectrum is compared against the spectrum of the brand on the
purchased drug label. These spectra do not match. In Panel B, the
spectrum is compared against the spectra of all other brands. The
spectra matches.
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Figure 1.4: Price Dispersion
Notes: Above is the graph of the price range within a village for the final drug purchased
among all drugs purchased. Each bar is a separate village. The price is the final price
paid, measured in USD. The exchange rate is $1=2593 UGX.
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Figure 1.5: Price Distribution
Notes: Above is the graph of the o er (pre-bargaining) and transaction prices
(post-bargaining) for the final drug purchased, in USD. The exchange rate is $1=2593
UGX. The sample is restricted to 802 purchases of AL, and excludes 4 high outlying
values of the distribution, greater than $10.00.
69
Table 1.1: Script Distribution and Study Design
Ask for Diagnosis Know
Malaria
TOTAL
Ask for a
Recommendation
Control Treatment 1:
Know Only
Malaria
0.261 0.248
N = 230 N=218 448
Know AL Treatment 2:
Know Only Drug
Treatment 3:
Know
Malaria &
Drug
0.250 0.240
N = 220 N = 211 431
TOTAL 450 429 879
Notes: Above is the realized marginal distribution of scripts that were randomly assigned
to shoppers in the analysis sample. N=879. Each cell was designed to have an equal prob-
ability of selection.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Drug Prices and Costs
N Percent
of Total
Average
Price
(UGX)
Average
Price
(USD)
Average
Cost
(USD)
Panel A: All Active
Ingredients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AL 806 0.86 8275 3.19 1.28
Quinine 34 0.04 6429 2.48 1.19
SP 79 0.09 2915 1.12 0.59
Other First-Line 7 0.08 12857 4.96 4.16
Other 7 0.08 4071 1.52 0.71
TOTAL 933 1.00 7757 2.99 1.25
Panel B: AL Sample,
by Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Brand A 112 0.14 7393 2.85 1.15
Brand B 253 0.31 7879 3.04 1.27
Brand C 150 0.19 9690 3.74 1.29
Brand D 38 0.05 8144 3.14 1.35
Brand E 35 0.04 10014 3.86 1.87
Brand F 208 0.26 7889 3.04 1.24
Brand G 1 0.00 10000 3.86 ≠
Brand H (mixed) 9 0.01 9333 3.60 ≠
TOTAL 806 1.00 8275 3.19 1.28
Notes: Above are summary statistics of the transaction price by type of active ingredient
(Panel A) and by brand (Panel B). All are simple means from a cross-section. The active
ingredients relevant to the study include artemether-lumefantrine (AL), quinine sulphate,
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP), and all other types of antimalarial drugs. Other first-line
includes all brands listed as currently e ective according to the Ugandan NDA. Panel B con-
tains summary statistics of transaction price by brand of the most commonly purchased active
ingredient, artemether-lumefrantrine (AL). The conversion rate is approximately $1=2593
UGX. Costs are averages of the reported of unit cost by brand within a parish.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Provider Survey
Panel A: Vendor Characteristics Average
Age 30.1
Male 0.230
Born in this parish 0.089
Qualified person 0.360
Years of Experience as Vendor/Pharmacist 6.190
Score on Malaria Transmission Test 0.808
Knows firstline treatment 0.844
Correct protocol for AL 0.282
Panel B: Outlet and Customer Characteristics
Number of Customers 21.8
Number of Customers Seeking Malaria Treatment 6.14
Percent Customers Know by Name 0.428
Percent of Customers That Ask for Advice on What to Purchase 0.647
Percent of Customers that Ask for a Diagnosis 0.659
Outlet tests for malaria 0.531
Outlet has beds to treat patients 0.468
Charge Consultation Fee 0.142
Monthly Profits (USD), Median 77.13
Number of Employees 2.4
Visited by NDA Regulator in past 6 months 0.716
HH Index Measure of Market Concentration (Village Level) 0.366
Number of Outlets Within Walking Distance 10.0
Notes: Summary statistics from the vendor survey (N=451). “Qualified person” is a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the respondent had the minimum educational and experience qualifications
to operate and/or dispense medicines at a drug shop. “Score on Malaria Transmission Test” is
the percentage correct of six questions on malaria transmission. “Firstline treatment” is a dummy
variable for whether the respondent correctly stated the recommended firstline treatment for un-
complicated malaria (AL). “Correct protocol” indicates whether the respondent knew the correct
schedule for a full dosage of AL. “Number of customers per day” and “Number of customers seeking
malaria treatment per day” refer to the total number of customers who visited the outlet the pre-
vious day. “Percent of Customers...” refers to the number of customers on an average day.“Charge
consultation fee” is a dummy variable for whether the outlet ever charged consultation fees for diag-
nostic services. “Monthly profits” is measured in US dollars, and is the stated value of profits from
the establishments (sales - costs) over the previous month. The conversion rate is approximately
$1=2593 UGX.“HH Index” is the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of market concentration.
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Table 1.6: E ect of Information on Drug Prices
Price
O ered,
Analysis
Sample
Price
O ered
of Rec’d
Option
Ln(Price
O ered)
Price
Index
Panel A: Any Information (1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Information ≠0.183úú ≠0.269úú ≠0.053ú ≠0.081úúú
(0.093) (0.111) (0.030) (0.031)
Panel B: Type of Information (1) (2) (3) (4)
T1:Know Only Malaria ≠0.230úú ≠0.143 ≠0.051 ≠0.081úú
(0.116) (0.139) (0.034) (0.039)
T2:Know Only Drug ≠0.129 ≠0.284úú ≠0.043 ≠0.070úú
(0.107) (0.124) (0.039) (0.034)
T3:Know Malaria & Drug ≠0.192ú ≠0.375úúú ≠0.066ú ≠0.090úú
(0.107) (0.131) (0.035) (0.035)
Observations 879 869 879 879
R-squared 0.572 0.518 0.528 0.574
Number of Clusters 459 458 459 459
P-value Malaria= 0 0.110 0.013 0.137 0.032
P-value Drug= 0 0.193 0.012 0.172 0.029
Mean of Dep. 3.585 3.785 1.180 0.009
Notes: Sample in the first columns is all visits at which a drug is purchased. Sample
in columns 2-5 is all visits at which a purchase was made and the drug could be tested
(N=879). All specifications contain village, shopper, and visit order fixed e ects. All prices
are in US Dollars. In Panel A, “Any information” refers to whether the covert shopper was
assigned to either know the diagnosis (malaria) or know the drug they wanted (AL). The
price index is the average z-score of the following variables: price o er, price paid, high-
est price o ered, lowest price o ered, price variation, average price o ered, and whether
or not bargaining was successful. The script and patient in all specifications is the ran-
domly assigned script/patient. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the out-
let level.ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 1.7: E ect of Information on Profits
All Visits Conditional on
Purchase and
Drug Testing
Profit,
O er
Price
Profit,
Price
Paid
Profit,
O er
Price
Profit,
Price
Paid
Panel A: Any Information (1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Information ≠0.223 ú ú ≠0.211úúú ≠0.192 ú ú ≠0.194 ú ú
(0.086) (0.078) (0.091) (0.086)
Panel B: Type of Information (1) (2) (3) (4)
T1:Know Only Malaria ≠0.217 ú ú ≠0.205 ú ú ≠0.264 ú ú ≠0.253 ú ú
(0.105) (0.096) (0.117) (0.111)
T2:Know Only Drug ≠0.179 ≠0.171ú ≠0.102 ≠0.104
(0.109) (0.097) (0.101) (0.090)
T3:Know Malaria & Drug ≠0.269 ú ú ≠0.254úúú ≠0.210 ú ú ≠0.223 ú ú
(0.109) (0.096) (0.105) (0.095)
Constant 1.628úúú 1.284úúú 1.758úúú 1.421úúú
(0.318) (0.286) (0.232) (0.226)
P-value Malaria= 0 0.034 0.023 0.058 0.041
P-value Drug= 0 0.039 0.023 0.138 0.062
R-squared 0.430 0.406 0.553 0.533
Observations 984 984 876 876
Number of clusters 492 492 459 459
Notes: Sample in columns 1 and 2 is all visits at which a profit margin could be calculated (N=984).
The sample in Columns 3 and 4 is all visits in which a drug was purchased, the drug could be tested,
and a profit margin could be calculated for the transaction. Profit margins are calculated by sub-
tracting the parish average unit cost for that brand from the price paid or the o er price. Visits in
which there was no sale are coded as zeros. Prices are in US dollars. Brands for which there was
no recorded unit cost at the parish level were set to the average cost of that brand at the district
level. The script in all specifications is the randomly assigned script. In Panel A, “Any information”
refers to whether the covert shopper was assigned to either know the diagnosis (malaria) or know
the drug they wanted (AL). “P-value Malaria=0” is the p-value from an F-test that the scripts indi-
cating information of malaria are jointly zero. “P-value Drug=0” is the p-value from an F-test that
the scripts indicating information of first-line treatment are jointly zero. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the outlet level. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 1.8: E ect of Information on O erings and Additional Products
Number
of Options
Presented
Additional
Products
Menu
Index
Panel A: Any Information (1) (2) (3)
Any Information ≠0.092ú ≠0.133úúú ≠0.440úúú
(0.056) (0.037) (0.038)
Panel B: Type of Information (1) (2) (3)
T1:Know Only Malaria 0.015 ≠0.090úú ≠0.072
(0.085) (0.044) (0.045)
T2:Know Only Drug ≠0.129ú ≠0.130úúú ≠0.550úúú
(0.066) (0.046) (0.046)
T3:Know Malaria & Drug ≠0.159úú ≠0.177úúú ≠0.686úúú
(0.062) (0.045) (0.044)
Constant 1.748úúú 0.615úúú 0.083
(0.160) (0.087) (0.089)
P-value Malaria= 0 0.023 0.001 0.000
P-value Drug= 0 0.031 0.000 0.000
Observations 879 879 879
R-squared 0.268 0.338 0.495
Number of clusters 459 459 459
Notes: Sample is all visits (N=879) where the shopper interacted with a person and
a drug was purchased. In Panel A, “Any information” refers to whether the covert
shopper was assigned to either know the diagnosis (malaria) or know the drug they
wanted (AL). Outcomes where the dependent variable is a dummy variable are esti-
mated using a linear probability model. The menu index is the average normalized
score for all outcome variables within the family of menu o erings: whether or not
there was a recommendation made, the total number of drugs o ered, and whether
or not the shopper was o ered additional products. The script and patient in all
specifications is the randomly assigned script/patient. All specifications include vil-
lage and shopper fixed e ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the outlet level. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 1.11: Hedonic Regressions
—–Price Paid—– —–Ln(Price Paid)—–
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Service quality index 0.367úú 0.320úú 0.076úú 0.051ú
(0.156) (0.146) (0.035) (0.027)
Drug quality index 0.013 0.025 0.012 0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 2.689úúú 2.474úúú 0.966úúú 0.920úúú
(0.224) (0.273) (0.066) (0.052)
Brand Fixed E ects X X
Observations 867 867 867 867
R-squared 0.56 0.65 0.521 0.76
Notes: Sample is the analysis sample, all visits resulting in a drug purchase that could later be
tested (N=879). Prices paid are in US dollars. The exchange rate at the time of data collection
is approximately $1USD = 2593 UGX. Service quality index is an average z-score of the following
variables: whether the provider reported asking questions regarding health; whether the provider
gave su cient time to the shopper; whether the shopper felt like all of their options were explained
to them; whether the vendor was reported as either friendly or unfriendly, whether the patient was
advised to take a malaria test, and whether the vendor expressed doubts regarding the diagnosis
of malaria. Unfriendly is coded negatively. The drug quality index is the average z-score of the
following variables (positively coded) correct dosage, (negatively coded) diverted drug, counterfeit,
substandard, fraction of tablets substandard, and fraction of tablets counterfeit. All regressions
control for village fixed e ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the outlet level.
ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 1.12: Surveys from Real Customers
All
Cus-
tomers
Any
Infor-
mation
No
Infor-
mation
P-
value
of Dif-
ference
P-
value
With
Village
FE
(N=372) (N=178) (N=194 )
Panel A: Transaction Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bought AL 0.608 0.539 0.670 0.010úúú 0.318
Malaria Test 0.310 0.191 0.420 0.000úúú 0.000úúú
Bought Add Product 0.557 0.475 0.632 0.002úúú 0.062ú
Product Price 2.53 2.19 2.84 0.000úúú 0.006úúú
Total Bill 3.05 2.34 3.70 0.000úúú 0.002úúú
Panel B: Demographic Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repeat Customer 0.778 0.698 0.853 0.000úúú 0.000úúú
Prim School or Less 0.253 0.281 0.228 0.244 0.270
Secondary School 0.445 0.449 0.443 0.7871 0.980
Distance From Shop 23.3 26.0 20.8 0.108 0.613
Mosquito Net 0.823 0.818 0.828 0.804 0.432
Malaria Literacy 0.737 0.735 0.740 0.845 0.512
Have child in HH 0.755 0.747 0.763 0.726 0.745
Borrowed Money 0.150 0.154 0.146 0.832 0.963
Income 152.02 152.03 152.01 0.999 0.822
Female Respondent 0.505 0.497 0.513 0.763 0.460
Notes: Sample is customers at shops in the study who reported buying an antimalarial drug (N=372). Re-
gressions exclude missing values or responses of “I don’t know”. Column (2) refers to the sub-sample of
the entire group of antimalarial customers who reported knowing either the diagnosis or the product they
wanted at the time of purchase (“Any Information”). Column (3) refers to the sub-sample of the entire
group of antimalarial customers who reported asking the vendor for both a diagnosis and a product rec-
ommendation (“No Information”). Within Columns (1)-(3) are averages for that subsample; Column (4)
contains p-values from tests of the null that Column (2)’s average is equal to Column (3)’s average. Column
(4) contains p-values of the same test, only inclusive of village fixed e ects. All prices and income variables
are expressed in 2013 US dollars; the exchange rate is $1US = 2593 UGX. Price paid is the transaction price
of the primary item, and total bill is the total bill inclusive of any additional products purchased. Repeat
customer is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the customer reported buying from the shop before
this purchase. Prim School or Less is a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent had completed
primary school; Sec school was whether or not the respondent had completed secondary schooling (excludes
primary school). Distance to shop is self-reported minutes spent walking to shop, and excludes those who
said that they do not live within walking distance. Mosquito net is a dummy variable whether the respon-
dent to the survey reported they slept under a mosquito net the previous night. Borrowed money is whether
or not the respondent had borrowed money from family or friends to complete the purchase. Income refers
to self-reported income the previous month. Malaria literacy score is an aggregate percentage correct of 6
questions on malaria transmission. Have a child in the household is a dummy variable for whether the re-
spondent had a child under 5. Statistical significance is determined clusters standard errors at the outlet
level.ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Chapter 2: An Evaluation of
Factors A ecting Drug Quality:
Evidence from the Antimalarial
Market in Uganda
2.1 Introduction
According to many di erent measures, the quality of healthcare is low in
many developing countries. Providers lack required training, are unable to
accurately diagnose ailments, and there is a substantial gap between provider
knowledge and practice (Das et al., 2012; Das and Hammer, 2007; Leonard
and Masatu, 2008). One measure of low healthcare quality is the prevalence
of counterfeit drugs. According to a recent meta-analysis, between 12 to
50 percent of anti-malarial drugs sold in the private sector in sub-Saharan
Africa are counterfeit, substandard or falsified (Nayyar et al., 2012). Low-
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quality drugs may harm individuals by delaying e ective treatment or wast-
ing money. They are also a public health concern, as they contribute to
drug-resistant diseases (Okeke et al., 1999). Identifying ways to improve an-
timalarial drug quality– without raising prices– is important to improving
the quality of healthcare, and ultimately health, in resource-poor countries.
Despite the substantial potential threat that low quality drugs pose to
global health, there is a lack of sound empirical evidence on the preva-
lence rate of low-quality drugs. These limitations are because of substantial
methodological challenges. The antimalarial drug market in low-resource
countries is typically composed of informal establishments with loosely en-
forced regulation. O cial records may be incomplete or inaccurate, and
building a sample frame to estimate an “average” market rate of drug qual-
ity is di cult. The gold standard to measure drug quality– chemical assays
to determine the percentage of active ingredients– are also time-consuming
and expensive to conduct for a large number of samples. As a result of these
challenges, the existing literature instead focuses on documenting that coun-
terfeit and substandard drugs are found in a variety of countries and drug
classes. Empirical work typically relies on small samples and non-random
sampling methods. Therefore, little is known about what explains variation
in drug quality rates within a country, whether price acts as a signal of quality
or if shopkeepers are complicit in the sale of deceptively low quality drugs.
To address these limitations in the previous literature, we conduct a study
with two primary objectives: 1) To estimate the average prevalence of low-
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quality antimalarial drugs; 2) To ascertain what transaction, customer, and
vendor characteristics are associated with low-quality drugs. We purchase
933 dosages from 438 outlets in randomly sampled areas of Uganda to es-
timate the average prevalence of counterfeit and substandard antimalarial
drugs. We focus on artemether-lumefantrine (AL), the WHO recommended
first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria in Uganda. We concentrate
on AL due to previous evidence of a high counterfeit rate for this drug and
the significant health implications to consumers from ine ective treatment.
We inspect and test all drugs using a handheld spectrometer, a device that is
suitable for field studies and that can quickly test drugs for authenticity. This
device also allows us to distinguish between two types of low-quality drugs:
1) counterfeit, yet medically e ective drugs, and, 2) substandard medicines,
those less likely to be medically e ective. We link transaction data on the
tested drugs with survey data from vendors at the outlets and real customers.
This rich descriptive data allow us to examine supply and demand factors
that are correlated with drug quality. We report results from survey mod-
ules on shop operations, low quality drugs, and survey exercises to estimate
whether providers know they sell low-quality drugs.
Contrary to the existing literature, we find that drug quality is relatively
high in the study area. While we find that counterfeit drugs are relatively
common at 17 percent, we estimate only 4 percent of drugs are substan-
dard. While we cannot generalize beyond the study area, or to other classes
of drugs, it appears that estimates in the previous literature are an upper
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bound on the rate of low-quality drugs. Our additional analysis of corre-
lates leads to the three stylized facts regarding counterfeit and substandard
drugs: 1) substandard low-quality drugs are typically diluted versions of
high-quality drugs, as opposed to “sugar pills”; 2) substandard drugs are de-
ceptive, and customers cannot distinguish substandard medicines from high-
quality medicines; 3) a small number of vendors are complicit in the sale of
low-quality drugs. However, identifying outlets and vendors that are more
likely to sell low-quality drugs is di cult. Vendor behavior changes only
slightly during low-quality drug sales. Observable characteristics of the es-
tablishment are generally not correlated with drug quality, and we reject the
theory that degradation is a cause of low-quality drugs. We also find that
areas with more competition have higher drug quality rates and that men
are slightly more likely to be sold a substandard drug. Our data also support
the interpretation that mobile drug hawkers are how substandard medicines
infiltrate supply chains. We end with a discussion of potential policy inter-
ventions, including results from the vendors themselves on what would likely
work to further improve drug quality rates.
While our data are extensive, there are some limitations in our analysis.
Results are specific to the study setting and context. Although our data are
from randomly selected areas, we document important geographic hetero-
geneity. Thus, even studies based on random sampling may find di erent av-
erage rates. We also caution that our empirical analysis on correlates should
not be interpreted as causal parameters. We account for potential confound-
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ing characteristics in our analysis, but there is likely bias due to omitted
variables in our estimates. Finally, we are unable to measure seasonal for
time-varying factors, or the drug quality rates of other drug classifications.
Theses limitations highlight the pressing need for ongoing, large-scale studies
of drug quality in important markets for global health.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide relevant
background on antimalarial treatment and the Ugandan operating environ-
ment. 2.3 we provide the theoretical framework of our analysis, potential
theories of how and why low-quality drugs end in markets. We next turn to
describing how our study addresses each of these theories in Section 2.4, and
describe the data that we collect. In Section 2.5 we present descriptive results
and in Section 2.6 we outline our empirical estimating equation. In Section
?? we present our results on the correlates of low-quality drugs. We then
discuss important mechanisms to interpret our results, namely if providers
are complicit in the sale of low-quality drugs in Section 2.8. In Section 2.9
we conclude.
2.2 Study Background
We first outline the market for antimalarial treatment in Uganda. We discuss
the choices that individuals have for antimalarial treatment. We conclude
with an outline of the policies and laws relevant to the sale of low-quality
drugs.
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Healthcare in Uganda
All essential medicines, including antimalarial treatment, are available for
free in public sector facilities. However, there are not enough facilities to meet
the needs of the population. As a result, the public sector is characterized
by long waiting times, poor service quality, and frequent stock-outs. There
are also concerns of corruption and diversion of free medicines from public
sector outlets for sale in the private sector. As a result of these problems in
public sector distribution, the private sector is the first source of treatment
for common diseases such as malaria.
As in many other markets of developing countries, the private sector for
healthcare in Uganda is informal and loosely regulated. In Uganda specifi-
cally, individuals typically buy antimalarial medicines in the private sector,
composed of nearly 17,000 drug shops and clinics, and 415 pharmacies (ACT-
watch Group, PACE/Uganda & the Independent Evaluation Team, 2012).
Despite their key role in healthcare delivery, vendors typically have inade-
quate medical qualifications. Stanback et al. (2011) estimates that up to 60
percent of drug vendors operate without the regulated medical qualifications
and licenses, potentially contributing to the low levels of healthcare quality.
Anti-malarial Treatment in Uganda
In Uganda, malaria represents the number one burden of illness. It is en-
demic throughout the country. The recommended first-line treatment of
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uncomplicated malaria is artemether-lumefantrine (AL) (ACTwatch Group,
PACE/Uganda & the Independent Evaluation Team, 2012). AL is part of a
larger class of medicines known as ACTs (artemisinin-combination therapies),
and is over 95 percent e ective in both adults and children (Baird, 2005).
Quinine is another e ective medicine, and commonly dispensed. However,
is intended to be reserved as a second-line treatment and for complicated
malaria (a severe form of malaria that can result in death, and primarily
a ects children). Older treatments– such as sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine
(SP) – are widely available, and cheap, but are clinically ine ective due to
parasitic resistance (ACTwatch Group, PACE/Uganda & the Independent
Evaluation Team, 2012).
Work as recent as 2011 has found that AL is available at only 30 per-
cent of outlets across six sub-Saharan African countries, including Uganda
(O’Connell et al., 2011). This low rate of availability may be due to either
low supply, low demand, or both. Stock-outs are reportedly common in the
private sector, potentially due to ine cient stock management and poorly
functioning supply chains. On the demand side, this low level of utilization
is potentially due to high prices, low levels of caregiver awareness, or due to
beliefs that low quality drugs are widespread. AL is a relatively newer treat-
ment, and relatively expensive. In contrast to other sub-Saharan African
countries, there is no regulation on prices in Uganda and few people have
health insurance; thus, health care is paid nearly entirely out-of-pocket. Mis-
conceptions regarding malaria transmission are common, and symptomatic
89
diagnosis from caregivers is problematic. Low-drug quality may also con-
tribute to suboptimal utilization. If caregivers cannot tell the di erence
between high and low quality drugs, then standard economic theory predicts
that households will be less willing to purchase drugs at all, potentially lead-
ing the market to collapse (Akerlof, 1970). As a result of these issues, is
estimated that one-third of febrile (“symptomatic”) children in Uganda do
not receive first-line anti-malarial drugs (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, ICF
International, 2012). Malaria is the second-leading cause of death among
children under 5 in Uganda.
To increase the usage of essential medicines, there are large-scale manu-
facturing subsidies on select brands of AL under di erent global donor pro-
grams. While prices have fallen nearly by half since 2011, prices remain more
than three times as high as the target price of the program (US$1).58 These
drugs are typically inspected for quality to ensure that minimum manufac-
turing standards are met. For example, the WHO pre-qualification program
is intended to insure that the subsidized drugs that are distributed through
governments and international agencies pass minimum quality standards.
58The e ectiveness, and cost-e ectiveness, of the subsidies at lowering prices is a subject
of debate in global health. Studies generally find that the large-scale subsides of the AMF-
m program were e ective at lowering prices (Tougher et al., 2012).
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Relevant Ugandan Laws and Other Institutional Back-
ground
There are also institutions and policies in place to regulate drug quality.
The government agency in charge of regulation is the Ugandan National
Drug Authority (NDA). As part of this mandate, the NDA has undertaken
initiatives to test imported drugs, license and regulate pharmacies and drug
shops, contribute to consumer sensitization on the rational use of medicines,
and raise awareness about the problem of counterfeit drugs. A recent audit
covering the period 2006-2010, however, indicates that the agency overall is
understa ed and under-funded to achieve these objectives.
In addition to poor regulation, there are weak criminal penalties for deal-
ing in fake drugs.59 As the problem of fake drugs has garnered attention, so
have attempts to enact stricter legal penalties. In 2010, the Ugandan Parlia-
ment considered a law entitled “The Anti-Counterfeiting Goods Bill of 2010”
that was intended to codify a maximum of 20 years of jail time for those
convicted of trading counterfeit goods, and give more power to regulators.
However, due to concerns over language, the bill has been tabled and is being
revised in committees within Parliament. Part of the issue is that there is
no international consensus for the definition of a counterfeit drug. There are
concerns that under proposed laws, non-branded generics could become ille-
59A legal o cer at UNBS has been quoted assaying that under current laws, the maxi-
mum penalty is two years imprisonment and a fine of 2000 shillings (approximately $0.81),
however some individuals have been sentenced in Uganda for longer periods and/or paid
larger fines (Mubiri, 2011).
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gal. Thus, eliminating counterfeit drugs may unintentionally restrict access
to medicines for the poor.
2.3 Theories of Low-Quality Drug Sales
In this section, we briefly outline various theories of how low quality drugs
appear at outlets. We divide the various theories of low drug quality into
three general categories: 1) demand-side factors, those factors that vary at
the transaction-level; 2) supply-side factors, those that vary at the outlet-
level; 3) institutional factors, including legal and social penalties, that vary
at the either the outlet or market level. While some factors could arguably
fit into several categories, our rough delineation will serve to guide the em-
pirical analysis while keeping the unit of observation roughly the same within
groups.
2.3.1 Demand-side Factors
The previous economics literature on low-quality drugs has focused on whether
consumers can identify counterfeit drugs through signals, namely price. Bate
et al. (2011) find in non-random samples from 17 countries that the price of
antimalarial drugs is weakly and positively correlated with drug quality, and
that the subjective shop appearance is also correlated with drug quality.
Bjorkman et al. (2012) similarly find that the counterfeit drug rate within
a non-random sample of project villages is weakly positively correlated with
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price. These facts suggest that 1) price is a noisy signal of quality and 2) a low
willingness-to-pay for quality of a drug, at least for the marginal consumer.
A complementary explanation for low-drug quality is that certain types of
customers are more likely to purchase low-quality drugs than others. Numer-
ous studies have documented that misconceptions about malaria causes and
symptoms are widespread, and low average education levels may make cus-
tomers more vulnerable to fraud. Bjorkman et al. (2012) also show that the
counterfeit rate is positively correlated with the average village understand-
ing of malaria transmission. In other words, shopkeepers take advantage of
low information customers and di erentially dispense substandard medicines
to such groups. This theory can be generalized into a theory of either taste-
based or statistical discrimination. Providers may simply not like individuals
with certain characteristics, and selectively choose to give them low quality
drugs. Alternatively, providers may make assumptions about demand char-
acteristics on the basis of customer appearance or behavior. For example,
providers may be able to guess an individual’s knowledge or eduction level, or
whether they are a local person, based upon gender or tribe of the shopper.
2.3.2 Supply-side Factors
Although a key source of healthcare in their communities, the private sector
for medicines are also firms whose objective is to make profits. Vendors make
choices of what drugs to stock, and when. As part of their decision, vendors
must also consider how to maximize profits based upon input costs. There
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are several di erent suppliers that vendors could use to procure new stock–
such as other retail outlets, wholesale pharmacies, or mobile drug hawkers–
and these suppliers may di er in their cost and quality of inventory. The
informal nature of the market and lack of enforced regulation may make
strategic behavior– such as selling cheaper, low quality drugs as high quality
drugs– more likely. This theory implies that low drug quality is the result of
vendors knowingly dispensing substandard drugs to unsuspecting customers
to maximize profits.
However, counterfeiters are adept at mimicking licit packaging. Providers
themselves could lack the ability to distinguish high quality from low quality
drugs. Additionally considering potentially low shopkeeper business acumen,
an alternative explanation may be that shopkeepers are deceived by suppliers
and unwittingly dispense low-quality medicines. Similarly, shopkeepers could
unintentionally sell low-quality drugs that have degraded over time due to
improper storage conditions. For example, exposure to heat, direct sunlight,
or humidity may cause active ingredients to degrade and become ine ective.
All of these factors may contribute to low-quality drug prevalence.
2.3.3 Competition and Other Institutional factors
Other aspects of the operating environment may also a ect the decision of a
given provider to sell low-quality drugs. For example, firms may also com-
pete over quality. Both Bennett and Yin (2014) and Bjorkman et al. (2012)
randomly introduce competition into the medicine market; Bennett and Yin
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(2014) randomizes chain store entry into urban areas of India and Bjorkman
et al. (2012) randomize a high-quality NGO competitor into monopolistic
villages in Uganda. Both find that the increase in competition causes an
increase in drug quality.
In addition to private sector competitors, firms may also face competition
from the public sector health facilities. Although shortages are reportedly
common, if drugs are available for free in public facilities then competing
over price is di cult.60 Instead, firms may improve market drug and service
quality to become more competitive instead.
A final salient factor may be the risks of legal or social penalties if the
vendor was caught selling low quality drugs at an outlet. Laws as enforced
make it di cult for legal penalties to be e ective. However, customers may
refuse to shop at the store. In addition, it is possible that drug vendors would
be socially ostracized, confronted, or potentially become victims of vigilante
justice. If these social sanctions vary by area, then perceived penalties of
may explain varying drug quality rates.
2.4 Study Design
We collect a robust set of data to address these various theories of drug
quality. Fieldwork took place from May-August 2013 and consisted of several
60Anecdotal evidence suggests that average quality falls when there are shortages in
the market; counterfeiters then enter in droves, where there are profits and a lack of licit
medicine. However, our data do not allow us to directly test this hypothesis.
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rounds of data collection. First, the sample frame was constructed by doing
a census of vendors within randomly selected areas. Second, two di erent
covert shoppers visited each outlet and each purchased an antimalarial drug
according to a randomly assigned script. Third, additional survey data were
collected from the drug dispenser at each outlet, and from real customers as
they were exiting the outlet. Figure 1.1 contains the project timeline.
2.4.1 Study Sites
Uganda is composed of 112 districts that are each divided into counties.61
Each county is further divided into subcounties; each subcounty is divided
into parishes; each parish is then divided into villages.62 Within each selected
study district, we randomly selected two rural and two urban subcounties.63
We then randomly selected two parishes within each urban subcounty and
three parishes within each rural subcounty, totaling 10 total parishes in each
of the five districts. For administrative reasons (such as fewer parishes in
some subcounties) the study contains a total of 45 parishes, in which there
are 142 villages with at least one drug outlet. We conservatively estimate that
the study area covers drug vendors serving approximately 200,000 people.
Study team members then conducted a census and mapped all drug out-
61The total number of districts at the time of data collection was 112.
62According to the 2002 census, the average size of a parish is 4,625 people; the average
size of a sub-county is 25,289. The average size of villages was not reported (Uganda
Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
63Bushenyi, Busia, Mbarara, Rukungiri, and Kampala (the capital) were chosen as study
districts due to their size and proximity to borders.
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lets within study parishes with a corresponding physical description of the
outside of the premises. I define drug outlet as “an immobile establishment
that sells antimalarial drugs for profit.”64 The nature of this sampling strat-
egy results in having a nearly complete picture of local antimalarial drug
markets.
2.4.2 Drug Purchases and Testing
Following the recommendations of Newton et al. (2009), a “mystery” shopper
was used to purchase medicines from these drug outlets.65 The following
protocol was used for purchasing drugs:
1. Buy the cheapest brand of AL o ered.
2. If a full dose of AL is not available, buy quinine.
3. If a full dose of quinine is not available, then buy the next cheapest
antimalarial available (typically SP).
4. If none of these is available, buy any other antimalarial.
5. If a full dose of any antimalarial is not available, do not buy anything.
At the conclusion of the fieldwork, all purchased drugs were inspected
by research assistants. The recorded drug characteristics include brand, ex-
64Note that this definition does not require that the establishment actually make a profit.
The study also includes a small number of “other” types of outlets (e.g.) individuals who
sell antimalarial drugs out of their homes, or shops that specialize in another market, such
as hardware stores, but also sell antimalarial drugs. However, herbal shops are excluded
from the sample frame, as are charitable or public sector hospitals or pharmacies.
65Shoppers used a randomized script to either declare that they have malaria or ask the
shopkeeper for a diagnosis; then they either asked for a specific product or for what the
shopkeeper recommends. There are significant observed di erences with respect to both
price and quality, and these results are reported in Fitzpatrick (2015).
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piration date, number of tablets, and whether the drug had public sector
markings (“diverted”). Drugs were then shipped to a laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Michigan for testing with a handheld Raman spectrometer, the
TruScanTM RM. Testing consists of comparing a purchased tablet with a
separate, high-quality authentic tablet of the same brand. As part of test-
ing we collected high-quality tablets from manufacturers and wholesalers in
Uganda, and built a “spectral library” for the study. Each purchased tablet
was tested at least once according to a strict protocol.66 Our analysis is
restricted to those dosages for which we were able to obtain a comparison
high-quality tablet (N=879).67
2.4.3 Definitions of Drug Quality
We define “counterfeit” as a purchased dosage (“sample”) for which at least
one tablet within the sample failed the spectrometry analysis. We aggregate
to the transaction/sample level in order to standardize the unit of analysis.
Note that the majority of medicines studied are non-branded “generics”; we
are not comparing the chemical composition of a generic to an innovator
brand, but rather a given brand to itself. “Counterfeit” refers to a tablet
that has a di erent Raman spectrum than the authentic comparison tablet
of the labeled brand. However, many brands are chemically similar. In addi-
66The protocol is listed in the Online Appendix for the companion paper, Fitzpatrick
(2015).
67To protect respondent and manufacturer confidentiality, we do not publish quality
results by brand or disaggregated results that could potentially identify outlets or locations.
98
tion, although tablets are intended to have uniform and consistent contents
and manufacturing, some brands may have high within-brand variation. In
practice a tablet that failed the comparison against its own high quality
authentic tablet could potentially match against another brand within the
library.68 We define “substandard” as a subset of counterfeit medicines where
the tablet’s spectra could not be matched to any high-quality authentic in the
library. The ability to cross-check the authenticity against other brands is
an advantage of creating a large spectral library, and testing a large number
of brands with the same active ingredient.
One potential concern with our methodology is that the high fluorescence
of the artemether can a ect the validity of testing with the handheld spec-
trometer. Hajjou et al. (2013) and Bate and Hess (2010) perform validation
exercises on a previous version of the TruScanTM RM. Both studies confirm
that there are a relatively high number of false-positives with respect to AL,
implying the potential bias from our method of testing would likely lead
to an overestimate of the rate of counterfeit and/or substandard drugs.69
Since the bias of the test is of a known direction, we retest all failing tablets
and a random subset of dosages with all passing tablets. This subset is 11
percent of all purchased tablets (N=2322). Results are in Appendix Table
68This is known as “low selectivity”, because many drug compositions are similar.
Among high-quality tablets of AL, for example, all brands were identical enough to at
least one other brand to pass. The selectivity tests are asymmetric and non-transitive,
because Brand A can be similar to Brand B, and Brand B can be similar to Brand C, but
Brand A can be di erent from Brand C.
69We are conducting additional analysis in order to estimate precisely the rates of Type
I and Type II error with the updated version of the machine that was used.
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2A.1. Conditional on a tablet passing the first scan, the likelihood it passes
the second scan is 98 percent; conditional on a tablet failing the first scan,
the likelihood that it fails the second scan is 75 percent. The correlation of
results across scans of the same tablet is 0.6659.
By aggregating the tablet results to the transaction level, we are able to
reduce the amount of variability in results. Conditional on a sample passing
according to the first scan, the likelihood that the sample would maintain
its classification in the second scan is 100 percent. Conditional on a sample
failing according to the first scan, the likelihood that the sample still fails
under subsequent testing is 72 percent. Therefore, by using a conservative
estimate of whether the tablet failed all of its scans, we are able to reduce
the spectrometer bias towards counterfeit medicines. We conclude that our
testing methodology is valid and internally consistent. In terms of external
validity, however, our results may represent an upper bound on the rate of
low-quality antimalarial drugs.
2.4.4 Other Data Sources
Later, we revisited the same outlets and conducted an extensive survey on
their background and shop operations (N=452). These surveys include 424
outlets where at least one dosage was purchased, and 415 outlets with a
complete survey and a purchase that was also part of the analysis sample (77
percent of all establishments). Enumerators recorded their observations of
the shop establishment, a facility observation survey. Among all purchases,
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we estimate that 85 percent of the individuals who dispensed the medicine
also answered the survey.70 In addition, surveys with real customers were
conducted at the same outlets (N=867). Of all of these customers, 372 had
purchased an antimalarial drug. All quality data and data at the transaction
come from mystery shopper purchases; no purchases from real customers were
tested. There is no correlation between drug quality and survey completion,
or drug quality and whether or not real customers were interviewed at the
store (not shown).
2.5 Descriptive Results
Before summarizing our key results on quality, we first present summaries of
outlet characteristics, including vendor beliefs on fake drugs. We specifically
frame our discussion in terms of the vendor and institutional characteristics
that may a ect the prevalence of low quality, and that we will later use
as correlates in our empirical analysis. We then present our key result that
drug quality is high in the study area, and that low-quality drugs are typically
diluted versions of high-quality drugs.
70Following both mystery shopping and the vendor survey, a member of the study team
filled out a short survey with a physical description of the dispenser or respondent. We
then take the di erence in observations, controlling for study team member fixed e ects,
and estimate a probit regression where the left hand side is instances where we are sure
there is or is not a match. We then use as a cuto  for a match 0.50 of the predicted values.
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2.5.1 Averages from Vendor Data
We summarize responses from the vendor survey in Table 2.1.71 Most ven-
dors are women; only 23 percent are men. The average outlet has 2.32
employees. Although we purposely did not ask about whether the outlet
was formal or informal, we estimate that only 36 percent of vendors meet
the legal qualifications to dispense medicines. Similarly, regulation in the
operating environment is not universal: 69 of drug shops report that their
outlet had been visited by a representative of the NDA, the regulator of drug
shops.72 Outlets are somewhat profitable and have access to credit. Twenty-
two percent of outlets report currently having any debt or loan obligations,
including through informal networks.
Despite the lack of formal qualifications, vendors are important sources of
healthcare for their communities. On average vendors treat 21.8 customers
per day (median value: 15), of which 6 are treated for malaria. Vendors gen-
erally are aware of proper medical protocols for malaria. Eighty-four percent
of respondents to the survey correctly report AL as the first-line treatment,
and eight-one percent generally knew the correct protocol for taking AL.
However, the advice given to mystery shoppers is, on average, slightly worse
than responses given to enumerators during the survey. Among vendors
making a drug recommendation, 75 percent recommended AL and 11 per-
71A summary of real shopper data is in Appendix Table 2A.2, and a summary of mystery
shopper characteristics is in Appendix Table 2A.3.
72Fifty-three percent of the outlets are drug shops; 40 percent are clinics; the remainder
are primarily pharmacies.
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cent recommended another first-line treatment. In 9 percent of transactions,
the vendor recommended SP, which is no longer an e ective medicine. The
distribution of recommendations is approximately the same at outlets where
the respondent correctly reported the first-line treatment, indicating a gap
between knowledge and practice.
There is a similar gap between practice and optimal public health prac-
tices. Despite the risks of increased drug resistance if individuals sick with
malaria taking partial dosages, vendors frequently sell partial dosages. Ven-
dors report only 66 percent of customers buy a full dose, potentially reflecting
the expense of first-line treatment. This relatively low fraction may also make
it easier to dilute medicines with substandard tablets, as it provides a way
for vendors to justify mixing packs. Similarly, despite the need to clinically
diagnose malaria with a blood test (either rapid diagnostic testing, or RDT),
only 53 percent of establishments o er testing services. Even conditional on
having tests available, only 44 percent of mystery shoppers were advised to
have the patient take a malaria test.
On the drug vendor survey, we included a module on counterfeit and
low-quality drugs. We first asked vendors why other vendors would sell a
fake drug. Of those answering the question, 85 percent suggested the reason
was related to money, or increasing their profits; only 15 percent thought it
was ignorance, and that vendors couldn’t identify fake drugs in their stores.
We then asked vendors what percentage of outlets in their parish and their
district sold fake drugs. On average, vendors thought that 32 percent of
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outlets in their parish sold fake drugs; and 44 percent of outlets in their
district sold fake drugs. Thirty-eight percent of respondents thought that
they could identify a fake drug if they saw one.
We also asked vendors about their thoughts on what the social sanctions
would be if a vendor was to be caught selling low quality drugs. Only 6
percent of vendors thought that there would be no consequences to selling
a low quality drug. Nearly all respondents (95 percent) believed that the
vendor would be reported to authorities, and 93 percent thought that cus-
tomers would boycott their store. Ninety-two percent thought that the shop
would be closed, and 88 percent believed that the stock would be confis-
cated. Seventy-seven percent of vendors thought that customers would do
something violent (vigilante justice).
2.5.2 How available is AL? Results from Covert Shop-
ping Data
We find that stock-outs are relatively rare and that AL was readily available
in most of the study area. In Table 2.2, we show that shoppers were able
to purchase AL during 86 percent of the 933 successful purchases (N=806).
This average translates into a purchase of AL at 92 percent of drug outlets.
While smaller fractions of the sample, quinine and SP are also commonly
available and purchased drugs. It is important to note that there are di erent
characteristics associated with the di erent active ingredients. For example,
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quinine is highly likely to be sold as an incorrect dosage. These di erences
may originate due to standard packaging. While AL is typically sold in blister
packs– allowing customers to recognize a full dosage more easily– quinine is
typically sold as loose tablets in bulk-size bottles. The fact that quinine is
often dispensed as loose tablets may make diverting this type of drug from
the public sector easier. While 7.8 percent of the AL sample and 8.9 percent
of the AL had public sector markings, 17.6 percent of the quinine sample
had public sector markings.
While AL is typically available, it is relatively expensive compared to the
other treatments. The high price may deter utilization, although discounts
are available for those who can bargain. The average price of AL is $3.19,
compared to $2.48 for quinine and $1.12 for SP. There is also a substantial
amount of variation in prices, for each active ingredient. As measured by
the coe cient of variation, prices vary substantially for each type of active
ingredient, from 0.39 - 0.46.73 Note that the type of drug purchased was
decided through our study protocol. Therefore, we do not use the type of
active ingredient as an outcome variable in our analysis.
2.5.3 Low Quality Drugs or Diluted High Quality Drugs
Overall, we find that drug quality is relatively high in the study areas com-
pared to previous studies, and that low-quality drugs are characterized by
73Sorensen (2000) finds in the US market that, for a given prescription drug, the highest
price is 50 percent over the lowest price, and the coe cient of variation is 0.22.
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dilution of high-quality drugs. We find that average rate of counterfeit drugs
across all transactions is 17 percent, but the average rate of low-quality drugs
across all transactions is 3.4 percent. However, the average rate of outlets
ever selling a low quality drugs across is slightly higher. We find that coun-
terfeit drugs were sold at 25 percent of outlets, and substandard drugs were
sold at 5.6 percent of outlets.74
One caveat to interpreting these averages, and the subsequent results
on correlates, is that we are only able to test drugs that are part of the
analysis sample. Because the focus of the study is AL, AL is more likely to
be part of the analysis sample. Thus, we were able to obtain a high-quality
tablet for 99 percent of the AL sample. In contrast, only 53 percent of the
quinine sample is also in the analysis sample and 81 percent of SP is also in
the analysis sample.75 Conditional on being in the analysis sample, we find
substantial di erences in terms of drug quality rates by active ingredients.
In fact, SP and “other” antimalarials are never found in our sample to be
either counterfeited or substandard. The substandard rate for quinine is
particularly high, at 47.2 percent.
The di erence between the average rates at the transaction level and at
the outlet level indicate that outlets tend to sell both high and low quality
drugs. Similarly, tablets within a dosage are typically a mixture of both high
74Note that if only one mystery shopper purchase had been made per store, the per-
centage of outlets selling low quality drugs would have decreased.
75Because quinine is often sold as loose tablets, we could not always identify the appro-
priate brand for testing.
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and low quality. Within the group of samples with at least one counterfeit
tablet, on average 61 percent of tablets were determined counterfeit; within
the group of samples with at least one substandard tablet, on average 47
percent of tablets were substandard. We interpret this quality dilution as a
strategic response to avoid detection. This interpretation is reminiscent of
Salop (1977)’s seminal work on price variation: by increasing noise in the
distribution of prices, providers make it di cult for consumers to distinguish
high-priced sellers from low-priced sellers. We conclude that by selling both
high and low quality, vendors introduce noise in the process, making it more
di cult for consumers to learn about true drug quality.
2.5.4 Geographic Distribution
The average rates, however, masks substantial heterogeneity within Uganda.
Figure 2.6 presents bar charts of how the average counterfeit and substandard
rates substantially vary by district, by as much as 50 percent. In Figure 2.7
we display graphically in a bar chart for each of the 44 parishes the average
counterfeit and substandard rate. A counterfeit drug was sold in 46 percent
of villages, and in 59 percent of parishes. These figures demonstrate that
previous studies based upon an average rate within a country may not be
appropriately capturing the variation within a country. Likewise, studies
that aggregate averages from a large number of countries may therefore be
masking important variation in the average rate of a given country.
In our study, we find that population density predicts drug quality. We
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find that urban areas have higher rates of counterfeit drugs, but rural ar-
eas have slightly higher rates of substandard medicines. In particular, 13.2
percent of transactions in rural areas were counterfeit, and 5 percent were
substandard. In contrast in urban areas, 18 percent of transactions were
counterfeit, but only 3 percent were substandard. Similarly, at the outlet
level, 20 percent of rural outlets sold a counterfeit drug, and 7 percent of
outlets sold a substandard drug. In urban areas 26 percent sold a counterfeit
drug and 5 percent of outlets sold a substandard drug.
2.5.5 Comparison to Previous Studies
One challenge with comparing our results to the previous literature is that the
bulk of existing studies have small samples or non-random sample selection
criteria. For example, in the meta-analysis by Nayyar et al. (2012), only
5 studies with data from African countries collected data on artemether-
lumefantrine, and all use convenience sampling. The average of those studies
indicate a substandard rate of approximately 30 percent. When considering
other types of antimalarial drugs, the view is similar. Only six of the twenty-
eight studies cited in the meta-analysis rely on random sampling methods,
and only three of those studies based on random sampling have more than
50 observations. More recent work by Kaur et al. (2015) formalizes this
intuition with a study in Nigeria. The authors find that convenience sampling
yields a substantially higher rate of low-quality drugs than random sampling.
The authors also find that there is little di erence in the drug quality rates
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between mystery shopper and overt shopper purchases, where providers gave
informed consent to have their drugs tested for quality.
An additional di culty is that the methodology for testing di ers sub-
stantially from study to study, and using equivalent definitions across dif-
ferent testing methodologies is not always possible. For example, Bjorkman
et al. (2012) use an older version of the handheld spectrometer which allow
for a measure of the counterfeit drug rate; they estimate that 21 percent
of drugs in select areas of Uganda are counterfeit. However, the updated
version of the machine that we use allows for repeat testing on the same
tablet, allowing us to cross-reference failing tablets to further estimate if they
are medically e ective (“substandard”). Our results imply that substandard
drugs are substantially less common at 4 percent.
We cannot conclude, however, that Bjorkman et al. (2012) would have
also found a low prevalence of substandard drugs had they done additional
testing for two main reasons. First, in 2012, after the data of Bjorkman
et al. (2012) was collected and before this study took place, the National
Drug Authority closed a national manufacturer of substandard antimalarial
drugs. This event was highly publicized throughout the country (Mugisa,
2012). Closing down a low-quality manufacturer would have a direct e ect of
eliminating a primary source of low-quality medicines, and an indirect e ect
of causing competing firms to increase quality to avoid closure. Secondly,
the sampling methods between our studies di er substantially and have little
overlap. Bjorkman et al. (2012) used drug outlets located in project villages
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in exclusively rural areas, and 55 percent were monopolists. Our results are
based upon random sampling methods from both urban and rural areas, and
only 6 percent of vendors are monopolists.
In conclusion, the average findings reported in previous literature are
potentially upper bounds on the true drug quality rate. However, due to
the nature of the testing methodology, definitions used, sampling strategy,
and other ongoing events in the market, it is potentially misleading to make
comparisons to any previous study specifically. However, by our estimation,
the rate of ine ective medicines is less than 4 percent in the study area,
suggesting that low quality drugs are not widespread in all areas of developing
countries.
2.6 Empirical Analysis on Correlates
In our empirical analysis, we first test what transaction-level correlates are
associated with drug quality. Second, we analyze the outlet-level correlates of
low quality drugs. Whether the drug quality rate for outlet i (transaction i)
is correlated with a given characteristic X is analyzed through the following
regression:
Qualityip = —0 + —1Xi + “p + µip (2.10)
where Quality is measured in two primary ways: whether or not at least
one tablet within the dosage is substandard, and whether or not at least one
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tablet within the dosage is counterfeit. X is a vector of characteristics that
are potentially linked with drug quality. Our outcome variables of drug qual-
ity are binary, and we use a linear probability model to estimate marginal
e ects. Because there is substantial variation across and within districts, we
include a parish fixed e ect, “, to account for any parish-specific characteris-
tics. The fixed e ect typically boosts statistical power, although in relevant
regressions we show a district fixed e ect specification that has more degrees
of freedom. We use standard errors clustered at the outlet level to account
for any correlations within di erent purchases of a shop when the unit of
observation is a transaction. We use robust standard errors for regressions
in which the unit of observation is the outlet.76
2.7 Results: Correlates of Low Quality Drugs
2.7.1 Price and other Demand-Side Explanations
We begin by testing the correlation between quality and characteristics of a
given transaction that would be observable to customers. These characteris-
tics include price, the number of separate blister packs, whether the dosage
had public sector markings (“diverted”), and whether there was an expiration
date marked. Results are in Table 2.3.
We find that while counterfeit drugs are priced $0.01 lower than non-
76In order to increase statistical power, we use the full set of non-missing observations
available for each group of outcomes. As a result, the sample size may di er between
regressions using the same data.
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counterfeit drugs, there is no correlation between price and whether the drug
is substandard. Assuming patients care primarily about the e cacy of drugs,
the lack of a price discount for low quality is consistent with consumer de-
ception. In contrast, other characteristics of the transaction are potentially
stronger, albeit noisy signals. For example, the number of blister packs–
loosely thought of as “chances” to dilute the dosage – is negatively and
strongly correlated with both counterfeit and substandard drugs.77 Each ad-
ditional blister pack in the purchase is associated with a 3.3 percentage point
higher likelihood of being sold a counterfeit drug and a 2.8 percentage point
higher likelihood of being sold a substandard drug. Contrary to expectations,
drugs lacking an expiration date are 12 percentage points less likely to be
counterfeit; there is no relationship between having an expiration date and
whether the drug is substandard. Diverted medicines are 26.6 percentage
points more likely to be counterfeit and diverted drugs are 9.3 percentage
points more likely to be substandard. Particularly for diverted medicines,
the sign of the correlation is surprising because medicines in the public sec-
tor are quality assured through the Global Fund pre-qualification program
for manufacturers. There are two alternative interpretations of the negative
correlation of public sector markings with drug quality. One interpretation
is that there is corruption and a lack of appropriate control measures as part
of the pre-qualification program. Alternatively, adept counterfeiters strate-
77Loose tablets were each considered a separate “blister pack” to have the same inter-
pretation.
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gically try to make substandard medicines look like public sector drugs. Our
data do not allow us to distinguish between these potential explanations.
However, di erent types of drugs have di erent dosages, di erent packag-
ing, and are purchased by di erent types of consumers. For example, quinine
is commonly sold in the form of loose tablets, and SP has a much lower av-
erage price than first-line therapies; each of these active ingredients have
di erent chemical quality rates. In columns 3 and 4, we show that whether
the drug is diverted and the price are still robust correlates of counterfeit
drugs. Similarly, the correlations of substandard drugs are the same when
controlling for a drug fixed e ect. Each additional blister pack is associated
with an increase in the substandard rate by 2.8 percentage points, and di-
verted drugs are 9 percentage points more likely to be substandard. Results
are robust to controlling for mystery shopper fixed e ects in columns 5 and
6, indicating that shopper characteristics are not mediating factors in these
relationships.
We now turn to identifying whether vendor behavior during the trans-
action is associated with drug quality. We consider two sets of independent
variables, objective and subjective characteristics. Results are presented in
Table 2.4. There are few robust characteristics of vendor behavior and drug
quality. Among the group of objective characteristics, the only significant
correlation is with drug quality and whether the provider asked any ques-
tions about the patient, either health-related questions or otherwise. Shop-
pers who reported that the dispenser asked any questions about the patient
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were 9-10 percentage points less likely to dispense a counterfeit drug, and
5-7 percentage points less likely to dispense a substandard drug. In addition,
dispensers who were rated as “very unfriendly” were 8-10 percentage points
less likely to sell a counterfeit drug, and 2-3 percentage points less likely to
sell a substandard. These correlations are robust to mystery shopper and
drug type fixed e ects.
Customer Correlates/Discrimination- Mystery shopper data
We next turn to examining whether certain groups of customers are more
likely to receive low-quality drugs, as in either taste-based or statistical dis-
crimination. We begin by examining characteristics of the shoppers that
purchased the drug during mystery shopping. Results in Panel A of Table
2.5 show that female shoppers are slightly less likely to buy both counterfeit
and substandard drugs, although p-values are outside the range of statistical
significance (p-value in Column 4 = 0.15). Similarly, shoppers that were of a
minority tribe in that district are slightly more likely to buy counterfeit but
slightly less likely to buy a substandard drug, although p-values are outside
the range of statistical significance (p-value in Column 4 = 0.179). Both gen-
der and being part of a minority tribe are significant in simple regressions
with parish or district fixed e ects, without controlling for the other, suggest-
ing that there might be an issue of statistical power due to multicollinearity.
There are only 16 di erent shoppers.
In Panel B, we examine whether the vendor’s response to the tribe or
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gender of the shopper depend upon the gender or tribe of the vendor. This
analysis slightly restricts our sample size because we condition on the per-
son who dispensed the medicine being the person who answered the survey
(N=603). We find that shoppers of the same tribe as the vendor are 8.5
percentage points more likely to be sold a counterfeit drug and 4 percentage
points more likely to be sold substandard drug, although point estimates are
di erent from zero only when controlling for a district fixed e ect. Being of
the same sex as the vendor is unrelated to quality.
The finding that female mystery shoppers receive a higher quality may be
consistent with taste or statistical discrimination in favor of women. How-
ever, there is certainly gender inequality in Uganda, and women have lower
incomes, less education, and lower bargaining power within the household.
Similarly, both male and female vendors react similarly to gender of the mys-
tery shopper. In Appendix Table 2A.4 we show that instead this observation
may reflect other demand characteristics correlated with gender. Women are
culturally in charge of healthcare and may be more likely to be “regular”
customers. Women are also given a higher o er price, more likely to success-
fully bargain, pay the same prices on average, and are less likely to be o ered
additional products for the treatment of febrile symptoms. They are given
the same service quality on average; members of a minority tribe are given
higher service quality.
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Time of Day/Day of Week
A more subtle characteristic associated with consumer demand characteris-
tics may be when customers tend to shop. For example, anecdotal evidence
suggests that farmers tend to go to trading centers during the day, when it
is too hot to work, or after dark. Thus, we test whether the time or day a
shopper visited an outlet changes the quality of the resulting sale. Results
are in Table 2.6. Although there is no linkage between time of day and drug
quality, substandard drugs are 3.9 percentage points less likely to be sold over
the weekend than during the week. These results are robust to controlling for
drug type and mystery shopper fixed e ects. Prices are also $0.18 higher on
weekends than weekdays (not shown). Systematic quality fluctuations may
indicate that certain types of customers shop di erent days of the week, and
that vendors respond to these demand fluctuations.
Real Customer Characteristics
Finally, we can also examine whether characteristics of real customers are
correlated with drug quality. Results are in Table 2.7. To account for di er-
ential response by shop, we average responses to the survey of real customers
at the outlet level. Excluding missing values, we are left with relatively few
observations, 277. Though we caution that we have limited statistical power,
we find that few characteristics of real customers at the outlet are correlated
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with drug quality.78 We use customer’s malaria test score, the average num-
ber of correct responses of six questions as a proxy for health literacy. We
use the average likelihood that the customer had shopped there before as a
proxy for whether mystery shoppers may have stood out more. We use other
measures of demographics– log income, distance walking to outlet, gender,
and whether the patient was buying for an adult patient. We find that the
average percentage of adult patients is correlated with whether the outlet
sold a counterfeit drug, and that the percentage of female customers is neg-
atively correlated with whether the outlet sold a substandard drug. This is
similar to the correlation observed between the gender of mystery shopper
and drug quality.
2.7.2 Supply-Side Explanations
We now change our unit of analysis to be the outlet level, to test if low qual-
ity outlets have specific characteristics. There is a large policy emphasis on
establishment type, including legal requirements for operation and training
of sta  and di erences in costs of licensing. Therefore, we begin by testing
whether establishment type is correlated with drug quality. We find little
evidence that establishment type is correlated with drug quality. Results are
in Table 2.8. In Columns 1 and 2, we use the full sample of all outlets with
78The reader should potentially also interpret results with additional caution. Recall
that drug quality is from a separate dataset, the transaction data from covert shoppers.
Thus standard errors may be upward biased for not accounting for the di erent sampling
errors.
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purchases; in Columns 3 and 4 we replicate the analysis with the sample of all
purchases at which a survey was also completed (excluding missing values)
in order to look at additional outlet characteristics. Although establishment
type is not related with quality, establishment type is strongly correlated
with the price paid. Compared to pharmacies, clinics charge on average
$0.72 higher and drug shops charge $0.36 higher per dosage. These results
are robust to using the mystery-shopper establishment classification and also
the self-reported establishment type on the vendor survey.79 Moreover, the
lack of observed quality di erences with respect to establishment type is not
simply semantic. Compared to pharmacies, clinics are 41 percentage points
less likely to have a qualified person working there; drug shops are 45 per-
centage points less likely. However, clinics and drug shops are more likely to
have a license on display in view of the enumerator. Pharmacies also have a
substantially larger selection of antimalarial drugs, nearly 7 more antimalar-
ial drug options than clinics or drug shops. Although establishment type
does signal to customers specific characteristics of the outlet, establishment
type does not help customers distinguish high quality drugs from low quality
drugs.
Although the simple establishment type classification is not descriptive,
some more specific characteristics related to the physical appearance of the
store may be related to drug quality. We next test whether various facility
79Price and quality are also not related to whether the mystery shopper classification
was the same as the self-reported establishment classification.
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characteristics that might make drugs more likely to degrade over time are
related to the counterfeit rate. We find that substandard medicines are not
consistent with poor storage conditions. Many coe cients are not di erent
from zero. Those that are significant go in the “wrong” direction: there is
actually a positive relationship between drug quality and some measures of
poor storage conditions. Results are in Table 2.9. Outlets which were ob-
served to either have a manual recording system or no system at all (“low
technology”) are 31 percentage points more likely to sell counterfeit drugs,
although 7.8 percentage points less likely to sell substandard drugs com-
pared to outlets which kept records electronically. A store that was classified
as “very crowded” is 5.2 percentage points less likely to sell a substandard
drug, although no more likely to sell a counterfeit drug. Stores with a con-
crete floor (as opposed to a dirt floor) are 16.6 percentage points less likely
to sell a counterfeit drug but no more likely to sell a substandard drug. Sim-
ilarly, inventory on the floor of the establishment is associated with a 13.5
percentage point lower likelihood (insignificantly di erent from zero) of sell-
ing a counterfeit drug and a 6 percentage point lower likelihood of selling
a substandard drug. Subjective shop quality was unrelated to measures of
quality. Although there may be potential issues of multicollinearity, reported
point estimates are approximately the same when characteristics are exam-
ined separately in a simple regression; results are also robust to including
controls for establishment type. These coe cients are all inconsistent with
a story where poor storage conditions indirectly cause low quality drugs.
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On the drug vendor survey, we also asked about the typical supply chain
processes. Results are in Table 2.10. Although not always significant, there
is a suggestive relationship between outlets who buy their drugs from mo-
bile providers/promoters and drug quality. Outlets who purchase from drug
promoters are 12.4 percentage points more likely to sell substandard drug (p-
value = 0.104). This result is robust to including a drug outlet fixed e ect.
Furthermore, the lack of statistical significance may reflect a lack of statisti-
cal power as opposed to the lack of a relationship. In Columns 5 and 6, we
control for a district fixed e ect as opposed to a parish fixed e ect, freeing up
additional degrees of freedom. In the specification with an outlet fixed e ect,
outlets purchasing from drug hawkers are 11.8 percentage points more likely
to sell a substandard drug, significant at the 10 percent level. These results
suggest that substandard drugs enter the supply chains through mobile drug
hawkers/promoters.
2.7.3 Institutional Factors/Competition
Table 2.11 examines whether other characteristics of the establishment, or
the operating environment are correlated with drug quality. Whether the
outlet has a name posted outside– a proxy of whether the outlet attempts to
avoid regulation– is uncorrelated with drug quality, as is whether the outlet
has been inspected by a regulator or government o cial in the past 6 months.
There is some suggestive evidence that less profitable establishments are more
likely to sell substandard drugs, but this correlation is not apparent in all
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specifications. Similarly, there is suggestive evidence that outlets with debt,
and more employees, are more likely to sell counterfeit drugs. Other charac-
teristics, including whether the respondent had ever taken a class on business
management, whether the outlet tested for malaria, whether the outlet had
beds, or whether the outlet charged a consultation fee, are unrelated to drug
quality in all specifications.
Finally, we consider the e ect of competition on drug quality. Results
in Table 2.12 show that in the cross-section, competition is correlated with
higher quality, and the e ect of competition di ers by the type of outlets in
the market. Having a public health facility in the village is associated with
a 24 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of an outlet selling a coun-
terfeit drug, but no significant di erence in terms of the likelihood of selling
a counterfeit drug. Each additional drug shop in the market decreases the
likelihood an outlet sells counterfeit drugs by approximately 1.3 percentage
points, and decreases the likelihood an outlet sells a substandard drug by
0.6 percentage points. Although the number of clinics is not correlated with
quality, there is a significant relationship with pharmacies and whether the
outlet sells a substandard drug. Each additional pharmacy decreases the like-
lihood that an outlet sells a substandard drug by between 3-5.6 percentage
points.
Aside from counts of establishments, there are also other ways to measure
competition in a market. We also consider the Hirfandahl-Hirshman index
(HHI), a standard measure of concentration within a market, as well as the
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distance walking to the nearest public or private facility. The HHI is the
percentage of sales within the village that are attributed to a given provider,
and its highest value is 1 (a monopolist). The HHI is a consistently strong
predictor of drug quality, where less competitive areas have higher rates of
both counterfeit and substandard drugs. On the other hand, the distance to
the closest competing outlet– either public or private– is uncorrelated with
quality.
2.8 Discussion
One key institutional detail relevant to the interpretation of results is whether
vendors are complicit in the sale of low-quality drugs. If shopkeepers know-
ingly distribute low-quality drugs, then providing education or training is
unlikely to improve market quality. Instead, limited resources should instead
be spent on increased monitoring, potentially at drug factories or points of
entry. If providers are also being duped by suppliers or are unaware of de-
grading drug inventory, then raids and shop closures – the current policy ap-
proach – may be unfair, expensive to maintain, and limit healthcare access.
Similarly, if suppliers are unaware of drug quality, then training programs
should be conducted to improve quality. We answer this question in sev-
eral ways. First, we conduct a list randomization exercise (Kuklinski et al.,
1997; Karlan and Zinman, 2012). Next, we examine whether all of the other
available evidence suggests vendors know the quality of their work. Finally,
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we discuss the key question motivating policymakers concerned about low-
quality drug rates: what policies would be the most e ective? We answer all
of these questions using data from the vendors themselves.
2.8.1 Do Drug Vendors Know Quality?
One way to determine if vendors know the quality of the drugs that they are
selling is to simply ask them through direct elicitation. However, direct elic-
itation may lead to systematic response bias. In addition to admitting to an
illegal activity, for which they would be potentially accountable, vendors may
also be unwilling to confess to an enumerator their culpability. To overcome
these response challenges, we conduct a survey exercise (“list randomiza-
tion”) intended to have individual responses be individually compatible with
truth-telling by masking individual responses.
The list randomization exercise works as follows. We randomly divide
survey respondents into “Treatment” and “Control” groups. Respondents
in the control group are shown a list of activities and asked to report how
many of the activities they had done. Respondents in the treatment group
are shown the same list of activities, plus one sensitive activity, and asked
to report how many activities that they have done. The di erence between
the two groups identifies the proportion of the sample estimated to have
done the sensitive activity, without revealing the behavior of any individ-
ual respondent. Thus, it is incentive-compatible for respondents to report
truthfully. We implement this methodology on the vendor survey for three
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di erent sensitive activities: paying a bribe to the regulator (the National
Drug Authority, or NDA); selling antibiotics when they knew it was unneces-
sary; knowingly selling a fake drug.80 The purpose of asking about multiple
sensitive activities was to compare against known problems in the market as
a check on whether the methodology worked as intended.
We use the following Intention-to-Treat specification to estimate the pro-
portion of the sample that has ever done a particular sensitive activity:
NumberActivitiesi = ⁄0 + ⁄1Treatmenti + ”ÕX + “d + ‘i (2.11)
where NumberActivities is the number of activities from the list that the
respondent reported having ever done; Treatment is an indicator variable
for whether the respondent was assigned to see a sensitive activity on their
list; X is a vector of characteristics to control for potential omitted variables
and account for the way the exercise was implemented; “ is a district fixed
e ect; ‘ is a heteroskedastic error term.81
One important assumption behind the list randomization technique is
80Note that in terms of the survey module for list randomization, both English and local
languages were used. The English word used was “fake”, but each of the local languages
have the same word for counterfeit/fake/substandard.
81There were two di erent list sheets shown to respondents. The first had the “fake
drug” sensitive activity first; the second had it third. In addition, due to concerns about
anonymity, the non-sensitive activities shown to each group in the “fake drug” treatment
were slightly altered in the second round. While implementing the survey in the field, the
enumerators expressed concerns about the relevance of the list of non-sensitive activities,
because it also included drinking and visiting Nakumatt, store that was not in all locations.
Therefore, we control for the list seen and survey round in all regressions.
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that randomization was implemented correctly and resulted in two compara-
ble groups. Preliminary results in Table 2.13 show that there is some degree
of imbalance for several characteristics. Specifically, respondents who were
male were significantly more likely to be in the treatment group for the “an-
tibiotics” and significantly more likely to be in the control group for the “fake
drug” group. Similarly there is also some imbalance in some treatment groups
for whether the respondent was the owner of the outlet or distance to the
nearest public facility. It is unclear how these di erences could have arisen,
although some di erences may be expected due to chance alone. Regardless,
we control for these imbalanced characteristics in our estimation.
Results of the list randomization exercise are in Table 2.14. The results
from the “bribe” activity show that 17.2 percent of the sample report having
ever paid a bribe to a regulator during an inspection, significant at the 10 per-
cent level. However, results for the “antibiotics” and “fake drugs” lists show
that the fraction of the sample admitting to doing these activities knowingly
is small. Although not significant from zero, the point estimate suggests
that approximately 6.2 percent of the sample has knowingly sold an antibi-
otic when it was not necessary and 6.7 percent of the sample has knowingly
sold a fake drug, The respective 95% confidence intervals are [-14.8, 27.15]
and [-10.7, 24.1].
So do vendors know when they sell low-quality drugs? While the list
randomization was inconclusive, it should be noted that the estimated pro-
portion of the sample knowingly selling a fake drug is approximately the same
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as the empirical average of 5.6 percent of outlets which sold a substandard
drug to a mystery shopper. Recent research has suggested that list random-
ization may have a downward bias due to cognitive di culties in adding up
responses (Su, 2015).
In addition, we can look at the accumulation of evidence in previous re-
search, including this paper and in Fitzpatrick (2015), which shows that ven-
dors strategically allocate drugs to customers who are statistically less likely
to return to a given outlet. Of course, if vendors did not know drug quality,
then we would still expect some characteristics to be significantly related
by chance alone. However, the most likely mechanism associated with this
result– drug degradation on shelves– does not hold up empirically. Further-
more, there are suggestive relationships between quality and selling through
drug hawkers, as well as the prevalence of diverted medicines (i.e., other il-
licit behavior). In contrast, observable characteristics that customers could
use to easily avoid low quality places– such as establishment type– provide
no guidance. In addition, two randomized studies have found competition
improves quality– interpreted as a strategic response to increase profits. All
together, these facts suggest that at least a subset of vendors know the qual-
ity of the drugs they dispense and are complicit in this deceptive practice.
This interpretation is also consistent with the figure we report of 85 percent
of vendors suggesting that fake drugs are sold in order to increase profits,
because they are lower cost inputs.
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2.8.2 How to Improve Drug Quality?
We asked what potential policy interventions the vendors themselves thought
would be e ective at reducing low-quality drug rates. Results are in Table
2.15. From a policy perspective, implementing fines and standardizing jail
penalties for being convicted of selling low-quality drugs should have an im-
portant deterrence e ect. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate over penalties
for selling fake drugs among lawmakers in Uganda. For those convicted of
selling low-quality drugs, vendors recommended a median fine of 1 million
UGX ($386), and the average jail term of nearly 9 years, with a median
jail term of 3 years. These penalty recommendations are uncorrelated with
quality (not shown).
Respondents were also asked to rank the potential policies on a scale
of 1 (“definitely will not work”) to 4 (“definitely will work”). The most
popular policy intervention that was thought to be most e ective was to
increase training programs for vendors and/or pharmacists to recognize fake
drugs; 97 percent of the sample thought that would be an e ective strategy.
Overall, 95 percent thought that increased inspections at borders and points
of entry would be e ective; 91 percent thought that increased inspections
at outlets would be e ective. Only 87 percent thought that increased fines
and 85 percent thought that increased jail sentences would be e ective. The
relatively least popular policy was consumer education campaigns, although
80 percent of respondents still thought that such a policy would be e ective.
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2.9 Conclusion
Recent empirical evidence suggests that low quality healthcare is prevalent
in many developing countries. One example of the problem of low quality is
the problem of fake, or counterfeit antimalarial drugs. Improving the quality
of antimalarial drugs is important to encourage appropriate and e ective
treatment, reduce medical complications, and improve health. In addition,
if counterfeit drugs increase drug resistance of malaria, then reducing their
prevalence becomes a significant public health concern. However, there is
little evidence on the prevalence of low quality medicine in Uganda, and
little guidance for policymakers on where to target anti-counterfeit policy
with scarce resources.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature on low quality drugs.
We first estimate the average rate, and are among the few to do so with a
a large, representative sample. We find that the rate of counterfeit drugs
is approximately 17 percent, but the rate of substandard drugs– those less
likely to be medically e ective– is approximately 4 percent. Second, we pro-
vide important insight into identifying the mechanisms through which low
quality drugs infiltrate markets. By combining unique and detailed datasets
on both supply and demand characteristics, we provide new empirical anal-
ysis on correlates of low-quality drugs. We find measures of regulation are
uncorrelated with drug quality rates, potentially reflective of ine ective in-
stitutions in resource-poor environments. However, competition may be a
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market-based manner in which to improve drug quality. We find that poor
storage conditions, and subsequent degradation, are an unlikely cause of sub-
standard medicines. In contrast, mobile hawkers and drug promoters appear
to be one way substandard medicines enter the supply chain.
We find that customers would have a di cult time discerning low-quality
drugs on the basis of price or characteristics of the vendor. Vendor behav-
ior changes only slightly when they are selling a low-quality drug. We find
low-quality drugs are typically dilutions of high-quality dosages. It is rela-
tively uncommon for vendors to sell a complete dosage of ine ective tablets.
In dosages with substandard drugs, on average only half of tablets fail a
handheld spectrometer test. We interpret this dilution as strategic behavior:
dilution increases noise, and makes it more di cult for customers to learn
about true drug quality from personal experience. We find that men are
more likely to be sold substandard medicines.
Our final result is that a small percentage of vendors are complicit in
the sale of low-quality drugs. The point estimate on knowingly selling a
fake drug is similar to the empirical average, although not significant. In
addition, other circumstantial evidence–such as responses from the vendors
themselves on why an outlet would sell low-quality drugs– and results from
previous literature make it harder to justify that these correlations and causal
e ects come about without any knowledge of the provider.
The relatively high rates of drug quality we observe are contrary to recent
research based upon small samples and nonrandomized. Ex-ante, it is un-
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clear whether the existing literature represents an upper or lower bound on
low-quality drug rates. For example, in rural areas, vendors may personally
know their clients and similarly the lack of competition may make reputation
motives to sell high-quality drugs very salient. On the other hand, in urban
areas, regulation may be higher, and the larger number of people may mask
accountability. Our data indicate that although the rate may di er substan-
tially between di erent geographic areas of the same country, previous work
is likely an overestimate of the rate of low-quality drugs.
We fully acknowledge that drug quality rates could be di erent in di er-
ent study areas, or among di erent drug classifications. In the study area,
malaria represents the number one burden of illness; results may in particular
di er in areas where malaria is less common, or where the local population
is less familiar with this illness. Regardless, the fact that our overall results
indicate that substandard and counterfeit drugs are substantially less of a
problem than previously estimated has important policy implications. We
do not conclude that a 4 percent rate of essential medicines as medically
ine ective as an “acceptable” rate of drug quality. However, policymakers
must make decisions regarding scarce resources based upon the competing
needs of their communities. Our results should help them evaluate where to
devote money, manpower, and expertise, in order to maximize their impact
among their communities, whether it is to further reduce drug quality rates
or instead to focus on other problems of healthcare quality. Our results also
highlight that future research on drug quality should incorporate technology
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and random sampling methods to maximize accuracy, impact, and relevance
to the local population.
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Figure 2.6: Quality Results by District
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Figure 2.7: Quality Result Averages by Parish
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Table 2.1: Vendor Data Summary
Panel A: Vendor Characteristics
Male 0.23
Number of employees 2.32
Qualified Person 0.36
Visited by NDA in past 6 months 0.69
Any debt 0.22
Number of customers, previous day 21.80
Knows first-line treatment 0.84
Percentage of customers who buy full dose 0.66
Sell malaria tests 0.53
Panel B: Why would a vendor sell a fake
drug
Money or Profits 0.85
Ignorance 0.15
Panel C: Beliefs on fake drugs
Percent outlets fake drugs in parish 0.32
Percent outlets fake drugs in district 0.44
Could identify fake drugs by sight 0.38
Panel D: Customer reaction to selling fake
drugs
Nothing would happen 0.06
Reported to authorities 0.95
Customers would boycott 0.93
Shop would be closed 0.92
Stock would be confiscated 0.88
Customers would do something violent 0.77
Notes: Data are taken from the vendor survey (N=452). Qualified person is a generated variable
based upon responses of education level received by the respondent and the type of establishment,
based upon the o cial regulations. Responses in Panel B are categorized responses to an open-
ended question. Percent fake drugs in parish/district are the respondent’s beliefs of the percent
of outlets selling a fake drug, asked as a number out of 10. Recommended fine is the respondent’s
recommendation of penalty for those caught selling fake drugs. Recommended jail sentence is
the respondent’s recommended jail sentence for those caught selling fake drugs, where responses
of “for life” are top-coded at 99. Could identify fake drugs by sight is a dummy variable of the
respondent’s answer to whether they thought they could identify a fake drug if they saw it, ex-
cluding responses of “don’t know”. Responses tallied in Panel D are not mutually exclusive.
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Table 2.2: Covert Shopper Data Summary
AL Quinine SP Other
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number 806 34 79 14
Number of Di erent Brands 7 5 5 5
Correct Dosage 0.945 0.265 0.949 0.556
Number Blister Packs 1.393 8.706 1.278 2.143
Diverted Drug 0.078 0.176 0.089 0.071
Average Price Paid 3.19 2.48 1.12 3.24
Bargained 0.600 0.529 0.506 0.571
Coe cient of Variation of Price Paid 0.458 0.398 0.452 0.651
Analysis Sample 0.988 0.529 0.810 0.071
Counterfeit 0.186 0.111 0.000 0.000
Fraction Tablets Counterfeit 0.611 0.544 0.000 0.000
Substandard 0.038 0.472 0.000 0.000
Fraction Tablets Substandard 0.468 0.417 0.000 0.000
Notes: Above is a summary of all data collected by mystery shoppers. ‘AL’ refers to
artemether-lumefantrine. ‘Quinine’ refers to quinine sulphate. ‘SP’ refers to sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine. ‘Other’ is all other brands and active ingredients, including those whose ac-
tive ingredients could not be identified. Number of di erent brands excludes where the brand
was unknown. The correct dosages is based upon the full adult dosage. Number blister
packs includes any loose tablets sold as their own pack. Average price paid is in US dollars.
The exchange rate at the time of data collection was $1US = 2593 UGX. Bargained refers
to whether the covert shopper was successfully able to reduce the price through bargaining.
Diverted drug means a drug with government markings. Analysis Sample indicates that the
drug was able to be part of the analysis sample, and able to be tested. This required obtain-
ing an authentic sample of the brand. Counterfeit refers to whether at least one tablet within
the dosage failed the handheld spectrometry test and is estimated in the analysis sample.
Substandard refers to whether at least one tablet within the dosage failed the handheld spec-
trometry test and could not be found to match another brand in the library. Substandard is
only estimated in the analysis sample. Both fraction of tablets variables are conditional on
being counterfeit or substandard, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Mystery Shopper Characteristics
Parish Fixed E ect District Fixed E ect
Counterfeit SubstandardCounterfeit Substandard
Panel A: Full Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Shopper ≠0.045 ≠0.017 ≠0.045 ≠0.019
(0.028) (0.014) (0.028) (0.013)
Minority Tribe 0.027 ≠0.028 0.027 ≠0.02
(0.039) (0.017) (0.039) (0.015)
Constant 0.182úúú 0.060úúú 0.182úúú 0.058úúú
(0.026) (0.014) (0.026) (0.014)
Observations 879 879 879 879
R-squared 0.054 0.098 0.054 0.019
Panel B: Matched Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Tribe 0.064 0.039 0.085ú 0.040ú
(0.048) (0.026) (0.044) (0.024)
Same Sex 0.006 ≠0.007 0.006 ≠0.014
(0.032) (0.016) (0.030) (0.015)
Constant 0.149úúú 0.033úú 0.145úúú 0.037úúú
(0.026) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013)
Observations 603 603 603 603
R-squared 0.076 0.15 0.023 0.024
Notes: Coe cient estimates are marginal e ects from a linear probability model. The first
two columns control for a parish fixed e ect, and the second two columns control for a district
fixed e ect. Panel A uses all purchases that could be tested for quality and Panel B uses pur-
chases from outlets where the dispenser is the same person who completed the survey. Same
Tribe and Minority Tribe refer to the tribe of the shopper. Minority tribe is specific to each
district’s most prevalent ethnic group. Same sex indicates that the gender of vendor is the
same as the gender of the vendor. Counterfeit refers to a purchased dosage in which at least
one tablet failed the handheld spectrometry test; Substandard refers to a purchased dosage in
which at at least one tablet failed the handheld spectrometry test and also did not match any
other brands within the library. Robust standard errors in parentheses,clustered at the outlet
level.ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 2.7: Real Customer Correlates
Sold
Counter-
feit
Sold Sub-
standard
Sold
Counter-
feit
Sold Sub-
standard
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Malaria Score 0.131 ≠0.045 0.063 ≠0.1
(0.152) (0.079) (0.164) (0.086)
Average Repeat Customer 0.026 0.01 0.074 0.025
(0.081) (0.042) (0.085) (0.045)
Average Price Paid 0.021 0.002 0.026 0.005
(0.023) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
Average Ln Income ≠0.013 ≠0.004 ≠0.019 ≠0.016
(0.033) (0.017) (0.038) (0.020)
Average Distance 0.001 ≠0.001 0.001 0
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Average Adult Patients 0.183ú 0.003 0.276úú ≠0.009
(0.107) (0.055) (0.116) (0.061)
Average Female Customers ≠0.078 ≠0.071ú ≠0.074 ≠0.070ú
(0.074) (0.039) (0.078) (0.041)
Constant 0.012 0.129 ≠0.043 0.205ú
(0.190) (0.099) (0.209) (0.110)
District Fixed E ect X X
Parish Fixed E ect X X
Observations 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.043 0.027 0.162 0.119
Notes: The sample is all outlets with at least one survey of a real customer. “Sold Counterfeit”
refers to whether a drug classified as counterfeit was ever sold from that outlet during mystery
shopping. “Sold Substandard” refers to whether a drug classified as substandard was ever sold
from that outlet during mystery shopping. All independent variables are from the surveys of
real customers, averaged at the shop level. Malaria score is an average of 6 questions regarding
malaria transmission. Repeat customer is whether the respondent reported ever shopping at
that outlet before. Price paid is the price in USD for the primary product. Ln Income is the log
of the respondent’s reported monthly income. Distance is measured in minutes walking to get
to this establishment. Adult patient is whether the respondent reported buying their medicine
for a child in the household. Female customer refers to whether the respondent was male or
female. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 2.9: Facility Observations
Counterfeit
Sold
Substandard
Sold
Counterfeit
Sold
Substandard
Sold
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Manual or No System 0.304úúú ≠0.078úúú 0.309úúú ≠0.079úúú
(0.107) (0.029) (0.107) (0.029)
All inventory protected from sunlight 0.075 0.036 0.064 0.035
(0.071) (0.022) (0.072) (0.024)
Crowded store ≠0.033 ≠0.052úú ≠0.03 ≠0.053úú
(0.063) (0.026) (0.064) (0.026)
Concrete floor ≠0.183úú ≠0.002 ≠0.197úú 0.002
(0.091) (0.044) (0.091) (0.044)
Establishment was very clean ≠0.012 ≠0.021 ≠0.006 ≠0.025
(0.059) (0.032) (0.060) (0.031)
Inventory on floor ≠0.135ú ≠0.061úú ≠0.147ú ≠0.060úú
(0.081) (0.028) (0.084) (0.029)
Above Average Quality 0.111 0.038 0.106 0.037
(0.159) (0.121) (0.160) (0.121)
Average Quality 0.094 ≠0.031 0.088 ≠0.033
(0.158) (0.116) (0.160) (0.116)
Below Average Quality 0.037 ≠0.04 0.028 ≠0.044
(0.161) (0.117) (0.164) (0.118)
Far Below Average Quality 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.004
(0.178) (0.129) (0.184) (0.133)
Drug Shop 0.029 ≠0.033
(0.111) (0.067)
Clinic 0.078 ≠0.026
(0.104) (0.063)
Constant 0.297 0.075 0.276 0.106
(0.205) (0.125) (0.234) (0.145)
Observations 409 409 409 409
R-squared 0.135 0.125 0.138 0.125
Notes: Sample is all outlets at which there was a survey completed, and excludes missing values/don’t
know/don’t recall. Data are from the observations of the enumerator after the conclusion of the survey.
“Manual or no system” refers to whether the enumerator observed a manual inventory and record-keeping
system, or no system. This variable is a zero for hybrid systems or computerized record-keeping. “All in-
ventory protected from sunlight” is a dummy variable indicating that the entire stock of inventory was not
exposed to direct sunlight. “Crowded store” is whether the enumerator judged that the store had adequate
space to display its inventory. “Concrete floor” is a variable indicating whether the floor was concrete, as
opposed to a dirt floor. “Establishment was very clean” is a subjective measure by the enumerator about
the cleanliness of the outlet. “Inventory on floor” was whether the enumerator noted that there were boxes
of inventory stored on the floor of the outlet, as opposed to shelves or cabinets. All regressions include a
parish fixed e ect. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 2.14: List Randomization Results
Bribe #
Activities
Antibiotics
#
Activities
Fake Drug
#
Activities
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.172ú 0.056 0.073
(0.102) (0.105) (0.087)
Male 0.421úúú 0.426úúú 0.558úúú
(0.115) (0.128) (0.100)
Minimum Distance to Public 0.004 ≠0.017 0.008
(0.128) (0.123) (0.105)
List Randomization Form Dummy 0.318 ≠0.056 0.225
(0.251) (0.267) (0.360)
Owner 0.055 0.106 0.329úúú
(0.114) (0.109) (0.095)
Constant 2.696úúú 2.265úúú 2.052úúú
(0.107) (0.111) (0.109)
Observations 440 440 440
R-squared 0.76 0.057 0.23
Dep Variable Mean, Control 2.87 2.36 2.38
Notes: Sample is all respondents who completed a survey, and excludes those with missing
values for any variable in the regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Above
are OLS estimates from a linear probability model of a list randomization exercise. The
dependent variable in all columns is the number of activities that the respondent has re-
ported doing. The treatment group was shown the same list of non-sensitive activities as
the control group, plus one sensitive activity. The sensitive activity in Column 1 is “ever
paid a bribe to a regulator (NDA)”; the sensitive activity in Column 2 is “ever sold antibi-
otics to a customer when they knew it wasn’t needed”; the sensitive activity in Column 3
is “ever sold a fake drug”. “Treatment” indicates whether the respondent was randomly
assigned to the treatment group (ITT). All regressions control for a district fixed e ect
and select covariates. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 2.15: Vendors Recommendations for Reducing Fake Drug Rates
Panel A: Vendor recommendations for penalties
Recommended fine 385.65
Recommended jail sentence 8.71
Panel B: Rank/Percentage of respondents stating the policy will work.
1 Increase training programs for vendors and pharmacists 0.973
2 Increase inspections at borders and points of entry 0.949
3 Increase inspections at outlets (NDA) 0.907
4 Increase fines for those who are caught 0.873
5 Increase jail sentences 0.849
6 Customer education campaigns 0.798
Notes: Data are taken from survey responses to the drug vendor survey (N=451). In
Panel A, the recommended fine is in USD, and the exchange rate used is $1US=2593
UGX. The jail sentence for those who said that the sentence should be “life” was top-
coded at 99. In Panel B, responses for each possibility included: 1 (“will definitely
not work”); 2 (“will likely not work”); 3 (“will likely work”); 4 (“will definitely work”).
Above are averages of respondents who agree that a given policy either will definitely
work or will likely work. Multiple responses were allowed.
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Table 2A.1: Spectrometry Testing Transition Matrix
Panel A: Tablet Level (N=2322)
Second Scan Outcome
First Scan Outcome Pass Fail
Pass 0.297 0.007
N = 689 N=16
Fail 0.177 0.519
N = 411 N=1206
Panel B: Transaction Level (N=879)
Second Scan Result
First Scan Result Non-Counterfeit Counterfeit
Non-Counterfeit 0.76 0.00
N=665 N=0
Counterfeit 0.07 0.18
N=59 N=155
Notes: In total, there were 879 purchases of antimalarial drugs which could be tested
using the handheld spectrometer. A full adult dosage of artemether-lumefantrine
contains 24 tablets, a full adult dosage of sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine contains 3
tablets, and a full dosage of quinine contains 30 tablets. There were 23,083 tablets
scanned with the handheld spectrometer, and 2,322 were scanned at least twice. In
Panel A, the sample is restricted to all tablets that were scanned twice. Each cell rep-
resents the marginal distribution/probability of passing or failing the first scan, and
then the second scan. In Panel B, the sample is all purchases. Each cell represents
the marginal distribution of results based upon the first scan of each tablet, and the
second scans of each tablet (if multiple scans were performed).
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Table 2A.2: Real Shopper Data Summary
Panel A: Purchase Data Sample Average
Did not buy anti-malarial drug 0.55
Bought anti-malarial drug 0.45
Among those buying an antimalarial drug:
Bought AL 0.60
Bought quinine 0.12
Bought SP 0.20
Product price 2.54
Panel B: Demographic Data
Asked for diagnosis 0.61
Asked for recommendation 0.51
Less primary school 0.30
Secondary school 0.45
Distance from outlet 21.85
Malaria literacy score 0.72
Income 133.04
Female 0.50
Notes: Above are sample averages from the surveys of real customers
at outlets (N=867) exclude missing values/nonresponse. AL stands for
artemether-lumefantrine; quinine refers to quinine sulphate; SP refers to
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine. Distance from shop is measured in min-
utes walking. Malaria literacy is an average of 6 questions of under-
standing of malaria transmission. Income and price paid is reported in
2013 USD. The exchange rate used was $1US= 2593 UGX.
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Table 2A.3: Mystery Shopper Data Summary
Panel A: Characteristics Sample Average
Age 34.14
Number of Visits 56.44
Female 0.50
Tribe:
Banyankole 0.438
Bakiga 0.188
Konzo 0.188
Baganda/Other 0.188
Notes: Above are sample averages self-reported by mystery
shoppers. In instances where shoppers were of more than 1
tribe, the mother’s tribe was used.
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Chapter 3: The Spillover
E ects of Health Insurance
Within Families: Experimental
Evidence from Nicaragua
3.1 Introduction
Rather than modeling the demand for health care from the perspective of an
individual agent, a growing literature considers how households make deci-
sions about healthcare utilization. Empirical work has shown that parental
behavior in particular is an important determinant of health and health be-
havior of their children. For example, consider the decision to enroll in health
insurance- an important determinant of healthcare utilization and ultimately
health outcomes (Olson et al., 2005). Eligible children with insured parents
are more likely to be enrolled in health insurance themselves, more likely to
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receive necessary care and more likely to receive regular checkups (David-
o  et al., 2003; Hanson, 2001; Lambrew, 2001; Guendelman et al., 2006;
Guendelman and Pearl, 2004). Much of the research focusing on household
dynamics and health insurance presents these types of static associations,
demonstrating the high correlation between health behaviors within families.
However, it is less clear how households allocate and reallocate healthcare
amongst their children as family resources and needs change. Understand-
ing the e ects of intra-household healthcare allocation not only sheds light
on the complex dynamics of household decision-making, but also is impor-
tant for designing health policies that reduce unmet need for healthcare, and
ultimately improve health and well-being.
From a theoretical perspective, there are several ways that health insur-
ance could a ect the utilization of a household. If insurance improves health
or preventive care (e.g., vaccinations) then there may be positive externalities
among uninsured members of the household. For example, insured individ-
uals may be less likely to infect their siblings. As a result, ineligible siblings
might not require as many visits to healthcare providers. However, e ects
on other household members do not depend on health insurance improving
health. Decreases in the price of health care will likely increase healthcare
utilization and reduce out of pocket expenditures among individuals who are
insured. If individuals within a family share a common budget and time con-
straint, then a change in the price of healthcare for one member will cause
a reallocation of both time and financial resources for all members due to
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both the income and substitution e ects.82 This prediction holds whether
one assumes a unitary model of household production or instead that the al-
location of health investments is the result of cooperative bargaining (Bolin
et al., 2001).Therefore, the equilibrium distribution of health demand for all
family members will change following enrollment into health insurance, even
if the individual is excluded from health insurance coverage. In the context
we study here, both the direction and magnitude of the spillover depends
upon the structure of the family health production function (i.e., whether
siblings are complements or substitutes).83
However, empirically identifying both direct and spillover e ects of health
insurance is di cult. First, selection into insurance take-up provides chal-
lenges for researchers using retrospective data because health insurance en-
rollment is likely correlated with other characteristics of a household. Stan-
dard theoretical models, as well as empirical studies, posit adverse selection
into health insurance: individuals who are more likely to be sick, and will ben-
efit more from insurance are those who enroll (Oster et al., 2010; Einav and
82This theory is formalized by Jacobson (2000) as an extension of the standard Grossman
(1972) model. This model predicts that parents will not equalize health status amongst all
members of a household. Instead, the model predicts that parents will choose the optimal
health inputs such that the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal cost are equal across all
family members.
83There is a related of literature related to how parents allocate resources among their
children. Evidence is mixed as to whether parents di erentially favor certain children
behavior on the basis of health endowments or labor market opportunities (Adhvaryu and
Nyshadham, 2014; Jensen and Miller, 2013; Li et al., 2010; Behrman and Rosenzweig,
2004). Duflo (2003) finds that when women have more bargaining power in a household,
female children benefit more than male children. Jason Fletcher (2012) find that siblings
with disabilities negatively a ect the education attainment of siblings.
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Finkelstein, 2011; Levine et al., 2011). On the other hand, recent evidence
has found advantageous selection into some health insurance markets, where
the most responsible, healthiest, or most knowledgeable individuals choose
to enroll (Fang et al., 2008). Second, measuring intra-household resource al-
location requires detailed individual-level data on utilization. However, data
are typically collected only at the household level, making it impossible to
study within-family spillovers. Although there are studies that correct for
selection into health insurance through randomized designs, these studies
have focused on the household or individual direct e ects of health insurance
((King et al., 2009; Levine et al., 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Sheth, 2014;
Newhouse, 1993; Asuming, 2013). As a result, there have been few studies
addressing the intra-household dynamics and behavior following insurance
coverage.
To overcome these empirical challenges, we utilize an experiment that
randomly assigned free health insurance to informal-working adults in urban
Nicaragua. In addition to giving comprehensive coverage to the primary
holder of the insurance, the plan gave coverage to children who were under
the age of 12. We use the randomized experiment and the age eligibility cut-
o  for dependents to identify causal e ects of parental health insurance on
both covered and uncovered children. We empirically assess how healthcare
utilization changes after one year, where we measure utilization with number
of visits, out-of-pocket expenditures, and choice of health provider. We also
include several self-reported health measures.
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We find that age-eligible children whose parents receive insurance in-
crease their total healthcare utilization by 1.3 visits, a 39 percent increase.
We find insurance increases utilization at covered providers by 0.56 visits
(a 360 percent increase). In addition, total utilization by insured children
increases by 1.26 visits (37 percent increase over the control group). Our
results indicate that health insurance was used to complement existing uti-
lization patterns among insured children, as opposed to substituting towards
covered providers.
However, there is a substantial and large negative spillover onto unin-
sured older children in insured families. Older, uninsured children with in-
sured parents/siblings decrease their total health visits by 3.4 visits (an 80%
reduction). There are also significant reductions in visits to and spending
at private facilities in response to parental health insurance. We find simi-
lar reductions in out of pocket expenditures, consistent with the changes in
utilization. We provide evidence that health insurance also change where
ineligible children sought treatment. Conditional on being sick, ineligible
children in insured households are substantially more likely to seek treat-
ment at pharmacies as opposed to private providers.
Next, we examine the e ects on reported health indicators. Among eligi-
ble children, we find no impact of the insurance on the likelihood of being sick
or in the severity of sickness. However, we find that health insurance coverage
resulted in 0.68 additional sick episodes (37 percent increase). There was no
significant impact on checkups or the likelihood of forgoing treatment. On
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the other hand, among ineligible children, sickness decreased by 1.06 episodes
(58 percent decrease) and these children were significantly less likely to be
reported to have forgone treatment due to lack of money. We discuss several
possible explanations for these results, and conclude that the changes in re-
ported health status are most likely due to improved information on actual
health status through interaction with high-quality providers.
We then present two sets of analyses to further understand the nature
of within family spillovers and their e ects on health. First, we examine
the extent to which the spillover to ineligible children is driven by parent
coverage or sibling coverage.84 Our results suggest that the relationship be-
tween parental and child utilization is stronger than across-child utilization.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by empirically assessing how
parental health insurance a ects the healthcare utilization and health out-
comes for both covered and uncovered children. Existing studies have either
focused on how parental insurance eligibility a ects the enrollment of eligible
children, or how children who are ineligible for health insurance enjoy health
benefits by being in insured households. For example, previous work on Med-
icaid expansions in the United States has found positive spillovers of parental
health insurance coverage on the enrollment of children in health insurance
(Dubay and Kenney, 2003; Sommers et al., 2012; Cutler and Gruber, 2001;
Aizer and Grogger, 2003; Busch and Duchovny, 2005). Ishdorj et al. (2007)
84We do not focus on outcomes for parents in this paper; rather, these results can be
found in Thornton et al. (2010).
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and Basiotis (1998) both find evidence supporting positive intra-household
spillovers of a supplemental insurance program in the United States (WIC),
among ineligible family members. Two studies that use an age-eligibility
cut-o  to examine how WIC a ected older, age-ineligible children also find
positive e ects. Ver Ploeg (2009) finds positive health e ects and Robinson
(2012) finds increases in nutritional intake among ineligible children (older
than five) when their siblings are eligible for WIC. Few studies have causally
estimated the e ect of parental health insurance on children’s utilization, and
to our knowledge no prior study has causally estimated the spillover e ects
of health insurance on the utilization of uninsured members. This gap is sur-
prising because many health insurance programs have age-eligibility cuto s,
and the magnitude of the e ect of insurance on both insured and uninsured
members has implications for the sustainability and cost-e ectiveness of pro-
grams (Basu and Meltzer, 2005).
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Health Insurance in Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, formal sector employees are eligible to enroll in the Nicaraguan
Social Security Institute (INSS) health insurance program. The INSS insur-
ance provides all subscribers with a comprehensive package of preventive, di-
agnostic, and curative health services and medications at 17 INSS-contracted
facilities in Managua (formerly called Empresas Me´dicas Previsionales, re-
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ferred to as EMPs). The services provided include primary and specialist
care, medication and laboratory exams, hospitalization, 24-hour emergency
care, voluntary family planning counseling and contraception, breast and
cervical cancer screenings, HIV and STD counseling, and prevention and
treatment of dengue fever and malaria. There are no co-pays at the time
of service; rather, individuals who enroll pay a monthly flat fee of approxi-
mately $15 to the Social Security Institute for coverage. In addition to the
subscriber, the subscriber’s wife is eligible for maternity services, including
prenatal care, childbirth and postnatal care. Dependent children under the
age of 12 are also fully covered for pediatric care and vaccinations; children
under age 5 also qualify for child wellness visits. Children over the age of 12
are excluded from coverage.85
While this insurance plan covers those in the formal sector, this repre-
sents only a small proportion of the adult population- just under half a mil-
lion adults or approximately 13.5 percent of the adult population (Instituto
Nacional de Informacio´n de Desarrollo INIDE and ). Options for healthcare
are limited among uninsured, informal sector workers. Uninsured individuals
have access to free public sector clinics and hospitals run by the Ministry of
Health Services (MINSA). However, these services are often under-resourced
85Available evidence suggests that this age cuto  is strictly enforced. EMPs are only
able to be reimbursed for services if they can document that the individual was enrolled
in the health insurance; that is, if the child is under 12. Any medical or labor expenses
incurred on ineligible children would not have been paid by the INSS program. Since these
facilities are for-profit, it is unlikely that they would have given away any medical care for
free.
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and the source of complaints of long waiting times, frequent supply stockouts,
and generally poor quality (Magnoni et al., 2005). Rather than seeking treat-
ment at MINSA facilities, self-medication from pharmacies for basic care is
common. For those who can a ord it, higher quality, more expensive private
facilities are available. On the other hand, many are unable to pay the high
out of pocket costs and forgo care altogether. Thus, the INSS health insur-
ance package may not only change the cost but also the quality of healthcare
for a ected individuals.86
3.2.2 The Pilot Program and Evaluation
In January 2007, the government of Nicaragua implemented a demonstration
project aimed at extending the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS)
health insurance program to the large population of informal sector work-
ers.87 Both this paper and Thornton et al. (2010) report results from this
evaluation. In 2007, a baseline survey was conducted among randomly se-
lected uninsured informal sector workers in the three largest open-air markets
86Higher quality services as a result of health insurance is not unique to the Nicaraguan
context. Research from the United States suggests that insurance often changes the qual-
ity of service received (Dubay and Kenney, 2001; Howell and Kenney, 2012; Selden and
Hudson, 2015). However, the e ect of insurance on quality is ambiguous. Insured individ-
uals may substitute away from more expensive high-quality care towards cheaper, covered
care. In the case of public healthcare programs, alternatively, insured individuals may
substitute away from free, low quality care in the public sector towards higher quality,
private providers.
87It is estimated that approximately 60 percent of the Nicaraguan workforce is in the
informal sector.
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in central Managua.88 The survey asked detailed questions about utilization,
spending, and health, for the respondent and each child in the household un-
der the age of 15. The primary objective of the program was to evaluate the
demand and impact of health insurance among informal-sector workers. The
secondary objective was to test whether allowing insured individuals to pay
deductibles at micro-finance institutions (as opposed to government o ces)
increased enrollment. Coverage and cost was designed to be as similar as
possible to those associated with the program for formal sector workers, and
enrollment into the program was voluntary.
At the end of the baseline survey, respondents were either given an in-
formational brochure about the insurance product or the brochure plus a
six-month subsidy for insurance worth approximately $100, nearly half of
the sample median household income.89 Respondents could enroll in the in-
surance plan at the INSS or at local micro-finance institutions, and there
was no deadline for purposes of this study for enrollment. Upon enrolling,
the insurance took e ect the first day of the following month. Government
ID numbers were collected to match respondents to health insurance enroll-
88Respondents were selected with the following two methodologies: in the first phase of
the survey, prior to the baseline survey a census of market booths was conducted to define
the sampling frame of possible respondents. In the second phase of the survey, interviewers
went door to door and sampled each market booth with eligible respondents. Participants
deemed eligible through the census were selected randomly (stratified by gender marital
status and micro-finance client status) and administered the baseline survey. Individuals
who were between ages 18 and 54, had a government ID, were an owner of the market
booth, and lacked health insurance coverage were eligible. Overall completion rates were
51 and 53 percent for the two phases.
89The original study design also assigned respondents into 2-month subsidy group; these
individuals were not in the follow-up survey due to low take-up and budget constraints.
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ment data that was to be provided by the INSS.90 The overall take-up rate
of insurance for respondents with insurance-eligible children was 35 percent
among those who were o ered the six-month subsidy and 2.22 percent among
those who were not.91
One year later, in 2008, a follow-up study was conducted among the
same individuals. Overall, 93 percent of the respondents were re-interviewed
(N=2608). There was no di erential sample attrition between those who
were o ered the subsidy and those who were not (Thornton et al., 2010).
The authors find that adults with insurance substitute from services at pri-
vate and Ministry of Health facilities to covered health facilities (EMP), with
no statistically significant increases (or decreases) in overall health utilization
of services (point estimate 0.918, standard error 0.749) or health. As a conse-
quence, total out-of-pocket expenditures fell by 55 percent when individuals
were insured (not statistically significant), with the largest expenditure re-
ductions for private clinics, laboratories, and pharmacies.
90The baseline survey also included respondents in four other smaller markets but be-
cause these respondents were not followed over time, they are not included in the analysis.
91Although this figure may seem low considering the high-value of this product, com-
pleting the enrollment process took approximately one full day for respondents, and many
of those who did not enroll reported confusion over the enrollment procedures and the
benefits (Hatt et al., 2009). Despite these barriers, this take-up rate is in line with results
from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, which found that low-income individu-
als who won a lottery for Medicaid for in the United States increased the probability of
becoming insured by 25 percentage points (Finkelstein et al., 2012). Similarly, several
studies have estimated the marginal take-up rate among U.S. children newly eligible for
Medicaid and SCHIP to range from approximately 10 to 30 percent, with average take-up
rates ranging by state from 57 percent to 95 percent (Sommers et al., 2012). Therefore,
although this population is generally less experienced with insurance products than those
in the U.S., this take-up rate may not be context-specific.
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3.2.3 Summary Statistics
This paper complements Thornton et al. (2010) by studying how family struc-
ture a ects health care utilization decisions.92 Of the 2608 adults/households
who were in the initial evaluation (with complete baseline and follow-up sur-
veys), 63 percent had at least one child under the age of 15. Thus our sample
consists of 2,996 children in 1614 households in both waves of the survey.93
Table 3.1 presents baseline statistics of households (Panel A), parents
(Panel B) and children under the age of 15 (Panel C). Summary statistics
of children in the three main age categories are shown disaggregated in Ap-
pendix A. Parent respondents are 35 years old on average, and have relatively
high levels of education (9.3 years), with a median annual income of 3,752
Cordobas (US$207). Among all children in the sample ages 15 and under
at baseline, the average age is 8. For most health variables, parents and
children have similar averages. Almost all of both parents and children saw
a health provider in the past year (76, and 75 percent). The likelihood of
92There are at least three reasons why the e ect of health insurance might di er between
parents and children. First, parents and children have di erent health levels; children are
sick more often than parents. Second, investment into children’s health is thought to
have higher returns than parental health investments. Third, parents typically control the
resources and children cannot typically a ord or seek healthcare without consent of the
parents.
93In comparison with the full sample, respondents with age-eligible children have 0.8
more people in their household, and the same median household income (C$3752), al-
though very di erent health patterns. Parents report on average C$1360 less for individual
health costs than non-parents, and C$500 more in total health costs for their household,
although household per-capita health costs are approximately the same. Parents are 0.7
percentage points less likely to be sick than non-parents. Similarly, parents report 1.26
fewer individual visits to all providers, but nearly double the number of total household
visits (15 visits and 9 visits, respectively); households with children report 0.77 more health
visits per person.
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being sick in the past year is similar as well; 77 percent of adults and 76
percent of children were reported ever being sick in the past year. Adults
were slightly more likely to have forgone treatment due to lack of money
than children (25 percent compared to 18 percent). The average number of
visits to all providers for adults was 4.28, compared to 3.82 visits for chil-
dren. Total average health costs for both parents and children are heavily
right-skewed. For children, total costs were nearly C$569, with a median
value of C$204; for adults, average costs were C$828, with a median value of
C$161. These figures demonstrate that some families experience extremely
large health costs.
Among children, these averages mask substantial heterogeneity by age.
Younger children, specifically those under 5, are sick approximately 2.8 times
per year and report 5.2 total visits to all providers, with an average health
care expenditure of C$869 (median:C$322). These averages are substantially
higher than the corresponding average at baseline of older children. Children
age 6-11 are sick 1.9 times per year and report 3.5 total visits to all providers
over the past year, with an average expenditure of C$449 (median: C$107).
The total number of visits and expenditures are similar among children 12-
15. We now turn to estimating the e ects of health insurance by eligibility
status.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
To study intra-household e ects of insurance coverage, we take advantage of
both the insurance randomization and the eligibility age-cuto . Our main
empirical strategy to measure intra- household e ects of insurance compares
children eligible for insurance coverage due to their age in insured and unin-
sured households. We categorize children into two main groups- those below
age 11 (Eligible), and those age 12-15 (Ineligible for dependent insurance
coverage). We correct for potential selection bias with respect to insurance
enrollment decisions by using the randomly o ered six-month subsidy to in-
strument for insurance enrollment.
We estimate the following di erence-in-di erence specification for child i,
in family f :
Yif = –+ —1 ú \Insurancef + —2 \Insurance*Ineligibleif+
—3Ineligibleif +X Õ“+‘if
(3.12)
with the following first stage equations:
\Insurancef = –+ ”1Subsidyf + ”2Subsidy*Ineligibleif+
”3Ineligibleif +X Õ“ + µif
\Insurance*Ineligibleif = –+ ⁄1Subsidyf + ⁄2Subsidy*Ineligibleif+
⁄3Ineligibleif +X Õ“ + ÷if
In Equation 3.12, Yif represents utilization or expenditures at health
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providers within the past year and Insurance represents whether or not the
parent enrolled in insurance. We control for household size, age, gender,
parental years of education, whether the child was sick at baseline, income,
and whether the child had forgone treatment in the past year due to lack
of money to improve precision, and account for potential imbalance with
respect to income. We also include market fixed e ects to account for the
sampling design. However, results are not sensitive to the choice of covari-
ates.94 We use robust standard errors clustered at the family level to account
for correlations in outcomes of interest between family members. All binary
outcomes are estimated using a linear probability model.
The estimate of —1 represents the same direct e ect of insurance on in-
sured children under the age of 11 as estimated in equation (1), while —2
estimates the spillover e ect of insurance on children who were in insured
families but ineligible for insurance themselves due to an age restriction.
This specification also allows us to test whether the total e ect of insurance
among ineligible kids is equal to zero.
Important to our identification strategy is the random allocation of the
subsidy across parents. Table 3.1 provides evidence that randomization was
e ective with individuals in the subsidy and non-subsidy groups having bal-
anced baseline observable characteristics. For almost every baseline parent-
level variable as well as child-level variable, there is no statistically significant
94Specifically, there are only two results that change in significance from 5 percent to
10 percent. However, magnitudes change by less than one-hundredth regardless of the
specification. Results available upon request.
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di erence between those whose parent were o ered a subsidy, and those who
were not (Column 4). These results hold when we consider each of the age
groups for children (Appendix Table 3A.1.) The exception is household in-
come is statistically significantly higher in the treatment group compared to
the control group. This statistical di erence is due to several high outly-
ing values; the median values are identical, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the income distributions are the same. Trimming the top
1 percent of income values results in no statistically significant di erences
between groups.
A second requirement to our instrumental variables approach is that the
randomly allocated subsidy is correlated with health insurance enrollment.
We present first-stage results in Appendix Table 3A.2 demonstrating that
take-up was strongly predicted by the subsidy o er. Eligible children whose
parents were o ered the six-month subsidy were 31 percentage points more
likely to be enrolled. However, parents receiving the subsidy with at least one
ineligible child were significantly less likely to be enrolled by 4.6 percentage
points.95 Overall, children in larger households are less likely to be enrolled,
and there is a small negative e ect on the rate of enrollment among adults
in large households. Although a one percent increase in income increases the
likelihood of enrollment among all adults by 2.1 percentage points, there is
95When including baseline controls, household size and whether the child had forgone
treatment in the past year due to lack of income are also significant predictors of en-
rollment. Age and other indicators of child health are not significantly correlated with
enrollment.
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no significant linkage between income and enrollment in either the sample of
parents or the sample of children. However, in all groups reporting forgoing
treatment in the past year due to lack of money is strongly and positively
related to health insurance enrollment. The F-statistics from the first-stage
equations are 215 and 217, respectively.
Equation 3.12 identifies the both the direct and spillover e ects of parental
health insurance coverage on children. However, it is unclear whether these
spillovers are from parents to children, children to parents, between children,
or some combination. To identify the direction of spillovers, we test whether
the e ect of health insurance enrollment on children di ers by children with
di erent family structures. Specifically, we estimate:
Yif = –+ —1 \Insuranceif + —2 \Insurance*Siblingif+
—3Siblingif +X Õ“ + ‚if
(3.13)
We then measure how eligible and ineligible siblings are a ected by estimating
this regression separately for those with eligible and ineligible siblings. We
instrument Insurance (and the respective interactions) with the randomly
assigned subsidy as in Equations 2-4 above.
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3.4 Results: Direct and Spillover E ects of
insurance
We first present our main results from equation 3.12 by examining health
care utilization and expenditures among children both eligible and ineligi-
ble for health insurance (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). As would be expected, health
insurance increases the likelihood that an eligible child visited an EMP (cov-
ered provider) by 23 percentage points, and increases total visits to an EMP
by 0.56 visits. Among age-eligible children, health insurance increased to-
tal utilization of care at all providers by 1.26 additional visits (38 percent
increase).
Among age-ineligible children, we find large negative e ects of health in-
surance on utilization. Children age 12-15 with parents enrolled in the health
insurance experience fairly substantial decreases in both the likelihood of vis-
iting providers, and the number of times providers were visited. While not
always statistically significant, the interaction term between Insurance and
Ineligible is consistently large and negative. Moreover, the net e ect of hav-
ing a parent with insurance on ineligible children for many provider types is
large and negative. For example, there is a statistically significant reduction
in ever attending a private facility or an EMP (covered provider). Similarly,
there are reductions in the number of visits, with a total e ect of reducing
visits by almost 2 visits (1.8 visits). These reductions are driven primarily
through reductions in visits to private facilities, including EMPs, although
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all estimated coe cients on interaction terms are negative. In addition to
these overall reductions, health insurance also changed patterns of where
treatment was sought among ineligible siblings. In Appendix Table 3A.3,
we show that (conditional on being sick in the past year), ineligible children
are significantly less likely to seek treatment for their last illness at a private
doctor or hospital, and instead more likely to seek treatment at a pharmacy.
Turning to expenditures on health, Panel A of Table 3.3 presents results
for whether there were any expenditures for a child while Panel B presents
results for the amount of spending for a child. To account for the presence
of outliers, as well as households with zero expenditures, we consider log
expenditures + 1, to include in our sample children with zero costs.96 The
point estimates in Table 3.3 demonstrate that among eligible children, there
are no statistically significant e ects on expenditures resulting from parental
health insurance enrollment. While most of the estimates are imprecise, the
majority are small in magnitude. The exception is that ineligible children in
insured households are almost 30 percentage points less likely to have ever
spent money at private providers, and similarly spend significantly less money
at private providers overall. The expenditure results are consistent with the
reduction in visits to private providers due to parent insurance enrollment
that we found in Table 3.2 among ineligible children.
An issue of primary importance is whether health status improved or
decreased as a result of the observed changes in healthcare utilization. In
96Forty-two percent of children under 15 have 0 health expenditures in the past year.
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Table 3.4, we present the e ect of insurance on health status collected from
the survey. Among all ages, children with enrolled parents are no less likely
to report ever being sick, and are not significantly more likely to ever receive
a checkup. While coe cients are negative, there is no statistically significant
impact of health insurance on the likelihood of a parent reporting forgoing
treatment due to lack of money. We find that age-eligible children are sick
0.67 times more often, significant at the 5 percent level, and miss 3 more
days of school (insignificant; p=0.107). The di erential e ect of parental
health insurance among age-ineligible children shows that there are signifi-
cant spillovers by reported measures of health. There is a strong, negative
indirect e ect of health insurance among age-ineligible children for the out-
come variables “times sick” and “number of days of school missed.” However,
there is no evidence that the severity of illnesses increased as a result of insur-
ance. The most common last illness reported among all groups is “cold and
flu”, and there is no di erence in diagnoses between Treatment and Control
groups.
It is possible that health insurance actually made insured and eligible
children sick more often, such as iatrogenic illness from waiting rooms (Steel
et al., 1981). However, this interpretation does not fully explain improve-
ments in health among the uninsured. A more plausible explanation is that
health insurance instead changed parental reporting patterns of sickness.97
97The RAND Health Insurance experiment randomized families into di erent rates of
coinsurance with significant changes in healthcare utilization. All individuals were en-
rolled in health insurance. This experiment also found no significant di erences in health
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For example, it is possible that parents received better information regarding
the child’s true health status. Given the substantial increase in visits among
eligible children, parents also could have been given advice to keep children
who visited the doctor home from school. This explanation, however, does
not fully explain why ineligible children missed fewer days of school, or why
more accurate health information did not also decrease reported health of
older children. Alternatively, it could be that parents use an available heuris-
tic, such as visiting a provider, as a proxy for how often their child is sick.
Similarly, if uninsured children visit the doctor less, then this interpretation
would also explain the reduction in number of times sick. Available evidence
supports this interpretation. In Figure 3.1, we graph the coe cient of the
direct treatment e ect of health insurance on eligible children by age of child.
Graphically it is clear that the results on number of times sick closely mirror
the number of visits to all providers. Similarly, the raw correlation at baseline
among all children between number of visits and number of times sick is 0.71;
at follow-up it is 0.84. In Appendix Table 3A.4, we also show that health
insurance did not cause changes in the parent’s willingness to seek care (i.e.,
moral hazard). In other words, health insurance does not change the likeli-
hood of getting sick or ever seeking treatment along the extensive margin,
but rather changes how parents recall illness episodes, particularly because
it increases overall utilization substantially. These results are also informa-
outcomes among children with increased or decreased utilization patterns due to health
insurance (Valdez et al., 1985).
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tive as to a potential mechanism of how health insurance a ects ineligible
children. In particular, these results are inconsistent with the theory that
health insurance a ects ineligible members through improved health status
and fewer contagious diseases.
3.5 Discussion: Spillovers from siblings or par-
ents?
The previous results show that older, age-ineligible children decreased utiliza-
tion in response to parental health insurance. We now turn to disentangling
whether these negative spillovers are due to substitution towards (or from)
younger, insured siblings or due to parental health insurance enrollment.
The mechanism of the spillover has implications for policy. If the increase
in utilization among younger siblings cause decreases in older siblings health
utilization, then this suggests that parents have a certain budget allocated
to children’s healthcare. Thus, these within-family e ects would only be
observed among child health insurance programs. However, if the spillover
comes from the parents, then we would expect our results to be observed
whenever parents have insurance, regardless of whether children are insured.
We test for heterogeneous e ects of health insurance among the sample of el-
igible/ineligible children with or without eligible or ineligible siblings. These
tests support the hypothesis of spillovers from parents onto their children.
We first test whether the e ect of health insurance systematically di ers
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by the eligibility status of siblings. We estimate model (4) on the sample of
age-eligible children (N=2172), where we interact the indicator of a parent
having insurance with whether the child has an older, ineligible sibling (age
12-15) in the sample. In total 29 percent of children age 11 and under in the
sample have at least one sibling age 12-15.
Results presented in Table 3.5 show that having an older, ineligible sibling
does not a ect the likelihood of ever visiting a provider, but does a ect the
number of times an eligible child attends a provider. Panel A shows that the
likelihood of ever visiting any provider is not significantly related to having
health insurance; this e ect does not di er by whether the child had an
older sibling. The likelihood of visiting an EMP is of the same magnitude
as presented in Table 3.2; being enrolled in health insurance increases the
likelihood of ever visiting a covered provider by 22 percentage points. At
all providers, the likelihood of ever attending a provider does not di er by
whether or not the insured child has an older sibling.
Panel B contains estimates for the number of visits at each provider.
Column 1 of Panel B shows estimates from the regression on the outcome
variable total visits to all providers. Insured children without an older sib-
ling increase their utilization at all providers by 1.905 visits, significant at
the 1 percent level. However, insured children with an older sibling have
a significantly lower average number of visits: the coe cient on the inter-
action term of Enrolled Parent*Sibling is significant at the 10 percent level
at -3.201 visits. For younger children, it appears that having an older child
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in the household mutes the e ect of insurance on total utilization, but not
the e ect of attending a covered provider. One complication with that in-
terpretation, however, is that all insured children also have insured parents.
There is no di erential e ect of having an eligible sibling in the household
(not shown).
We next estimate a model among children age 11 and over with or without
an eligible sibling. Thus, we e ectively shut down the channel of sibling
spillovers among those who had decreased utilization. Results are in Table
3.6. Although our sample size decreases to 824, coe cient estimates are
suggestive of spillovers from parents. The likelihood of visiting any provider
does not di er by whether or not the child had eligible siblings, and point
estimates are typically positive- suggesting that eligible siblings, if anything,
mute the negative e ect on enrollment. Similarly, although the coe cient
on Enrolled Parent is still negative for the outcomes of number of visits to a
private provider and total number of times sick, these averages do not di er
by whether or not there is a younger sibling in the household.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the e ect of health insurance on both covered and
uncovered children within a household. Children who were covered by their
parent’s insurance have substantially more visits at covered providers, and in-
crease their total number of visits at all providers combined. We find neither
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health improvements nor changes in expenditures among covered children al-
though the time in which they were covered was short. In contrast, children in
the same families who were not eligible for coverage due to an age restriction
substantially decreased their utilization and spending at private providers
and laboratories. These older children are also reported to be healthier than
their counterparts in the Control group, suggesting that unmet need did not
increase despite the decrease in utilization. We then decompose the spillovers
to disentangle whether the e ects on older children are primarily due to their
younger siblings, or alternatively their insured parents. Our results suggest
that the parental channel is stronger than the sibling channel.
This paper provides new insight into how households allocate resources
amongst their members. It also demonstrates that the observed correlations
of health behaviors between members of the same household do not neces-
sarily imply that health demands, or health outcomes, also typically move
together. In contrast, our results are consistent with a model in which par-
ents respond to health insurance by completely adjusting demands of all
members- and specifically by decreasing utilization among those for whom
healthcare is relatively more expensive.
The findings of our research have interesting implications for provid-
ing families with insurance rather than individual insurance for children or
adults, in particular for public health programs that aim to improve chil-
dren’s health. Our results suggest that the primary benefit to children of
parental health insurance is improved access to care. Parents may be taking
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advantage of those visits to have their children seen by doctors for either pre-
ventative or curative care. This result was possible because clinics covered
by the INSS insurance were full service clinics that included both pediatric
and adult services. In the case where covered services are provided by clinics
that can treat both adults and children, there can be positive externalities
to treating adults on children’s health. Additionally, marketing of pediatric
services during adult visits may have greater impact as a result. Some inverse
spillover may also be occurring whereby parents who take small children to
the doctor may use the visit to make appointments for their own future visits.
This is a topic for further study but would imply significant benefits to mar-
keting adult preventative and curative care through children’s visits when
families are uninsured. By utilizing the fact that family members demands
are correlated, including parents in children’s insurance coverage could be an
important step towards reducing unmet need.
However, programs should be carefully designed to avoid unintended con-
sequences, such as negative spillovers on uninsured members of the family.
The results of this paper highlight that families allocate resources- including
health demands- according to a specified budget and/or time constraint. If
utilization increases dramatically among insured members, then it is possible
that healthcare demands among uninsured members would fall as a result of
health insurance enrollment. While our study was not powered to detect rare
or serious ailments among ineligible children, one may assume that reducing
healthcare utilization in a resource-poor setting could potentially have true
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negative consequences on health.
As health insurance programs, including that of the United States, move
towards covering children on health insurance programs, it is important to
understand the net benefits and the costs to families from parental health
insurance. When considering the e ect, and cost-e ectiveness of health in-
surance as a social policy, it may be empirically important to account for
the positive as well as the negative e ects that influence healthcare demands
even uninsured members of the household.
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Figure 3.1: Treatment E ect by Age
Notes: Above point estimates are estimated coe cients are from 2SLS-IV estimates
where ”Parent Enrolled in Health Insurance” is instrumented with random assignment
status. Each treatment e ect by age is estimated using a separate regression sample for
each age of child. The dependent variable is either the Number of Times Sick, or the
Number of Visits. control for household size, household size squared, logged parental
income (+1), parent’s years of education, age of child, age of child squared, gender,
whether the child was sick in the past year, the number of times sick, total number of
health visits, and survey round and market fixed e ects. Individuals without valid
income data were imputed to be the median and regressions were run with a dummy
variable indicating the missing value.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Characteristics of Households and Children
All No Subsidy 6-Month Subsidy Di erence P-value Di erence
(Control) (Treatment) (C-T)
Panel A: Household Characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size of household 4.81 4.76 4.85 ≠0.09 0.258
Number of children 11 and under 1.34 1.35 1.34 0.01 0.72
Household income 5399 5058 5712 ≠653.41 0.052
Household income, top 1% trimmed 4791 4699 5003 -304 0.73
Panel B: Parent Characteristics
Years of education 9.30 9.25 9.36 ≠0.11 0.624
Ever sick 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.02 0.193
Number of times sick 2.44 2.58 2.31 0.26 0.095
Forgone treatment 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.446
Ever visit health provider 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.02 0.26
Total number of visits, all providers 4.28 4.46 4.11 0.35 0.26
Total health expenditures 827.76 903.58 758.59 144.99 0.225
Households/Parents (N) 1614 770 844 – –
Panel C: Child Characteristics
Age 8.00 7.94 8.06 ≠0.12 0.459
Female 0.48 0.48 0.49 ≠0.01 0.473
Ever sick 0.76 0.76 0.77 ≠0.01 0.843
Number of times sick 2.16 2.19 2.13 0.06 0.602
Forgone treatment 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.153
Ever visit health provider 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.00 0.983
EMP visits 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.704
Public health facility visits 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.03 0.679
Private health facility visits 1.04 1.12 0.96 0.16 0.302
Pharmacy visits 1.80 1.80 1.80 0.00 0.916
Total number of visits, all providers 3.82 3.90 3.74 0.16 0.435
Total health expenditures 569.21 533.23 601.76 ≠68.53 0.302
Children (N) 2996 1423 1573 – –
Notes: Above are sample averages for the full sample (Column 1), the Control group of respondents/children not awarded a 6 month
subsidy for insurance (Column 2), and the Treatment group of respondents/children who were awarded a 6 month subsidy (Column 3).
Panels A and B uses the sample of households with at least one child age 15 and under at baseline. All variables except for income are
reported averages for the respondent parent. Income is defined as reported monthly household income. Valid income data are not avail-
able for 174 families. Panel C uses as the child-level observations, for all children age 15 and under. Health providers consist of EMPs,
public clinics, pharmacies, private hospitals, private doctors, public hospitals, and laboratory visits. All health and visit variabes are
reported to be during the past year. All income and expenditure data are in 2008 Cordobas. Children who were not sick in the past year
are included as zeros for number of times sick and all visit/spending variables. Forgone treatment in past year due to lack of money was
calculated to be zero for children who were not sick in the past year. Column (5) represents the p-value from a t-test of means between
treatment groups after accounting for the sampling strategy (market and round fixed e ects). ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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Table 3A.2: Predictors of Health Insurance Enrollment
All
Children
All Adults Parents
Panel A: Ever Visit/Sick (1) (2) (3)
6 Month Subsidy 0.309úúú 0.372úúú 0.359úúú
(0.021) (0.016) (0.023)
Ineligible Child 0.002 ≠0.012 ≠0.014
(0.029) (0.011) (0.015)
6 Month Subsidy*Ineligible Child ≠0.046ú ≠0.089úúú ≠0.076úú
(0.028) (0.029) (0.034)
Household Size ≠0.018úú 0.007 ≠0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Household Size Squared 0.000 ≠0.001úú 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age ≠0.001 ≠0.001 ≠0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Age-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female ≠0.006 0.024 0.007
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Parent’s Years of Education 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Parent’s Income) 0.009 0.021úúú 0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Ever Sick in Past Year 0.022 0.010 ≠0.002
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
Forgone Treatment 0.072úúú 0.053úúú 0.081úúú
(0.025) (0.018) (0.023)
Constant ≠0.046 ≠0.178 ≠0.049
(0.085) (0.115) (0.161)
R-squared 0.190 0.2263 0.2163
Observations 2996 2608 1614
Round and Market Fixed E ects? Y Y Y
Notes: Sample in column 1 is all children age 15 and under at baseline; sample in column
2 is all adults; sample in column 3 is all parents with at least one child aged 15 years and
under . Above are coe cients from OLS regressions of whether or not the child’s par-
ent enrolled in health insurance on baseline variables, conditional on random assignment
status. All regressions include market and round fixed e ects. Missing income values
are imputed to the mean, and an indicator variable is included in the regression. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level. ú ú úp < 0.01, ú ú p < 0.05, úp < 0.1
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